


JPRS-UPA-89-046

27 JULY 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-046

CONTENTS

27 JULY 1989

PARTY, STATE AFFAIRS

Performance of Outgoing Government Assessed [N. Yakovchuk; <i>EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA</i> No 21, May 89]	1
Repeat Elections Held in UkSSR [PRAVDA UKRAINY 16 May 89]	5
Solovyev Answers Readers' Questions on Political, Economic Restructuring [Yu. F. Solovyev; <i>LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA</i> 12 Mar 89]	6
Report of Kazakh CP CC First Secretary Kolbin to 17 May Party Aktiv [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 18 May 89]	13
Turkmen CP CC Buro Calls for End to 'Illegal' Use of Student Labor [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 5 Apr 89]	21
UzSSR: Samarkand Oblast Territory Transferred to Bukhara Oblast [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 17 May 89]	22
New Rayons Established Within Uzbek Oblasts [PRAVDA VOSTOKA 18 May 89]	22

MEDIA, PROPAGANDA

Journalists' Cooperative Plans Services to 'Compete' with TASS [V. Fedinin; <i>ZHURNALIST</i> May 89]	24
Latvian, Lithuanian Journalists on Separation from USSR Journalists' Union [V. Avotins; <i>ZHURNALIST</i> No 4, Apr 89]	25
Uzbek Glavlit Official on Relaxed Press Censorship [S. Braginskiy; <i>KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA</i> 5 May 89]	27
Uzbek Youth Newspaper Provides Content Analysis of Own Reporting [A. Semerkin; <i>KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA</i> 5 May 89]	29
Specialist Views Status of Soviet "Videoculture," Pornography [S. Pluzhnikov; <i>KOMSOMOLETS</i> 6 May 89]	31

CULTURE

Aytmatov Interviewed on Effects of Perestroika [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA 4 Apr 89]	33
Stalin's Bodyguard Provides New Material for Film [M. Ilyina; <i>LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA</i> 19 May 89]	37
Kazakh Literature 'Stagnant', Devoid of Contemporary Themes [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 30 Mar 89]	40
Kazakh Filmmakers Congress, Notable Films Reviewed [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 14 Apr 89]	42

SOCIAL ISSUES

Letters to Editor on May Day Hooliganism in Ashkhabad [T. Dzhalalov; <i>TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA</i> 11 May 89]	45
Transportation Officials Reprimanded For Bus Driver Strike [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA 19 May 89]	46
Hostage-Taking Plagues Labor Camps [V. Belykh; <i>TRUD</i> 25 May 89]	48
Restraint Urged in Judging Methods of Labor Colony Staffers [V. Savelyev; <i>SELSKAYA ZHIZN</i> 15 Jun 89]	50
Extradition Of "War Criminal" From Canada Requested [A. Yanushevskiy; <i>PRAVDA UKRAINY</i> 18 Apr 89]	52
Republic Preliminary Census Data Published	54
Armenian SSR [KOMMUNIST 13 May 89]	54
Azerbaijan SSR [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY 17 May 89]	56
Belorussian SSR [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 11 May 89]	59
Georgian SSR [ZARYA VOSTOKA 29 Apr 89]	62
Kazakh SSR [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 20 May 89]	63
Latvian SSR [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 11 May 89]	66
Lithuanian SSR [SOVETSKAYA LITVA 30 Apr 89]	68

Moldavian SSR /SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 30 Apr 89/	73
Tajik SSR /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 7 May 89/	74
Ukrainian SSR /PRAVDA UKRAINY 7 May 89/	77
Uzbek SSR /PRAVDA VOSTOKA 13 May 89/	81

REGIONAL ISSUES

Journalists Explain Delays in Reporting 9 April Tbilisi Events /MOLODEZH GRUZII 4 May 89/	83
Georgian Journalists Question Central Coverage of 9 April Events /MOLODEZH GRUZII 13 May 89/	84
Former Officer Loses Faith in Army After 9 April Tbilisi Events [B. Vasilyev; MOLODEZH GRUZII 9 May 89/	84
Civil, Military Legal Experts Investigate 9 April Tbilisi Events [N. Leonidze; MOLODEZH GRUZII 13 May 89/	85
Officer Defends Army's Actions in 9 April Tbilisi Events [A. Abramkin; LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 19, May 89/	87
Georgian Journalist Attacks Officer's Defense [R. Miminoshvili; MOLODEZH GRUZII 23 May 89/	94
Proposals for Changing ArSSR Administrative, Territorial Structure [L. Valesyan; KOMMUNIST 20 May 89/	96
ArSSR: Officials Meet to Coordinate Investigation of Recent Mass Poisonings [KOMMUNIST 9 May 89/	99
Armenian Council of Ministers Approves Leninakan Reconstruction Plan /KOMMUNIST 7 May 89/ ..	100
ArSSR: Leninakan Workers Concerned Over Factory Closure Rumors [Yu. Arutyunyan; KOMSOMOLETS 16 May 89/	101
ArSSR Gosstab Official on Quake Reconstruction Commission Concerns [KOMMUNIST 30 May 89/	103
Starovoytova on Reducing Tensions in Interethnic Relations [G. Rubinyan; KOMSOMOLETS 13 May 89/	103
Uzbek Academy of Sciences Roundtable on Nationality Questions [S. Novoprudskiy; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA 11 May 89/	107
Status of Uighur Minority in Uzbekistan Outlined [Kh. Khudayberdiyev; PRAVDA VOSTOKA 6 May 89/	111
Turkmen Academy of Sciences on Developing Bilingualism Program [B. Charyyarov; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 4 May 89/	114

Performance of Outgoing Government Assessed
18001150 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 21, May 89 pp 2-3

[Article by N. Yakovchuk: "The Government Relinquishes Its Powers"]

[Text] Among the new political realities born by perestroika the following has also appeared: In a few days the powers of the USSR Council of Ministers will expire and all members of the government will resign. The USSR Supreme Soviet newly elected by the Congress of People's Deputies will form the country's new government.

Not a simple job has fallen to the lot of the present members of the government. The drastic economic and political changes of the last few years have demanded a tireless search for methods of realizing them in practical life. During the past 4 years in accordance with the general policy outlined by the party at the 27th congress and the 19th party conference the foundation for new production and social relations has been laid down, revolutionary transformations in the political system of society have begun, and serious steps in the establishment of a legal state have been taken.

However, the renewal of the socialist economy remains the truly "hot shop" of perestroika. The implementation of the basic directions in economic policy developed by the party has required a drastic breakdown of obsolete stereotypes and of the entire practice of management.

Thus, throughout several decades the attempt to intensify public production came to a halt in the face of the need to limit the sovereignty of departments and to give real rights to the low-level link—enterprises. An unambiguous answer has now been given to this fundamental question.

The attempt to transform property depersonalized and torn apart by departments into the real property of specific labor collectives and to make their economic interests one of the moving forces of perestroika has led to the decision to open a wide road to various forms of full cost accounting and self-financing, contracts, cooperatives, leasing, family production, and individual labor activities, which demonstrate their high efficiency.

The party has urged the revival and implementation in a full measure of the main principle of social justice, that is, "each according to his labor," elimination, on the one hand, of the psychology of dependence and wage leveling, when one can live comfortably while doing a bad job, and, on the other, removal of unjustified restrictions in the amounts of earnings and a sharp increase in people's interest in the highest final results.

These principles proclaimed by the party have received the people's full support.

An extremely difficult task—to create a reliable mechanism for the realization of these principles—is placed on the shoulders of the government. The economic mechanism, which will serve as the moving force of our society's renewal, will help to create living conditions for the Soviet people, which are adequate to the present time.

The USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association). The Law on Cooperatives. The Statute on Leasing Relations. It is sufficient to name these three documents in order to evaluate the entire complexity of innovative work carried out by the government, which has assumed responsibility for the first steps of perestroika.

The special complexity of the moment was determined by the fact that the country, gearing its economic management primarily toward economic methods, did not want to lower production rates and at times the government—we admit this—had to act like an automobile driver, who had both to start a motor rapidly and to move forward, would act.

Under these conditions how did the present members of the Council of Ministers manage to accomplish the set tasks? The economic difficulties in the country are so big that at the first moment a negative answer suggests itself.

The disbalance on the consumer market, the aggravation in the situation with the supply of foodstuffs for the population, the growing budget deficit, the country's extremely tense financial situation, and the increase in the foreign debt—these are the features characterizing the present economy.

Against this background criticism directly or indirectly addressed at the government is often heard in the press, from rostrums of meetings and assemblies, and during television debates. True, at times reproaches mutually exclude each other.

Some see the reason for the existing situation in the excessively hasty decisions and in their contradictory nature and lack of interfacing. At times these reproaches are not groundless. Let us recall the recently adopted and then abolished or amended decisions of the Council of Minister ordering the establishment of state production associations as the medium-level managerial link; or the notorious scale of taxation on cooperative workers; or the decision on curtailing currency trade inside the country.

On the other hand, critics accuse the government of an unjustified sluggishness in the solution of problems arising in the course of perestroika and inability to promptly rectify mistakes.

Probably, it is time to critically evaluate some elements of the presently existing economic mechanism and to see whether it justifies itself fully.

It is no big secret that a number of elements (in particular, the first cost-accounting model) as yet do not create incentives for a more efficient operation of enterprises, do not impel people "to run after work" and not "from work," and do not ensure a real and close dependence of the income of labor collectives on the final result.

For example, the tendency, when enterprises adopt plans amounting to billions of rubles less than their capabilities, manifests itself noticeably. Last year's experience convinces us that these understated plans are overfulfilled easily and significantly. The higher deductions from the additional profit enter the incentive funds of enterprises. There is no doubt that the members of the government realize how dangerous such a tendency is. After all, in essence, the less the enterprise, which understates the plan, measures off the planned production volume for itself, the more deductions into funds it will receive. Obviously, this situation must be rectified as quickly as possible.

Or let us take the situation in the construction complex. The financial status of construction organizations is improving rapidly. This is good. At the same time, hardly two-thirds of the plan for commissioning projects was fulfilled last year. Above-normative incomplete construction exceeded 13 billion rubles, growing by 5 billion rubles in 1988 alone.

These results clearly show that the economic mechanism existing in the construction complex, which is oriented toward the volume of performed construction and installation work, not toward the final construction product, that is, commissioning of projects, needs to be improved urgently. What kind of a mechanism is this if it reduces commissioned projects, generates "unfinished projects," and, at the same time, improves the financial situation of builders?

Probably, such alarming manifestations in the national economy really demanded a "quicker reaction" from the government.

At the same time, the attempt to place the entire responsibility for the difficult economic situation on "incorrect decisions by the authorities" and to connect it with the implemented economic reform is noticeable in recent writings on current economic issues. It seems that this is illegitimate.

We must be aware of the fact that the disorder in the financial system, the neglected monetary circulation, and the disbalance between credit resources and their real commodity coverage have been accumulating for a long time. We have inherited them from previous decades, but they have been exposed and have clearly manifested themselves precisely now, when we have tried to activate economic levers. Thus, as enterprises

have accumulated the funds earned by them, the problem of "bartering" them has become aggravated. As a result, about 50 billion rubles have now accumulated in accounts of enterprises.

The aggravation of chronic economic diseases now evokes in some colleagues the instinctive desire to retreat and to return to previous administrative procedures. However, we need a firm, systematic implementation of the principles of democratizing economic life and emancipating people's activity, not relapses of old command methods.

The development of an economic mechanism adequate to present tasks is a lengthy process. Most likely, both mistakes and solutions, which in some things do not prove worthwhile and will be corrected, are inevitable in it. This is natural and the situation should not be dramatized.

Especially as in the course of the economic reform we will inevitably encounter ever newer unexpected problems. Here is an example.

It seems that the government foresaw the present difficulties in the monetary circulation system. In an attempt to limit the growth of effective demand in the country it tried to solve this problem not so much by limiting the population's income as by reducing inefficient state expenditures. For example, a persistent and not unsuccessful attempt to narrow the front of construction work with a view to finally entering normative construction periods and to put an end to "late completions of projects" was made at the beginning of the five-year plan. By painfully overcoming the steadfast resistance of ministries, in 1987 it was possible to attain the suspension of 21,000 construction projects, which had already been unfolded. This immediately had a positive effect on the results of management.

Then, however, the Law on the Enterprise entered into force, labor collectives received the right to begin construction at their discretion, and preferential material and technical provision for these projects was guaranteed. The number of new construction projects immediately jumped up by more than 40 percent in 1988 alone! It is obvious that this sharply increased the disbalance in the national economy and the shortage of construction equipment and materials rose...

How should the government act here? To further aggravate this disbalance? Or to halt it and bring the process into the channel of existing opportunities, "attacking" the rights of enterprises? And, perhaps, to find economic levers (amounts of the loan fund, interest rates for credit, taxes, and so forth), which will help to regulate this heretofore completely spontaneous process?

It must be admitted that, in fact, a certain indecisiveness and half-heartedness were inherent in some recent decisions. For example, it is well known that the more the amounts of enterprise income were affected by various

kinds of indirect incentives—for fulfilling deliveries based on contracts on schedule—as well as by additional payments for special stylishness, “youthfulness,” and “novelty” of articles, that is, by the same “fillers,” which do not contain any additional material, the further they were removed from the real result. However, having abolished them, we retained the index “N”—the main source, which enables light industry enterprises to inflate their income with impunity, at the same time, not giving anything especially new and durable, and enables trade to successfully “increase” the commodity turnover with the same number of goods (EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA wrote about the mechanics of these processes more than once).

Perhaps this inconsistency is manifested with special clarity with respect to the cooperative movement. At times cooperative workers evoke public rejection, which is usually due to two reasons. The first: “They charge exorbitant prices.” The second: “They earn too much.”

Like any new business the cooperative movement also brought a certain share of the “foam” to the surface. However, let us recall: Why did we proceed to develop the new cooperative movement? Because we became convinced: In the national economy there are many zones, especially in the service sphere, where, so to say, a wide-cut unit does not pass and unsuitable land and ravines have to be cultivated manually.

Do cooperatives and individuals increase the quantity of goods and services necessary for enterprises and individual citizens? Yes, without a question. And this is good. The very process, which we have sought, has begun. However, as soon as some negative deviations are revealed, in order to stop them, common decisions are adopted and, at the same time, the main task, which we accomplish by means of new forms in the national economy, is forgotten completely.

“They charge exorbitant prices.” This is a serious matter. It seems, however, that prohibitive measures will not help here. It is necessary to include tax levers and to withdraw undeservedly obtained superprofits. The same tax system should encourage the work on state rates much more strongly than now.

With regard to superprofits, which, incidentally, are often obtained through labor intensification and an efficient organization of work, here too it should not be forgotten that, ultimately, precisely this—to create conditions for state enterprises and cooperatives for a possibly rapid transfer of capital investments and resources to spheres contributing to advanced structural shifts and giving a high return—is profitable for the country. Ultimately, such a policy will increase the general efficiency of the economy and will facilitate the provision of resources for the outlined programs. After all, superprofits are formed precisely where the unmet demand for a given product is especially big.

Finally, we must clearly decide on the chief thing for ourselves: On what task do we want to concentrate our efforts: To improve the economy, to fill stores with goods that people need, and to do everything that is possible to enhance the well-being of the masses, utilizing the broadest spectrum of forms of economic management, techniques, and methods for this? Or to demagogically follow the old rules and “not forgo the principles” in their simplified concept, to which we have become accustomed during past decades? However, if there is a desire, it is possible to successfully declare not only new cooperatives, leasing relations, shares, bonds, commercial credit, and taxes, but also the payment of interest on deposits in labor savings banks, or even full cost-accounting and self-financing principles themselves, to be nonsocialist phenomena.

Today, when democratization and glasnost have made the activity of the government more open, when the press and television have seemingly enabled everyone to personally attend meetings of the Council of Ministers, it has become especially clear how far from simple it is to find a wise and balanced solution taking into consideration all, at times opposite, points of view. A nationwide discussion of draft laws on the most important problems affecting the interests of the country and each of its citizens has become a rule quite recently. The Law on the State Enterprise (Association) was discussed on the pages of EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA for half a year. After that draft laws on inventive activity and on the quality of output were submitted for a nationwide discussion. Both from readers' letters and from the sharp discussions—which were held in an atmosphere of full democratism—of these documents at meetings of the Council of Ministers with the participation of the public it is clearly evident how difficult it is to combine contradictory interests, wishes, and possibilities. How much state wisdom has to be manifested in this case!

Unfortunately, very often the members of the government have to make such decisions without the support of a profound scientific study.

Many representatives of economic science appear on television, in the press, and during scientific debates mostly as the opposing side—opposing literally everything that is offered or accepted by directive bodies. However, when it is a matter of making serious, substantial, and constructive proposals, representatives of economic science remain in the background, or offer concepts, which can hardly be called realistic.

Structures-wishes based on attempts to find quite strange compromises are offered more often now; for example, the following: Let the market become the regulator of economic relations, but without market prices. Payment should be made strictly according to the result, but a significant differentiation of earnings must be avoided. It is necessary to develop competition, but, at the same

time, no one should suffer. Wholesale trade should be introduced everywhere and more rapidly, but an answer as to what should be done with monopolism and shortage is not offered.

Unfortunately, life has shown that in many respects departments still work according to the old method. There is a large number of examples of this.

Statistical reporting showed us that, having reduced the size of the managerial personnel in the higher and medium-level link by approximately 600,000 people, we increased the number of managers at enterprises by 700,000.

However, let us look truth in the eyes: Enterprises, which have begun to count their money, even with a noticeable attempt to reinforce their economic and legal services and to add to the number of suppliers, will hardly spend funds so thoughtlessly on an increase in the multistory staircase of managers. With the persistent, purposeful reduction of unnecessary managerial links, where is this growth from?

The point is that neither did apparatuses of Union and republic ministries give up the previous style of work. This fabulously higher number of "managers at enterprises" to a considerable extent represents none other than the same number of workers at yesterday's management bodies, which today have been transformed into all kinds of associations, trade organizations, trusts, administrations, and "voluntary associations," whose apparatus, in addition, has also been endowed with the rights of enterprises. We constantly try to outsmart ourselves and we keep and transform fruitless "lifetime employment offices."

Evaluating the work of the government, at the concluding meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov said that the style and methods of work of ministries and departments, as well of councils of ministers of the Union republics, did not meet the new requirements.

But, in fact, at whom should we take offense for the "unrealized" money and empty store shelves if all of us try to get more, giving instead less, if we wait for results not from ourselves, but from someone else?

For example, let us take the problem of output of consumer goods. Problems of meeting the population's effective demand for goods and services have by no means been solved. Thus, last year the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building alone failed to deliver output worth almost 2 billion rubles to the market. In many regions large, well-equipped machine building enterprises produce goods worth only 2-10-20 kopecks per ruble of wages of their own workers. What kind of a market glut can be discussed here?

The following figures were cited at one of the latest meetings of the USSR Council of Ministers: A total of 12 out of 15 Union republics requested that additional commodity resources be allocated to them for this year. Let us consider this figure. Who can and should increase these resources and from what sources? For example, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers complains that the USSR Ministry of Trade has allocated commodity resources worth 3 billion rubles less than needed to the republic. It turned out, however, that not all of these goods would be bought at enterprises in the Ukraine. One may ask: Whom should republic managers blame if not themselves?

There were complaints from the Estonian SSR that in 1989 deliveries of leather footwear and wool fabrics to the republic from Union stocks were reduced. Meanwhile, it turned out that leather and footwear enterprises bought by the country and built by foreign firms on a turn-key basis on Estonia's territory were not being used. Did they prove to be inoperative? Hardly, because precisely the same enterprises operate successfully in three shifts in the RSFSR.

At the latest government meeting N. I. Ryzhkov designated the range of immediate tasks, which would confront the future members of the government. Fundamental problems of the social program await their solution. They include filling the market of goods and services, the problem of inadequate provision, and the pension reform. Work on the financial improvement of the economy and normalization of monetary circulation is unfolding. The development of long-term measures in this area is ahead.

To determine the directions in the country's long-term development is the immediate goal.

The new members of the government, which in a few days will be declared the newly elected supreme body of people's power, will have to solve very complex problems from the first days. The economic situation existing in the country places, as never before, high demands on the members of the Council of Ministers—both on their competence in a specific area and on their general economic erudition and ability to manage the economy at the level of present requirements.

We hope that the experience of the present members of the government, who have worked at a time of a sharp turning point in our homeland's fate, and the miscalculations, which at times have been made in the most difficult work on economic restructuring, will help the new members of the government to avoid them subsequently. We wish the future Council of Ministers to wisely and consistently manage our economy along the path of radical transformations.

Repeat Elections Held in UkSSR

18001224 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 May 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Names of the New Deputies"]

[Text] Repeat elections for national soviet of peoples deputies took place in many regions of the republic on Sunday, 14 May. Our correspondents are reporting preliminary results.

Kiev. Thirty three candidates for peoples deputy were placed on the Kievskiy National Territorial District No 33 ballot. V.K. Chernyak, doctor of economic sciences and department head of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, and V.A. Karpenko, editor of VECHERNIY KIYEV newspaper, received the greatest number of votes. They will also continue the campaign for the deputy's mandate. A runoff election will be held on 21 May.

V.A. Yavorivskiy, a writer, and L.P. Telyatnikov, deputy department chief of Kiev Oblispolkom UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] Fire Prevention Administration are continuing their campaigns for the deputy's mandate in Minskiy Territorial District. Dneprovskiy District voters will also have to make a choice between V.P. Grishchuk, a Kiev State University professor and senior lecturer, and V.I. Zayets, a Darnitsa Electric Locomotive Depot machinist.

Voroshilovgrad. Over 92 percent of the voters in Leninskiy Territorial Election District took part in the voting. P.I. Mostovoy, chairman of UkSSR Gosnab, garnered the majority of the votes—74 percent.

N.F. Gonchareva, brigade leader at Novoaydar Poultry Plant, and A.V. Sheyko, chief agronomist of Pervoye Maya [May Day] Kolkhoz in Starobelskiy Rayon, remain on the lists for the runoff election in Starobelskiy Territorial Election District.

Chernovtsy. V.P. Viznyuk, a builder, and L.M. Kvarchuk, head of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department, will continue their campaigns for the deputy's mandate in the national territorial election district.

Cherkassy. Umanskiy District voters must choose between Serviceman M.M. Gaydoy and Monastyrishche Machine Building Plant Boilermaker N.A. Golishevskiy who garnered the most votes among four contenders two days ago.

Kharkov. Repeat elections were conducted in three districts here. Poet Ye.A. Yevtushenko was elected national peoples deputy in Dzerzhinskiy Territorial District where eight candidates were on the ballot. V.A. Korotich, editor-in-chief of OGONYEK Magazine, was victorious in Kharkovskiy National Territorial District.

A runoff election will be held in Ordzhonikidzevskiy Territorial District.

Zaporozhe. In Zhortnevyy Territorial Election District, voters will have to make a choice during a runoff election between Professor I.P. Volchok, chairman of the metal technology department of Zaporozhe Machine Building Institute, and V.A. Chelyshev, correspondent for the INDUSTRIALNOYE ZAPOROZHE Newspaper.

Dnepropetrovsk. National Territorial District voters elected G.F. Lezhenko, a Krivbassrud Mine Management Association imeni Lenin worker at the Mine imeni Lenin.

Deputies have still not been named in three territorial districts. Runoff elections will be held there. The following have been placed on the ballot: A.K. Litovchenko, carpenter at Dnepropetrovsk Tram and Trolley Bus Administration Car Repair Plant; V.A. Semenov, senior research associate at UkSSR AN; Ya.Ya. Bezbach, blast furnace brigade leader at Nizhnednepropetrovsk Rolled Pipe Plant imeni K. Libknecht; I.I. Shiptun, deputy director of Dnepropetrovsk Middle School No 56; S.I. Konev, surgeon at Dnepropetrovsk Medical Institute; and, I.F. Golovko, chairman of Ukraina Kolkhoz.

Nikolayev. V.I. Lisitskiy, deputy director for economics of Chernomorskiy [Black Sea] Ship Building Plant, won 30.5 percent of the votes in Zavodskiy Territorial District and I.N. Ovdienko, director of the Shipbuilding Plant imeni 61 Communards, won 22.5 percent. A runoff election is also required here.

Donetsk. A peoples deputy was elected in only one of three Donetsk Districts, Kramatorskiy Territorial, where repeat elections were held. He is V.I. Karasayev, chairman of Kramatorsk Industrial Institute and he collected more than 72 percent of the votes.

V.A. Pasternak, brigade leader of Avdeyevka Metal Design Plant, and V.V. Goncharov, first secretary of Yenakiyevo Ukrainian Komsomol gorkom, are continuing their campaign for a deputy mandate in Yenakiyevo Territorial District. In Volnovakhskiy Territorial District, K.S. Omelyanenko, chairman of Rossiya Kolkhoz of Volnovakhskiy Rayon, and G.Z. Fedorov, shop chief of Donetsk Chemical and Metal Plant are continuing their campaigns, too.

Lvov. Repeat elections took place in four election districts. Writer R.A. Bratun became a peoples deputy for Lvov Zaliznichnyy Election District. Runoff elections will be held in three election districts.

Sumy. E.G. Kozin, senior professor of the economics department of the Sumy Branch of Kharkov Polytechnical Institute, and V.I. Yatskov, a grinder of Sumzhilstroy

Design and Construction Association, received the greatest number of votes in Sumskiy Territorial Election District. A runoff election will determine which of them becomes a peoples deputy.

Solovyev Answers Readers' Questions on Political, Economic Restructuring

18000735 Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 12 Mar 89 pp 1, 2

[Report on meeting of Yu. F. Solovyev, non-voting member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, with editors of *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*, by I. Lisochkin and I. Sidorov: "Looking into the Future with Optimism"]

[Text] Several days ago the *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* editorial office asked Yu. F. Solovyev, a nonvoting member of the Politburo and the first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, to respond to a number of questions which concern the newspaper's subscribers and Leningraders today.

Preparation of the questions and the answers got underway. But during this work Yu. F. Solovyev decided on a different way: he came to the editorial office to meet with journalists and answer their questions directly.

The meeting was held in the editorial office's small conference hall. There were no empty seats in the hall; all the associates of the newspaper attended except those working on operational and the most urgent assignments.

Yu. F. Solovyev said the following:

Comrades! I think that journalists know very well how things are going in Leningrad. Most likely you are more familiar with many problems than I am. That makes my task easier. To start with, I will talk about three things which I think are important specifically for press workers.

The first one. The perestroika which is going on in society is a complex social process. Unusual situations arise in it and shortcomings and miscalculations are revealed. All of us are extremely interested in ensuring that Leningraders receive full information and can judge everything themselves.

I do not want to discard everything useful that has already been done by *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* and other mass information media in the process of perestroika. The press has become frank and topical and "zones closed to criticism" have virtually disappeared. But despite all that, Leningraders often remain inadequately informed.

I often have to visit labor collectives and meet with very diverse people; I am constantly answering the same or very similar questions about the dam, the proposed construction of a sports and cultural center, and other things directly involving the city's life.

I do not think any of these questions were "closed" to the press and all of them were discussed in sufficient detail on the pages of newspapers. But I must assure you that information "has not reached everyone" and that facts, arguments, and various points of view on certain problems presented in the press remain unknown to many people. Therefore, as I see it, a newspaper should not confine itself to saying, "we wrote about that" and leave it at that. We all must create an effective mechanism to inform the public which includes newspapers, radio, and television. It is still too early to rest on our laurels.

The second thing. The big topic of the day is the election campaign. A multitude of questions is arising, among them those to which it is difficult to give a precise and principled answer. Tension is increasing and disputes, disagreements, and conflicts are arising. Many of them have already been reflected on the pages of the press. I think that is good. Let us look at things directly. There have been no elections like this in the history of our country, and in the full sense of the word we are learning democracy and accumulating political experience. But no one has ever gotten experience except by trial and error, from bruises and bumps. We must not fear that.

The Law on Elections, which seemed so perfect before the campaign started, has proven not to be in practical use. I think we should not panic in this regard. Otherwise, it would be impossible to test it in practice. We intend to summarize the results and generalize all the experience accumulated and bring proposals on improving and refining the Law to the party Central Committee. That is a step forward.

And the third thing. I know that many of you were very disturbed by the last publication from the meeting of the obkom buro. Already one hears that the topic was supposedly "cutting back glasnost" or even "returning to the ways of 1937." I dare to reassure you that there was no such talk at the buro meeting nor could there have been.

It is something else again that all of us are concerned that certain communists are departing from genuinely party positions and not observing the demands of the Party Charter and are falling under the sway of gossips, demagogues, and careerists. This also applies to journalists. I think that this kind of mistake has been made less often in Leningrad than in certain other regions of the country. But it would be wrong to assert that we had none at all. Therefore, I am certain that the decision adopted by the obkom buro is essentially right.

Perestroika is a struggle. And every communist and newspaper person must define his position in it and decide which ideals to fight for and what to defend. The CPSU Charter puts altogether specific obligations on each of us. Each of us has the right to decide whether we

are going to obey its demands and observe party discipline and organization. If we do, then we must try to prove it in our actions. If not, no one will force us to stay in the party. And we must talk about this completely frankly and openly.

And now, please, let us go on to other questions...

Running slightly ahead, let us say that the meeting of Yu. F. Solovyev, non-voting member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, with the associates of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA continued for about three hours. Of course, there were no notes and it consisted of something more than answering questions. The questions frequently turned into monologues and a dialogue arose which was supplemented by responses. There were very direct emotions, there was noise, applause, and laughter in the hall.

It would probably be very interesting to publish the complete record of this meeting. But, taking into account newspaper space, that is not a possibility. Therefore, we have decided to limit ourselves to the questions and answers which are most interesting to our readers.

[Correspondents] Perestroyka is in its fourth year. The achievements of society in the area of democratization, glasnost, and the development of socialist pluralism are indisputable. Now general attention is more and more being focused on the problems of the economy. The slow course of economic reform and the poor results even permit many people today to assert that "perestroyka is not having results." How do things look in Leningrad in that regard?

[Solovyev] Let us objectively examine the state of affairs in our economy. It has constantly accelerated in the present five-year plan. The average annual rate of growth in labor productivity in industry has increased by a factor of 1.7 and the drop in the output-capital ratio has slowed to one-third its former level.

In the leading sector, machine-building, more than four-fifths of the output certified is produced with the state Mark of Quality, more than one-third of the major items meet the world standard or exceed it, and the coefficient of renewal of equipment, devices, and instruments has doubled. I can also cite some other figures. The shift factor for highly efficient equipment has reached 1.7 here and at certain enterprises it has exceeded 2.0. For the first time in the last 10 years the absolute decline in the total number of pieces of industrial equipment was 8,000 units (before it increased by 25,000 to 30,000 units per year).

All this is reality. Of course, the introduction of the state acceptance system, the implementation of the "Intensification-90" program, and work to improve the use of the active part of fixed capital played their roles here. But I would like to emphasize that all the positive

advances which I spoke of were achieved above all by the labor of thousands of people—workers, technicians, technologists, engineers, and economists. Their brains and talent went into them.

Indeed, wherever the work was approached thoroughly and responsibly, we have seen results: the level of contract discipline increased, the rate of growth in labor productivity rose, and profits rose. As examples I can cite the Svetlana Association, the Izhorskiy zavod Association, the Proletarskiy zavod Association, the Combine imeni Telman, and others. Therefore, discarding what has been achieved under the pretext that "perestroyka is not having results" would not be fair and would be offensive to many people.

But the main thing is that a decisive breakthrough on the path to increasing production efficiency has not yet been achieved and that the retardation mechanism is still far from being broken. In the region there are low-profit enterprises and even enterprises operating at a loss. Frequently local leaders are in no hurry to delegate rights obtained to those below them, to the shops, sections, and brigades. Although the transition of enterprises to cost-accounting, self-support [samookupayemost], and self-financing is being carried out in stages, priority has been given to the first model, which suffers from many shortcomings. Every person should know about this as well. Because we are just starting off, we must continue searching with even greater persistence.

[Correspondents] In the opinion of many Leningrad managers of enterprises, economic managers, and economists, the "diktat of the center" is not only not declining now, it is even growing. More and more legal regulations and normative documents focused on depriving an enterprise of any independence are being developed. There is just one conclusion: such a policy conflicts with the decisions of the 19th Party Conference. And what is your opinion?

[Solovyev] I am in complete agreement with that point of view. Departmental diktat of the center continues and the reins and the whip and the opportunity to limit the initiative of enterprises using various orders, instructions, and agreements remain in the hands of the ministries.

I had occasion to be a minister, and I know the life of ministries well. Sometimes the matter is portrayed as if we are waging a struggle against dull, narrow-minded bureaucrats who are only interested in keeping their own jobs. I assure you that there are in the ministries many first-class specialists, highly competent and knowledgeable people. The trouble is something else. These people are sincerely convinced of the need for maximum centralization of management and profess the old economic faith, which is expressed in the proposition: "Strong center—strong enterprises."

However, and I had occasion to speak about this at the Politburo, economic reform is impossible without a complete transformation of the proposition, which now should sound like this: "Strong enterprises—strong center."

In switching to cost accounting, of course, we have already seen the shortcomings which we will run up against in both the first and second models. In Leningrad the idea was born of creating large associations and a kind of socialist concern which could work freely, without a rigid link with the plan and without the diktat of the ministries.

Two such associations have already been set up, as you know. They are Energomash and Tekhnokhim. Despite all the difficulties, all the complexities, and the struggle of opinions which continues to surround them, practice confirms that the path chosen is the right one.

There are now documents submitted for consideration in the USSR Council of Ministers which speak of creating an organization in Leningrad which has been named the "Construction Committee."

At the present time the economic mechanism in construction operates in such a way that it is profitable to build in an expensive manner. Therefore, billions are simply buried in the earth. The "Construction Committee" should be an organization that is not only not subordinate to the ministry but not to the Lensovet Ispolkom either. It is subordinate only to the Law. I am not going to present its structure and principles in detail; that would take too much time. I will only say that its future activity may be compared with the activity of Finnish firms which are carrying out construction in Leningrad very successfully: "Your money—my work".

Both production and scientific collectives of the city are participating in developing this type of enterprise. And they are not being built on good wishes and intentions, but on precise economic calculations, which are difficult to dispute. But nonetheless, the work is moving very slowly. For example, we pose the question of setting up such an association and we receive the order that it "can be set up with the voluntary assent of participants and their collectives." It seems that everything is correct and democratic and in the spirit of the times. But in fact this is an attempt to bury the project in endless discussions and debates and put off its implementation for many years.

As we see, comrades, the struggle is going on even here. The center is very unwilling to give up power. But the party obkom will continue to insist on it, because our economic problems cannot be resolved without real enterprise independence.

[Correspondents] And what is your attitude toward the idea of regional cost-accounting? There are disputes about it going on everywhere. Is it promising in Leningrad?

[Solovyev] Let us be specific. Inasmuch as no region is a closed system but is linked by thousands of threads to the economy of the entire country, it would be more correct to speak of regional self-financing rather than regional cost-accounting. As everyone knows, in accordance with the decisions of the 19th Party Conference such a mechanism is beginning to be developed in the Belorussian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, and the Latvian SSR and in Moscow, the Tatar ASSR, and Sverdlovsk Oblast.

The scope of the experiment, as we see, is at first limited. During the experiment we must answer many questions on which there is a broad range of opinion among economic sciences, including opinions which are completely contradictory.

We are proceeding from the viewpoint that practical experience must be accumulated here and it must be thoroughly studied in order to make the optimum decisions. At the same time, however, we should not delay with preparatory work. One of the problems is the existence of unprofitable and planned-loss enterprises. They cannot exist under the new system of economic activity other than within the experiment. That means we must seek a solution, possibly even eliminate them.

The conception of territorial self-financing is now being studied in our country at the Northwest Branch of the Central Economic Institute under RSFSR Gosplan, the Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Problems, and the city's economic VUZes. Of course, these scientific institutions keep in close contact with party and Soviet organs.

What is the essence of these preliminary studies? It includes establishing economic and cost-accounting relations between enterprises and local soviet organs in order to carry out territorial self-financing, develop the social sphere and the production infrastructure, and rationally use natural resources and the environment.

[Correspondents] The structure of the party apparat has already been reorganized and new forms of interaction of party committees with the organs of the soviets have been set up. What are these forms? What are the prospects?

[Solovyev] To assert that the reorganization of party organs is complete would be premature. It would also be early to give an evaluation of the efficiency of their new structures. I am certain that life itself will make its corrections here.

Of course, there will still be changes in the interrelationship of party organs and soviets. Today there is less parallelism and redundancy. That is an undisputed fact. But party responsibility for everything that is happening in the city and the oblast, no matter how paradoxical, as yet is not only not declining but even increasing. The point is that we must not simply hand over rights to someone, they must be claimed. As practice shows, the executive committees of soviets are by no means always

ready to do that. Because both the reduced party apparatus and the primary organizations have enough concerns. Moreover, in the spirit of the times party cadres in this difficult period must operate only through using political methods, defining priorities and prospects, and placing and educating cadres.

[Correspondents] The Leningrad Party Organization always played a special role in the history of the party and in the history of the country. A multitude of examples of that can be cited—from Great October to, for example, the events in our Central Asia and the war in Afghanistan. During the turning points of history the Central Committee always drew the most reliable cadres loyal to the party cause from Leningrad. Today certain “wavering” is observed even among party members. How do you evaluate the moral state of the Leningrad Party Organization and what are its political possibilities?

[Solovyev] I am annoyed here by the fact that the question is posed in the past tense. For in reality the Leningrad Party Organization in the years of perestroika continues to play the role of one of the primary detachments of the party. As you know, both the party Central Committee and the Soviet Government listen attentively to the opinions of Leningrad, Leningraders, and our organization.

The history of our organization has not been either simple or easy. Remember the “Zinovyev Opposition” and the “Leningrad Affair.” Remember the term “Leningrad Chauvinism,” which was used in the years of the cult of personality to belittle Leningrad’s role in the history of the country. But you and I know that there never was any “chauvinism,” nor will there ever be. In fact one of the clear features of our organization is loyalty to Leninist traditions and the cause of the people. And in response to the question of the moral state of our organization, I will say that its members continue to be distinguished by restraint, a business-like manner, a principled attitude, and the incapability of being taken in by a slogan or an empty phrase. And that also speaks of the political possibilities of the organization.

[Correspondents] The elections continue to be today’s most important political campaign. How do you think they are going? And, incidentally, a question from letters to the editor: do you not feel “lonely” being the only candidate for deputy from Nevskiy Rayon?

[Solovyev] I agree with the formulation of the question. The campaign is really an important and critical one. I was speaking of the responsibility of the communist and I will also speak of the responsibility of particular party organizations. Practice shows that not all of them have managed to properly prepare for this important political event. Meetings and conferences to nominate candidates for deputies were turbulent with high activism by working people. That is very good. But in places where party organizations were slow and ineffective, the reasons for frank questions were not removed from the life of labor

collectives and the development of events got out of control, while demagogues and negatively-minded people got the last word. That is a general lesson for us all.

I shall try to answer the second question frankly as well. That is simply necessary. The Law on Elections does not envision that there must be several candidates from an election district. There may be several, there may be one. In my case I was alone. Yeltsin was an alternative candidate in the last stage. But the district conference declined his candidacy and decided on me.

I can understand complaints of some kind of “extra work” or “pressure.” But there was no such thing and everything happened openly and publicly, both the discussion of candidates and the voting. Of course, I understand very well that in Leningrad the first secretary of the obkom can be an “inconvenient” opponent for other candidates. But if we follow the Law and the will of voters precisely, what can I do now? Merely apologize for this “inconvenience” to the other candidates.

[Correspondents] There are now problems with industrial goods and with food, and one of the main reasons for the dissatisfaction of quite a large number of people is the empty shelves in food stores. How will the problems of saturating the market be resolved?

[Solovyev] As you know, this is not just a Leningrad problem but a problem everywhere. It is aggravated by the fact that a large part of the money which the population has is not balanced with the mass of goods. That results in a spurt of growth in purchasing power which cannot be foreseen. That is what happened in our country with furniture and electrical goods and even with soap and detergents.

This problem was a subject of detailed study at the 19th Party Conference. The Central Committee adopted the decision to make questions involving food and consumer goods priority questions.

Of course, this work is being carried on in Leningrad and in the oblasts. A party obkom plenum on the food problem was held and a concrete program was developed which will help substantially improve the situation soon. You told about this and I hope that this most important subject will not leave the pages of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in the future either.

The saturation of the market with industrial goods is also of general concern to all of us. There is potential for this. There are still many enterprises, defense enterprises among them, which do not participate very much in producing consumer goods. Such giants of industry as the Kirovskiy Plant, the Bolshevik Plant, and the Metals Plant are not making adequate use of their potential.

In formulating new plans today enterprises are doing a great deal of work to reconstruct and set up technological lines for producing consumer goods. I will not say that all

economic planners have already turned to this problem. That would be an exaggeration. But whoever is late in doing so will in the future have only himself to blame. The party obkom believes that this is a political question and implementation of the program has been and will continue to be under constant monitoring.

[Correspondents] For many years Leningrad was a pioneer in new ideas and undertakings and created unique vehicles, ships, and systems which were what made us famous. Now in this sense we are living "quietly." What will make many people speak of Leningraders and of Leningrad in coming years?

[Solovyev] I think that is the wrong formulation of the question. I am not an advocate of the formula which defines Leningrad as a "great city with an oblast destiny," or rather I put the main emphasis on the first part of the phrase. We in fact do live in a great city. There are other great cities on the globe, London and Paris for example. Ask any Londoner or Parisian what he intends to do to make his city famous in coming years and he will be astounded, I think. For there is simply no need to do so.

I was speaking of the food problem. I shall return to it again. Do we have the possibility of sharply increasing the agricultural yield of the oblast? It seems that we do not have favorable conditions and we cannot rely on improving the climate. But after all, in Holland, for example, which is in approximately the same conditions as we are, the yield of potatoes and vegetable crops is higher than ours, a little over twice as high.

Look, the Dutch, who have practically the same amount of land, receive twice or even three times as many potatoes per hectare as we do. That means that we would need one-third the land if we raise the yield. The same is true with other crops. Just yesterday we were talking with our hothouse farm: if we can enlarge it to 500 hectares, we will solve the problem of year-round supply of fresh vegetables for Leningraders. There is no problem anywhere in Europe: any time of year, day or night, one can always get fresh vegetables. We have the problem, and if we do get them, half of them are rotten.

So then, do we not know how to work and have scientific minds grown scarce here? No. We are only just beginning to recognize such cases and draw the appropriate conclusions. And I regret that the newspapers are not telling much about what in fact has already been done. For this is certainly one of the most serious problems. Let us keep it and others like it under control. We will solve them and we will be able to be proud of it.

[Correspondents] What is your attitude to the idea of setting up "special economic zones"? The press has already discussed the question of setting up the zones which will help make the economy more dynamic in the Maritime Region, the Baltic Region, and in the rayons of Vyborg. Are there any particular plans involving this in our region?

[Solovyev] The ideas of these zones is not a new one, it is true. It is also true that many countries are setting up special economic zones in order to take advantage of the investments of other states to accelerate development of a certain region.

Of course, the idea itself has not bypassed Leningrad and it is being studied in fair detail here too. The concept is being developed for certain rayons near Vyborg. It will be presented to the Council of Ministers for consideration.

However, we should not hurry here. A "special zone" is not a free gift but an economic statute which has its pluses and minuses. As practice shows, any state must pay a great deal of hard currency to develop the zone. Because reality poses the task of self-financing for us, we have to be particularly tight with money and currency. Will this be beneficial to us or not? For the present time we are relying on the findings of our leading economists. And they have not yet had the last word here.

[Correspondents] Let us return to the recent decision of the obkom buro. If we speak openly, journalists have gotten a complex impression from this decision, which speaks of the extremist tendencies which appeared during the elections and of journalists who played up to these trends in an unprincipled manner. In the words of the popular song, "the cool of the evening flees beyond the gates" from these words.

[Solovyev] Well, the cool of the evening should hardly flee beyond the gates for you. Let us nonetheless try to grasp the meaning of the entire document as a whole rather than individual lines. There it specifically says that we must work on democratic principles and by political means, that pluralism of opinions should unquestionably be observed, and that there can be the most diverse disputes. But we must take care not to overstep the line beyond which a ship, in listing to the right and then to left, capsizes.

Recently I invited the leaders of the new Leningrad movement "For a Popular Front" to a meeting. We talked for two hours and we found points of contact. We agreed that we would meet more often. The initiative is theirs: as soon as the movement is prepared to name concrete questions upon which constructive cooperation is possible, we will meet that cooperation halfway.

Unfortunately, at the present time it is precisely for this constructive cooperation that our opponents are frequently unprepared. And if today we saw that very opposition movement proposing something useful to the cause, the question of it would be something altogether different. We are prepared to be allies. The party does not possess the ultimate truth and we ourselves do not yet know many things; after all, we are following an untrodden path. But, alas, those movements which make claims to the role of the "opposition" for the most part arise not from a desire to do something useful for socialism but from personal ambitions and unsatisfied vanity.

[Correspondents] But Hungarian communists have decided that true democratization is possible only within the framework of a multiparty system.

[Solovyev] I do not agree with this point of view. The Hungarians are following their own path and we—ours. Ultimately, time will tell. We are developing mechanisms of intraparty democracy and socialist pluralism of opinions. Various public movements may be the spokespersons of certain opinions within the framework of the unified socialist model, but they must be constructively oriented. We are all following the same path and if we list too far to the right or to the left, unforeseen consequences await the country. That has already happened more than once in our history and we do not want that. I am sorry, but after all we are receiving threatening messages. How would you have us view them?

[Correspondents] As pluralism of opinion ... (laughter)

[Solovyev] Pluralism. Alas, extremism really exists. And we communists must give this unhealthy trend a timely and politically precise evaluation. Of course, a person can relate to these phenomena in other ways; that is his right, but how can that be compatible with membership in the party? We certainly remind these communists of their party duty. And as for journalists, I repeat that the cool of the evening should not flee beyond the gates. Oftentimes after your publications some leadership comrades complain to me: how can a party newspaper so sharply criticize us communists? They seem to be accustomed to universal love, and this regardless of the individuals. You are doing the right thing. We believe your newspaper has grown a great deal. [Correspondents] Ecological problems naturally disturb many of our readers a great deal. You know that judging from the press, and not only the Leningrad press, many people see the construction of a dam as the main danger. What is your opinion?

[Solovyev] In my opinion, it was precisely in your newspaper that I read a fair observation about this. The dispute between the "supporters" of the dam and the "opponents" of it has been going on for many years. The positions of the sides are emotional and uncompromising. Opinions clash and the competent reasoning of scientists is enlisted. Somewhere the truth begins to come to light and the controversy quiets down. In a short time it starts again, without any consideration of what has already been discussed. Old arguments appear again and everything begins from the beginning. There is no end in sight.

I think that the controversy over the dam not only does not serve the struggle against the deteriorating ecological situation, but even covers up the truth for the public. For the point is by no means the dam. I will cite a perfectly simple example. While Neva water where it joins the

river in the city still satisfies the demands made upon it, it becomes simply unsuitable for drinking in the Petropavlovskaya Fortress region. What does the dam have to do with anything here?

This is the real situation. It is much worse than many people imagine. Leningrad, which, it would seem, has always had the enormous stores of the unique Ladoga, faces the real prospect of being without drinking water altogether.

The water will be no better in either April, or in May, or in August. It will be worse. The Kirovskiy Plant, the Bolshevik Plant, the Metals Plant, and other major enterprises discharge wastes into the Neva virtually untreated. In the region of Petropavlovskaya Fortress the acceptable limits of concentration for many substances have been exceeded several times. I am still surprised to see smelt and salmon swimming in the Neva. I should mention that we started a decisive struggle against this at the beginning of the year. I was asked once: well then, aren't you going to stop the Kirovskiy Plant? We will stop it. We will stop any enterprise if we see that they are doing nothing there to improve the ecological situation. We must not tolerate it any further. As far as I know, the Lengorispolkom will introduce this question to the forthcoming session and, I hope, the deputies will adopt strict decisions. We will find the violators and stop them ruthlessly, despite the pressure of departments.

I shall return to the dam. How did the project come about? Is it necessary? You know that the idea of protective structures for our city has been nurtured by several generations of scientists and engineers. We certainly do lose a great deal from floods. Even those fluctuations in the level of the Neva and insignificant rises in water which Leningraders do not even consider floods ruin facilities of the underground systems and damage the old part of the city, which suffered so much in the years of the blockade. Annual losses from that on the average amount to 50 million rubles.

But that is not the main thing. The cycles of fluctuation in the level of water are well known by years and by decades. Among them are catastrophic fluctuations. Even now Leningrad has quite a few people who remember the terrible flood of 1924. We have no power over such natural phenomena. Essentially Leningraders are constantly under the threat of a disaster, only no one can say whether it will happen in the lifetime of the present generation or perhaps the next one.

And if the disaster does happen, the losses will be reckoned not in millions but in billions. In addition, Leningrad would lose a substantial part of the art treasures which are invaluable and which represent a national property. And then, comrades, how do we justify ourselves to one another, and in fact to the whole people?

I, of course, will not undertake to evaluate the structures as a whole and their role, effectiveness, and impact on ecology. The project was created with the participation of hundreds of scientific, research, and design organizations, and here we must rely on the competent collective evaluation of leading economists, ecologists, sociologists, biologists, and scientists of many other orientations.

You know that under the pressure of public opinion an independent and highly authoritative commission was set up which examined both the project and progress in construction and reported on it to the CPSU Central Committee. It did not support the "opponents of the dam." Now at the initiative of the USSR Academy of Sciences one other commission has been set up and is carrying on work. I do not see anything bad in that. The matter is a very serious one and it is useful to examine and weigh every aspect of it again. The results of the commission's work will naturally be studied in the most attentive way.

[Correspondents] A turbulent protest campaign has now unfolded in the pages of the press regarding building of the "Leningrad Disneyland" in Lisyiy Nos. How do you feel about that?

[Solovyev] Somewhat surprised. Certain emotions are being persistently inflamed without the least amount of reliable information. For all the opinions about the "sale of a piece of land to Western companies" and the "preserve for foreigners" are not at all in keeping with reality.

Here is how things really stand. A firm headed by Cyrus Eaton Jr. proposed to build on swamp land located not far from Lisyiy Nos a culture and sports center (mainly a center rather than a "Disneyland"), which would consist of exhibit halls, sports stadiums, and enclosed areas, indoor swimming pools and tennis courts, and children's sports and entertainment complexes.

Is there a need for such structures? Undoubtedly. Both Leningraders (for rubles) and foreigners (for hard currency) can take advantage of them. The city will receive 51 percent of the profits and the firm—49 percent.

The proposal deserves attention because it does not require investments from us. Our contribution is land and works of art from museum reserves which may be shown in the modern exhibit halls (now, for example, the Hermitage is capable of showing less than 8 percent of its own treasures, the rest is in storage).

As for Lisyiy Nos, it essentially will not be affected by the construction. In contrast, the settlement which is well known to all of us will receive a water main, a sewage system, and central heating, which it now does not have.

The people write that the "decision was made in the corridors of offices." But in fact there has not yet been a decision and Cyrus Eaton Jr.'s proposal has not gone beyond the stage of preliminary negotiations. If the

parties come to an agreement (and the bargain may be a very important one) and a real plan appears, it should be published and certainly discussed by the community. Let Leningraders decide themselves: is such a center needed or not?

We must approach this matter seriously. At one time we essentially "handed over" the Olympic Sailing Center to Tallinn and gained nothing by it. Now both Muscovites and representatives of other cities are following our negotiations with the foreign firms carefully. If we do not come to an agreement, I think that Cyrus Eaton Jr. will quickly find other business partners in our country.

[Correspondents] The question of "dachas on Kamen-niy." It seems that everything has already been discussed in the press on this account, but letters keep coming and coming. And as yet we have not been able to get a substantive answer from the Lensovet Ispolkom.

[Solovyev] I do not want to repeat myself. I will talk briefly. There have never been and there are no "dachas" on Kamenniy Island. Several state residences are there. Detailed material on them with photographs was published, if I am not mistaken, in VECHEIRNIY LENIN-GRAD.

Are they necessary? Yes. Leningrad is carrying on international ties and receives delegations and guests of the highest level. According to existing diplomatic practice, a city must provide certain conditions to house them, protect them, and the like. The residences also serve this purpose.

Here is another matter: do we need as many as there are or could there be fewer? This question was discussed in detail at the meeting of the bureau of the party obkom. We adopted the decision which recommends that two residences (the oblsoprof and the MVD) be handed over for public needs. The former oblsoprof residence will be remodeled, as far as I know, into a medical rehabilitation center with 16 places. I understand that the figure disappoints many people. But after all, it would be naive to assert that the city's social problems could somehow be solved at the expense of state residences. A different path and a different scale is needed here.

[Correspondents] These days more and more often we encounter a very unique interpretation of pluralism. We publish a sharp critical article and in response we hear the following: we have pluralism! We consider it one thing, and you consider it something else altogether different. Therefore, the important rubric "after the newspaper's statement" has begun to disappear from the columns of our newspaper. Do you consider this normal?

[Solovyev] No, I do not. I am not going to hide the fact that some of your articles make certain party and economic workers want to go at the newspaper with their fists. They must restrain themselves. Really I did not know that we have comrades who have forgotten their

party duty to give concrete responses to critical statements of the press. I promise you that the oblast party committee will devote the most serious attention to this aspect of the matter.

[Correspondents] We understand that the abundance of critical statements in the press compels many readers to look at the world through somber eyes. Is that right? Do we have grounds for optimism?

[Solovyev] Of course. Despite any complexities, difficulties, or problems. There is no alternative to perestroika, that genuinely revolutionary process which is going on in society and creates new energy and enthusiasm. We have every reason to look to the future with optimism.

[Correspondents] During the conversation we have also talked about purely professional problems, newspaper questions. There are quite a few of them, but we do not consider it possible to look at them in depth right now. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to prepare a special memorandum on this which could be examined in the party obkom.

[Solovyev] That is a sensible proposal. Here the question has been heard: is the obkom interested in the profits which the newspaper provides? I will answer in this way: not in the profits, but in raising the quality of work—we are very interested. At the same time I understand that we must not consider the situation normal where the labor payment of a journalist is economically unrelated to its quantity and quality, the circulation of the newspaper, and the newspaper's popularity. Most likely something must be corrected here. In short—prepare your proposals.

Today's meeting brought me considerable satisfaction. Of course, we are in constant contact with the newspaper's editor and with the editorial collegium. But now I am convinced that that is no substitute for talking with the entire collective of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA. I hope that the talk was useful for both parties. And, as it seems to me, it would be worthwhile to make such meetings regular and systematic in the future.

The hall responded with applause to this proposal which came at the very end of the talk. The LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA people, like all journalists, value highly the opportunity to receive information first hand. And above all—in the interests of the newspaper's readers.

Report of Kazakh CP CC First Secretary Kolbin to 17 May Party Aktiv

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[Report by Kazakh CP CC First Secretary G.V. Kolbin: "On the Republic Party Organization's Tasks for Deepening the Processes of Perestroika in the Light of the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpts] Comrades!

The results of the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum are of principal significance to our party; I would even say that to a certain extent, they represent a turning point. In essence they go far beyond the framework of examination of organizational questions of the activities of the CPSU Central Committee, and embrace a significantly broader spectrum of the problems of perestroika, which is now being developed in the country.

I think I would not be mistaken if I said that the attention of the Plenum participants was focused basically on two key aspects. First of all, never before has the question been put so strongly and uncompromisingly, of the critical necessity for increasing in every possible way the responsibility of each member of the CPSU Central Committee, each candidate Central Committee member, and each member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, for the pace of the restructuring processes in all spheres of life. Secondly, the dialogue at the Plenum turned into a serious attempt for in-depth political analysis of the party's great four-year work on practical realization of the ideas expressed in April 1985—ideas which defined a sharp turn to new thinking, to renewal of Soviet society, and to renewal of socialism.

Of course, a considerable amount of effort was required to stay on top of the current tasks, both for the CPSU Central Committee and for the entire party. Many people had to overcome themselves and change their habitual style of leadership. The processes of democratization and glasnost, which have become widely developed in society, concerned first of all intra-party life, and forced the communists to actively engage in self-education and self-improvement, and in the study of political work methods. Nor were we able to get around a significant amount of replacement and strengthening of the cadre corps.

This can also be seen by the example of the Kazakh CP Central Committee. During the period which ensued since the 27th CPSU Congress, its Buro has been almost completely replaced, and 16 people were turned out of the central committee for various reasons. Sixty-five secretaries of oblast party committees have been replaced, as have 630 raykom and gorkom secretaries. And noteworthy changes have occurred in the cadre make-up of Soviet and economic organs.

For all practical purposes, two stages of cadre reorganization have taken place in the republic during the years of perestroika. The first was of the nature of purging the party, Soviet and economic organs of persons who discredited themselves by gross violations of the norms of social life: all sorts of careerists, time-servers and servile types, corrupted elements, and so on. The second stage, which today one cannot say is complete, was brought about by the new tasks which objectively arose in the course of implementing perestroika.

Comrades! One of the key questions brought up for discussion at the Plenum was the question on further development and affirmation of economic reforms. And that is not by accident, inasmuch as it is precisely with such reforms that the most critical problems of social life are associated today, and our analysis of the effectiveness of perestroika. By the logic of the changes being implemented in the country, the people have a right to expect a reasonable return; however, after four years they still encounter shortages of food and a number of other daily necessities, insufficient housing, and interruptions in the supply of raw materials and assembly parts on the job, which violates normal working rhythms. All these things have a negative effect on the workers' mood, which hardly promotes reduction of social tensions.

And here in our own republic, a defeatist attitude is arising among some people, and notes of disaffection and disbelief in perestroika are beginning to creep in. They say that no changes whatsoever are taking place; that just as before, they say, life is not as good as it is in developed countries; and so on.

It's true that we are still far away from the desired standard of living. And it would be naive to suppose that an economy that has been so badly scarred by the numerous diseases of the stagnation period could be able to somehow "become well," and that everyone's problems could be put right so rapidly. But one cannot help also see the positive processes taking place today in the economic sphere, which—in spite of the conflicts, and at times the very complex nature of perestroika—are steadily paving a road. Economic accountability is persistently changing the people's way of thinking and their attitude toward business, and is forming a completely new type of worker who is capable of fully realizing the broadest possibilities of socialism.

In order to become convinced of this, it is sufficient to take a look back into the very recent past and soberly look at what was, and what has come to pass. Take, for example, the food supply. It has, undoubtedly, improved, and the people are aware of that.

But where have the foodstuffs been taken from? At whose expense have we managed to add almost 10 kilograms of meat to per-capita consumption in only three years, when during the period from 1975-1985 this growth amounted to only 2 kilograms in the republic? The answer is one word: perestroika; it was perestroika that helped achieve such a noteworthy success. It was namely perestroika that brought about the resurrection of the people's economic initiative, permitting them to get rid of the many prohibitions which in defiance of common sense had been forged over long years, and which literally stifled the natural enterprising nature of the workers who till the soil.

The administrators and specialists took on the solution of such concrete problems as the fodder base, restoration of the health of the farms, and herd replenishment.

Integration of social production and family farms has taken place indeed, and not just in words. We have stopped trying to calculate how many head of cattle a peasant can keep in his barnyard—the more the better! And we have put a stop to limiting the amount of feed the people need—if you need land to produce it, take as much as you please. If you want, take both land and cattle on lease, or organize a farmstead. Just go to work, and feed yourselves and the people!

Now people from beyond the borders of the republic know of the good food supply in Tselinograd, Kokchetav, Taldy-Kurgan, Semipalatinsk and certain other oblasts in Kazakhstan. The central press is writing about them, and people are talking about them in all ends of the land! Delegations from neighboring oblasts, including the RSFSR, are coming to see them. They come in order to see for themselves a live, vivid example of what perestroika can bring, if the opportunities it offers are used skillfully.

And the secret of its success is inherently simple. It lies in economic gumption; in the enterprise of the administrators who have finally been given the freedom to act, the freedom to do everything for the good of the people, that is not prohibited by law. Hence the radically changed approaches to solving the food problem. Whereas in the past for many administrators the most important thing was to make a lot of noise in one's victorious report about fulfilling the plan, today the sole criterion of successful work is the availability of a broad assortment of food on the shelves of the stores.

It is true that one cannot say that the realization of this truth came about easily and painlessly. When, in 1987, the Kazakh CP Central Committee began to lay down strict requirements on the number of different kinds of meat products, many people made fun of it: Just look, they said, of what we've lived to see—they've started to ask for an assortment, when there is not enough ordinary meat. They say there will be a piece of meat on the counter—that's all the people need...

It is not for nothing that they say that—simplicity is worse than robbery. And such an oversimplified approach to the problem plainly showed that certain administrators did not have a clue as to how to approach its solution or from what aspect. After all, in order to ensure uninterrupted trade in meat products in contemporary conditions, one has to know not only what kind of assortment to offer, but also at what price—state or cooperative—and to anticipate what will remain on the counter and what will not.

In a word, Lenin's ordinance, "Learn to trade," has today assumed special significance. And those who still have little understanding of organizing trade and who continue to think that the struggle for a wide assortment

of meat, dairy, flour and other food products is simply a pipe-dream of the leadership—is a hopelessly outdated administrator, and is totally incapable of managing the perestroika processes.

And on the other hand, in those places where they have begun to boldly assert the new approaches, where they have at the same time displayed initiative and persistence, today there are several dozen different kinds of meat products on sale! There they trade not only in ice cream, but in fresh meat, and there are also edible by-products in abundance. And all this came about because they actively influenced the development of the processing industry for in-depth processing of meat and other agricultural products.

Take, for example, the Alma Ata meat combine, where from one ton of cattle they process products worth 2,161.00 rubles. And the very same enterprises in Chimkent and Uralsk—produce exactly half as much. And so you can judge, who is conducting business and how. In the one case—zealously and businesslike, desiring not only to sell the purchaser a piece of meat, but also to satisfy his demand to the fullest. In the other—only to get shut of the people's needs, and to cover-up with the notorious "gross output" indicator.

Obviously with such an unsuitable attitude toward business it is hard to achieve an abundance of food items for every selection and taste. It is hard to believe that our stores will in the near future become like those about which we love to talk among ourselves, after returning from a trip to Western countries. News about the fact that in certain stores in the USA there are from 70-100 varieties of cheese alone—seems a fairy tale to us. But we can't even buy processed cheese here, not to even mention other types.

One must not close one's eyes to the fact that for many years, Kazakhstan lagged behind significantly in supplying food products to the populace, from a number of important positions and directions. Many regions are experiencing a severe shortage of vegetables, fruits, grain products, dairy and meat products. Very often they do not even have what the people need to live. We cannot tolerate such a situation any longer. Profoundly understanding the very severe nature of the problem, the Kazakh CP Central Committee and the government of the republic are setting a task to increase, in the course of this year and the next, per-capita meat production by another 5 kilograms, in order that the overall growth in the current five-year plan will amount to no less than 15 kilograms. Significant growth in the production of other kinds of foods is envisaged as well.

These goals are realistically achievable under conditions of active struggle for economizing on agricultural production and reducing their losses; and the introduction of leasing relationships, private farming [fermerstvo], and other progressive forms of conducting business.

Today in the republic almost a third of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes are assimilating the intra-farm form of leasing, and in most of them production losses have noticeably declined, and profits have increased. Take, for example, the Yermентаuskiy Rayon Special Farming Association [rayspetskhozobediniye] in Tselinograd Oblast. Gross production output here in 1988 increased by 20 percent in comparison with the preceding year; nearly six million rubles in profits were received; and the level of profitability has reached 60 percent. And there are now already dozens of collectives in which the new economic relationships have produced a large effect.

Currently there are 49 private farms [fermerskoe khozyaystvo] in operation in Kazakhstan. This of course is not very many; but as they say, an undertaking, once begun, gains experience. For example, Yu. Bekkayev of the Chemolganskiy Sovkhoz took out a lease on 10 hectares of arable land and 100 hectares for making hay; he purchased 60 calves on credit from Gosbank, and the entire family is working on its own farm.

The Raskanov family from the Karatalskiy Sovkhoz in Eastern-Kazakhstan Oblast took a different path. By means of a loan taken on the farm, the family acquired 50 cows and 30 calves, and bought an MTZ-50 tractor. The sovkhoz gave them a lease on 30 hectares of arable land and 106 hectares for making hay. And things have not gone bad with them as well.

The party must direct the full force of its influence toward supporting such initiatives, and for creating the conditions which would permit the people to achieve high labor productivity. Local soviet and economic organs should energetically resolve the problems of extending them long-term credit on preferential terms; and render them assistance in material-technical supply, cultivation of arable lands, and in construction and repair of housing and production assets.

Everyone must understand that in the zone where agriculture is a risky venture, where three out of five years are drought years, the farmer or lessee must not be left to cope with nature one-on-one. Here we must give considerable thought to a complex of economic and economic measures, in order that a man who has taken a lease on land, let's say for 50 years, would be completely insured from any adversity; and that he would always be assured of the state's concern for him.

While showing concern for the development of various forms of labor organization in agriculture, we must above all focus our attention on implementing the resolutions of the March 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Currently agricultural workers are faced with three main tasks: the first—to complete Spring field work in the optimal time period; second—to organizationally enter into the preparation of fodder; and third—to skillfully shift animal husbandry to the summer work regime, and to ensure the sheep are sheared.

The precipitation which occurred nearly everywhere in the last weeks of April and the first half of May have significantly replenished the stores of moisture in the soil. The conditions are favorable for all varieties of crops to get a good start. At the same time, most regions of the republic are experiencing a lack of warmth. Under these conditions, no small details must be overlooked in the technology of cultivation of any of the crops. With the required amount of herbicides on hand, we must not allow the fields to be choked with wild oats, especially in the northern oblasts of the country. We must significantly increase the role of specialists as harvest engineers, and free them from administrative functions unsuited to their profession.

The extended cool Spring has had a negative effect on the growth of grasses. Under these conditions it is important to rationally utilize mineral fertilizers on the fodder plantations. We must also give thought to which land reserves can be used to expand the area for annual grasses and corn, in order to provide the farms sufficient hay, and grain silage.

By all accounts, we must begin preparations right away for a hot, dry summer; and above all, in the dairy sector. In the course of the present year many oblasts have succeeded in building up a good tempo for milk production and procurement. Now, the main thing is not to lower the tempo in June and July. And that is why the green conveyor must work without stopping for the entire summer-fall period, on every farm; and this is a task of paramount importance. We must also achieve a good supply of green fodder for the individual animal husbandry sector, and effective organization of milk and meat procurement from them for the summer period.

The spring frosts have done great damage to vegetable crops, gardens and vineyards. Vegetable plantations must replant on an urgent basis, and also prepare right now for receiving, processing and storing fruit and vegetable production, and potatoes. At the same time we must consider the mistakes of last year, and hold crop losses to the minimum.

Grain procurement will be carried out under complex conditions. The shortfall brought about by the cold spring must be compensated for by reducing the period for cutting grasses and by producing high-quality fodder. Strict accountability must be kept for all fodder remnants, and individuals must be held materially accountable.

The most critical period has arrived in animal husbandry—the completion of wintering, and switching the farms to the summer work regime. It is now important to not permit a drop in productivity on the farms. In order to do this, we must skillfully utilize all fodder reserves.

The food-producing potential of the last years of the five-year-plan is being established right now. The tasks of the party organs is—to shift the center of gravity of work to the labor collectives, in the localities, and to put the party's agrarian policy into effect under concrete conditions.

Perestroyka has also given rise to quite a few new approaches in other spheres of economic activity directed at satisfying social needs. Take housing construction for example. For the third year in a row, you see, we have been confidently trying to solve this problem; and no one has even a shade of a doubt about the successful realization of the Housing-91 Program.

And after all, I do not want to offend anyone, but there were also skeptics and unbelievers, who considered this bold program a utopia. Let them look today at the new blocks in the cities and villages, at the now-famous "Kulenovka"—as its residents, metallurgists at the lead and zinc combine, have unofficially named it, in honor of their director, A.S. Kulenova, an ardent supporter and initiator of individual housing construction in the republic—the housing development in Ust-Kamenogorsk. How strikingly different are the cottages erected here—modern ones with all the conveniences—from the wretched little hovels which one customarily associates with the concept of the "private sector."

To a decisive degree the success in housing construction has brought about a situation in which calculations are not made in terms of abstract square meters, but in terms of the amount of time one must wait in line to receive an apartment. Strict observance of the schedule—no less than 10 percent of the annual task, every month—has permitted precise adjustment of the construction conveyor, and has forced them to seek and find, without disturbing the flow, more and more new reserves of material supply.

The question resounds loudly: But where did we get the manpower, equipment and materials—which were chronically lacking even under previous, far more modest construction rates? Certainly not by waving a magic wand; but not by illegal means either. A policy was set to establish the maximum workload for the housing construction combines and brick plants, many of which had previously operated at 60-70 percent of their designed capacity. After organizing two and three-shift work operation at these enterprises, a solid addition to building materials and construction was achieved.

An experiment in using substitute binding materials was carefully studied and introduced to production. Thus, it became clear that one can successfully utilize the tailings from phosphorous production, the millings from which permit deriving a replacement for cement of a relatively high category, without additional processing. Great assistance was also rendered by the fact that the republic

has received the permission of the CPSU Central Committee and the union government to use for its own needs above-plan production of metals, cement, slate, and so on.

Accelerating the introduction of housing was greatly facilitated by the growth of the capacity of housing construction using the poured cement method. Also subordinated to this goal was the fact that housing construction combines had begun to build cube housing with collectives incapable of installing them, and the finishing work had to be done by the future residents themselves. Individual and cooperative housing construction and house-building from one's own resources have become widespread.

These and many other extraordinary measures have permitted radically increasing the construction rate. Suffice it to say that over the last three years the citizens of Kazakhstan have received over 1,700,000 square meters of housing space above the plan, and the republic has achieved first place in the country in terms of the construction rate. Is that not convincing evidence in affirmation of the perestroika processes?

The next priority direction for our work is—consumer goods. Has there been much change here? Judge for yourselves: whereas on 1 January 1985, 60 percent of all goods sold had been imported from outside Kazakhstan, at present the figure is 43 percent. The remaining production takes place in the republic. And once again, these positive achievements have become possible thanks to perestroika.

Today we Kazakhstanites have had our hands untied, as they say, in many sectors. By virtue of rapid and inexpensive construction of production modules, light industry has begun to develop at an accelerated rate. Production of radio and electronic articles in great demand among the public is now being organized in facilities vacated as a result of reducing various office services.

Since 1988 the right has been granted for industrial processing of leather and fur raw materials. In the last year alone, five shops for production of leather and fur goods for local sales, have been set up in the republic. A number of mutually-profitable contracts have been concluded with foreign partners for construction of modern production facilities for processing furs and hides, and for making fashionable clothing from them. This in turn promotes the development of farms on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, specializing in raising fur-bearing animals.

A decision is now being taken which permits radically increasing production of consumer goods in the republic. We are talking about re-profiling a part of the capacity of defense enterprises to produce complex household technology—modern refrigerators, and sewing and washing machines. There is every basis to hope

that when their manufacture commences, the current difficulties in the republic in terms of financial circulation will be removed to a significant degree.

At the present time the situation is, to put it bluntly, not an easy one. It is for this very reason that it was necessary to appeal to the appropriate union authorities with a request for support. But not with monetary support, for issuing currency; but a positive solution to the problem of the sale of our above-plan raw-material products to certain foreign states in exchange for food and manufactured goods. Such freedom of action would permit the republic to liquidate the existing budget deficit in a short period.

As you can see, we have had quite a few positive achievements in many important sectors of perestroika. But as they say, we also have more difficulties than we need. And this reaffirms the thoughts expressed at the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, on the fact that perestroika is not yet going smoothly everywhere; at times it is contradictory; and a lot of people are not yet satisfied with its result rate.

But what is the matter? Why have the efforts, which have been embodied in real, visible achievements, nevertheless not brought satisfaction, and do not provide an opportunity to heave a sigh of relief and say: the life of the Soviet people has become immeasurably better, richer and happier?

I do not think that perestroika is to blame for this. The course for renewal of society which was plotted by the party is the only true course, the only proper one, and on the highest plane the one necessary to pull the country out of the breach. But too many major tears have been made in the fabric of our economic, social and political life that one can hope to completely eliminate them in a short time. What is needed here is stubborn, lengthy work, aimed not only at solving the social and economic problems, but the psychological and moral-education problems as well.

In this connection, someone might try to show that, just as before, the people are being called upon to pull their belts a little tighter, to buckle down to hard labor without looking up, and without any hope for any kind of near-term prospects for improving their lives. Not so. Putting the question thus would be fundamentally incorrect, and would be in conflict with the hopes and aspirations of the people, which have even thus suffered far too many casualties. The party is choosing a different route, a more concrete one, which responds to the everyday needs of the populace; namely: along with the gradual and persistent offensive along the entire broad front of perestroika, to focus primary attention on the priority, on the most severe social problems, and to achieve their solution in a compressed period, come hell or high water.

To try to take in everything at once today, to try to comprehend the incomprehensible—means to fritter away our forces, to erode the dam of perestroika, to undermine the people's faith in the party and toward its revolutionary ideals. And we must not permit this to happen under any circumstances.

While proceeding from the situation which has come to pass, we must be very careful, I would say even hypercritical in our approach to analysis of what we have achieved, and not under any circumstances give in to euphoria over intermediate successes. Time does not permit us to wait until someone "wheels out" this or that problem. We should, while trying to overcome events, ourselves seek out the sore spots and the means of eliminating them, whether it be the food problem, housing, ecology, international or any other problem.

It is time to fully acknowledge that until now Kazakhstan has occupied one of the last places in the country in terms of the standard of living. In 1985 annual per capita goods turnover in the republic amounted to 984 rubles; today, it is 1,071 rubles. It would seem there was an increase. But the nationwide average amounts to 1,282 rubles, and in the Estonian SSR it is even higher—1,965 rubles. As you can see, we still have a long way to go to reach these levels.

And you see, per capita goods turnover is an indicator of the people's purchasing power, and consequently their standard of living. What are the reasons for the lag here? There are at least three. First there is the objective factor—there is a significant number of families with many children in the republic. In these families, for every worker there are more children and dependents than in other regions of the country. Secondly, we have a low level of high-technology industry to provide high national income. Thirdly, we are experiencing a serious shortage of consumer goods.

We must proceed from these causes in organizing our work and find effective approaches to solving the entire complex of problems.

Materials of the latest session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, at which the complex of questions associated with protecting public health was discussed, received broad resonance in the country. There is no point in repeating the numerous factors which characterize the extremely low level of development of this vital, in the literal sense of the word, social sphere. The level of health care and its material base will not stand up to any kind of criticism. The most elementary items are absent. In many rayons there is little more than 100 liters of water per resident per day, which is below the norm by a factor of five. What can one say here about other reasons for the high rate of tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, and severe gastro-intestinal infections, as well as the excessively high infant mortality rate?

And although in recent times, as a result of taking emergency measures, we have begun to notice certain changes for the better: specifically, we have finally managed to fulfill the tasks for introducing health-care projects, our lag behind other union republics remains an enormous one, as before. In order to achieve their level, we must work persistently, and not for just one year.

Or take the question of housing construction, of which many have become accustomed to speak with justifiable bitterness. Yes, the approaches which have been found are significantly changing the situation for the better. But it would not be wrong to pour "a little cold water" on those whose heads are spinning from success. After all, the tasks which is being solved is the minimal one; it answers to a certain extent the interests of only those waiting in line who have less than six square meters of living space per family member; moreover, these "lucky ones" are to receive only nine square meters per person and no more.

But even here we cannot avoid guile: we close our eyes to the fact that thousands upon thousands of people still live in dug-out earth and mud-wattle hovels, which it is shameful to call human habitat. And they are not placed on the waiting list, because they live in the so-called "private" sector.

Just the other day I managed to revisit Guryev Oblast, way out in the remotest area. Honestly, one's heart breaks when one sees the severe conditions in which people are forced to live—and not for a year or two, but their entire lives! We were forced to make a special request to republic television to film these and other settlements situated on other oblasts, where the situation is not a bit better, in order to show these scenes to the present-day aktiv. When you see them, I am convinced you will understand what strong feelings can grip a person.

Here is what I am thinking about in this connection. In the course of the recently-held elections for People's Deputies of the USSR, some of the well-known party and Soviet leaders of rather high rank failed to receive the support of the electorate, including the leaders of Leningrad who were rejected by the voters. Because of the election results, a joint plenum of the party obkom and gorkom was held there, the materials of which you are already familiar with from the press. If you will recall, the plenum arrived at the conclusion that one of the principal reasons, which had a negative influence on the electors toward the candidates, was their lack of attention to realization of the social problems in the city. And so, do the people of, say, Kzyl-Orda or Uralsk, Chimkent or Karaganda really live better than those in Leningrad? And you see, here, party leaders experienced not the slightest discomfort in the course of the election campaign!

Of course, it is not a matter of our leaders devoting greater attention to social problems than the Leningrad leaders. More likely the reverse is true. And it is not a

matter of the fact that the people who live in the remote parts of Kazakhstan are completely satisfied with their situation. It is a matter of particular delicacy to the people and, perhaps owing to their inherent national reticence and modesty, they are unable to express decisive disagreement with their living conditions which are unworthy of human conditions. For them even the insignificant changes for the better which we have managed to achieve mean a great deal, and the people from their spiritual generosity at times do not disdain from showing gratitude to their leaders.

However, some people do not consider these circumstances in the same manner, and are prepared to take the fact of their unanimous election as Deputies of the USSR as the result of having achieved truly enormous changes, and for their personal merit. This, of course, is altogether not so! I think that in an atmosphere of developing democracy and glasnost the people can very quickly grasp just who is who, and they will cease to be subservient to their leaders, who take a who-gives-a-damn attitude toward their wants and needs.

It is time to acquire the ability to forestall possible conflicts, and to remove social tensions in a timely manner. A good example of this is the recently-adopted decree of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, directed toward rendering extraordinary social assistance to a number of the rayons in the republic which are lagging behind in their development and find themselves in a very serious situation. Before the end of the current five-year-plan it is envisaged to introduce 200,000 square meters of housing there, and in the following five-year-plan over a million square meters more. In addition, it is planned to build general-educational schools for 63,500 students, as well as a large number of regional hospitals, polyclinics, and municipal-housing and cultural-domestic projects.

I would hope that the administrators of the ministries and agencies given the responsibility for carrying out the given decree would increase their responsibility for rational use of the resources allocated to them would not take a perfunctory attitude toward the matter entrusted to them, but a statesman-like approach considering not only today's needs, but also the needs of tomorrow for the citizens of these rayons. We must build in such a matter that settlements situated even in the most remote parts, would have comfortable housing with sewage, running water, heat, good roads, and so on.

It is also proper to think about centralized supply of food to lagging rayons. At the present time food stocks allocated to the oblasts are distributed on an averaged basis, without considering the real situation in this or that rayon. Therefore we have not yet had to speak about any kind of special concern or priority attention to those experiencing severe want.

Solution of these and other urgent tasks is closely associated with the level of responsibility of party, soviet and economic administrators for carrying out the obligations entrusted to them. And it is no accident that it is precisely to this moral aspect, which characterizes the cast of mind of a communist—a member of an elected party organ—that the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum devoted such rigid attention.

Unfortunately, we are forced to verify that in our republic far from all communists, on whom the special trust of their comrades in the party has been bestowed, acknowledge their role in asserting perestroika. There are instances which testify to not only the passive behavior of certain party leaders, but also to such of their activities which are directly at odds with the demands of the party, and which are dealing a direct blow to its prestige.

Thus, in March of this year, the republic newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA published "Double Bookkeeping," a critical article about significant shortcomings in the activity of the Taskeskiy Party Raykom of Semipalatinsk Oblast, and also of gross violations of the norms of party life and social justice committed in the rayon. Literally several days later, the Kazakh CP Central Committee received a refutation of the publication from the Semipalatinsk Obkom, demanding that the journalist who was so bold as to criticize the rayon leadership be "called to order." A special commission had to be formed to clear up the conflict. And here are some of the additional details which came out in the course of its work:

It turns out that A.S. Akhmetova, the wife of Taskeskiy Party Raykom First Secretary D.S. Sultanov works right along side him in the post of deputy director of the ideological department, and that officials on the staff see her as none other than the "boss." And not without reason. For example, Akhmetova wished to get a passenger car out of turn, and the raykom buro then and there issued the appropriate permission, basing it on none other than..."improving the organization of Marxist-Leninist education in the rayon."

A similar attitude toward the distribution of social benefits is characteristic of a number of other party committee leaders as well. For example, Raykom Secretary N.I. Bosikova lived in a hotel for a long period of time, but she paid the 319 ruble bill for her stay nine months later, and only after the members of the auditing commission pointed out to her the impropriety of such a debt. With a family of four people, Bosikova occupied a detached house with almost 80 square meters of space, knowing full well that it was intended for a family with a lot of children which was on the waiting list.

The immorality of the leadership was even more monstrously reflected in the mores which prevail in the rayon. Here is just one characteristic feature: Last year an attraction was set up at Tasbulak Sovkhoz for a country holiday—the key to an apartment was placed at

the top of a smooth pole. Whoever is the most adept and strongest would be the new occupant, inasmuch as an invalid or a mother with lots of children would not be able to climb the pole in a hundred years...

Incidentally, it is well known that this sovkhoz is one of the worst in the rayon in terms of production indicators, and its director, O. Chaykenov is not only incapable of properly managing his affairs, he also permits a grossly despotic attitude toward the farm workers. However, he is getting away with all of this. And it is not surprising, since Chaykenov knows how to show gratitude to the leadership: on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the deficit-ridden sovkhoz, he threw a banquet which Party Raykom First Secretary Sultanov did not refuse to attend.

In a word, the inspection showed that in the evaluation of the improper actions of the communist administrators in the rayon, and I believe in the oblast as well, improper "double bookkeeping" does indeed take place.

Of course, all these instances are out of the common run, and testify not so much to irresponsibility as much as to violation by communists of the norms of common human mores. But you see, one has to cope right and left with the unobliging attitude of party members toward observance of Soviet laws, and carrying out party decisions. Moreover, at times they look at these offenses, as they say, through their fingers.

People are truly happy about the fact that perestroika has provided a mighty impulse to the development of democracy and glasnost, and has opened the broad floodgates of political activeness of the masses. But one cannot help noticing the side effects of a clearly negative nature which arise at the same time. It is no secret that certain persons, among whom there are unfortunately communists as well, are trying to substitute permissiveness for democracy, and do not hesitate to take actions which lead to undermining constitutional legality.

While analyzing the situation which has come to pass and citing historical parallels, we once again observe an amazing similarity between the events which took place at the dawn of Soviet rule and at the current turning point in the life of our society. Here is what V.I. Lenin said in his report at the Second All Russian Congress of Political Education Committees in 1921: "When the people changed to the new economic conditions, they did not stop to think about what would come of it and how it must be built in the new way. Without going through a stage of general discussion, it was not possible to begin anything; because for tens and hundreds of years the people had lived under a ban on discussing anything, and the revolution could not develop in any other way than by going through a period of holding common, universal meetings on all questions." And later on, he made a very important point for our times: "If we learn in time how to distinguish what is needed for holding meetings, and what is necessary for governing, only then will we be able to reach the pinnacle of a Soviet Republic."

Some people, of course, do not like firm rule and strict demands. Especially those who, under the cover of perestroika slogans, would like to substitute anarchy and permissiveness for democracy, and turn the rights granted them by perestroika against observance of Soviet laws.

The situation is exacerbated also by the fact that in the new and yet unfamiliar situation, certain party committees and soviet, trade-union and law-enforcement organs are displaying confusion and have practically curtailed their work on strengthening discipline and observance of the law. As a result, the criminal situation in the republic has gotten much worse in recent times. For example, for the first four months of the present year, the crime rate has increased by 31.5 percent and severe crimes by almost 41 percent. An especially critical situation has come to pass in Alma Ata and in Guryev, Dzhambul, Karaganda, Taldy-Kurgan, Ural and Tselinograd Oblasts.

Analysis shows that the make-up of the corps of deputies has become highly diverse. It includes communists and non-party members, people of various ages and fates, some of whom have extraordinary and even eccentric views for solving this or that problem. Hence, at this time, on the eve of the Congress of People's Deputies, consolidation of the people's representatives, their solidarity and unity are becoming especially important, in terms of the fundamental interests of the people and the interests of perestroika.

I speak of this because of the existence of certain centrifugal forces which are striving for disunity on the eve of the congress, for setting up groups expressing coalition interests. One of the numerous testimonies to this is a notice in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI describing the fact that a group of deputies assembled in Moscow—about 15 people—to discuss important question of deputy activities. But what sort of problem was on the minds of the people's representatives? It turns out, distribution of honoraria between the deputies who work "beyond the Kremlin walls," and all the rest. That is certainly a "burning" issue today, is it not?

We must keep in mind that completely unacceptable proposals can be put forward at the congress under the guise of defending perestroika. After all, it is no secret that, for example, certain newly-elected deputies have spoken out openly for repeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukaz, "On the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Gatherings, Meetings, Street Processions and Demonstrations in the USSR." I want you to notice, that they are talking about the Ukaz, about standards of conduct. In other words, whoever speaks out against it is in essence an opponent of order in conducting public measures of one sort or another, and stands for anarchy in our society. Can such a demand be acceptable for a mature person, on whom the people have bestowed their trust? I think the answer here is

found in one word: democracy—this is the rule of the people, and no rule can exist without discipline and order; without these there is no democracy.

Every people's deputy must have a reliable civic immunization against the dangerous intrigues of the enemies of perestroika, no matter what kind of ultra-democratic costumes they put on. Along with the people's representatives from the other fraternal republics we must decisively assert justice for all, and not just regional justice; and support that which promotes the strengthening of the USSR and not that which divides the people into separate national quarters.

In this connection, the people of Kazakhstan are greatly concerned about the phenomena taking place in various regions of the country, which hardly support improvement of inter-ethnic relations. There, large social formations are being set up along nationalist lines, respected citizens are being plastered with insulting labels such as "migrant," and absurd but not at all harmless demands are being raised for creating "our own" national army, "our own" money, and so on.

Does all this have anything at all to do with the perestroika processes? Certainly not! After all, the purpose of perestroika was pointed out in the report at the celebration in honor of the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution, which concludes with the words, "...to completely restore both in theory and in practice Lenin's conception of socialism, which gives first priority to the man of labor, with his ideals and interests; and to humanitarian values in the economy, social and political relationships, and in culture."

I believe that the forthcoming Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee Plenum on questions of perfecting inter-ethnic relationships will provide a precise evaluation and the purpose of the negative phenomena which are now going on. One thing is clear: We must fight for that which unites the people, and decisively rebuff everything that divides them. Every person has the right to the feeling of equality in any corner of our country, and everyone is obliged to respect the dignity, culture and language of the people of the republic in which he lives.

Turkmen CP CC Buro Calls for End to 'Illegal' Use of Student Labor

18300626 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 5 Apr 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Turkmen CP Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] The Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro has adopted a resolution, "On the Illegal Use of Students of the Republic for Agricultural Work."

The resolution notes that recently in the republic's agro-industrial complexes several positive changes have begun in the areas of increasing the all-round mechanization of cotton production, introducing new forms of management and organization of production, and reducing the volume of labor-intensive work. Last year the labor productivity in cotton production was 10.5 percent higher than in 1985, and the level of mechanization in harvesting was 12 percent higher.

At the same time, last year's figures testify to the fact that the obkoms and raykoms have not drawn conclusions from the demands of directive organs and have not taken the necessary measures to terminate the illegal act of enlisting students to cultivate cotton and other agricultural crops or to take part in the harvest of these crops, to the detriment of the youths' education and health. Testifying to the large-scale violation of existing legislation are notes from the Procurator's Office of the TuSSR and from the republic's Ministry of People's Education as well as the article "Cotton Molech," published in the newspaper "Pravda" on November 24, 1988, and letters by workers.

The analysis presented has shown that groups of students from comprehensive secondary schools, vocational-training schools and specialized secondary education institutions were enlisted to harvest cotton wool for periods of 10 to 30 days.

A significant number of violations with respect to enlisting students for agricultural work have been permitted in the Mary, Vekil'-Bazar, Sakar-Chaga, Charshanga, Deynau, Tedzhen, Kirov, Tashauz, and Kunya-Urgench rayons.

The absence of proper organization and labor safety for agricultural work leads to occupational injuries and accidents. To the detriment of the education and health of school children, the use of child labor within the framework of family and tenant agreements is not being prevented. Neither the Ministry of People's Education of the TuSSR nor its organs in the localities and pedagogical collectives have taken a firm, principled stand on this issue.

Party and soviet organs, the republic's Ministry of People's Education, and Gosagroprom [State Agro-industrial Committee] of the TuSSR are not carrying out purposeful work towards organizing an effective system for training and educating students and making a realistic contribution towards meeting the tasks of production outlined by the March (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Many student production brigades are created nominally; they are not always provided with irrigated strips and the necessary agricultural equipment. A network of subsidiary farms and school camps for labor and rest is developing at an extremely slow pace.

The Buro of the Turkmen CP Central Committee finds absolutely intolerable the way in which many directors of party, soviet, and economic organs and of kolkhozes and sovkhozes rely on hand labor from masses of school children and students rather than on purposeful steps towards the wide-scale introduction of advanced agrotechnics, intensive technologies, and all-round mechanization. These directors also carry out weak organizational and political work in their efforts to draw the entire able-bodied rural population into social production and ensure the population's high degree of labor activity and its constructive attitude towards the task at hand.

The Buro of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, condemning the wanton practice of illegally enlisting the republic's students to cultivate and harvest agricultural crops, has demanded that the oblispolkom and rayispolkom as well as Gosagroprom of the TuSSR and the Ministry of People's Education of the TuSSR end this illegal diversion of students from comprehensive secondary schools, vocational training schools and other educational institutions for agricultural work.

The obkoms and raykoms should institute strict party proceedings against communist directors who have allowed violations to take place.

The obkoms and raykoms under the republic's auspices, as well as the Ministry of People's Education and Gosagroprom of the TuSSR are to inform the Turkmen CP Central Committee about their progress in implementing this resolution by June 1st and November 1st, 1989.

Both the ideological department (under B.M. Soyunov) and the agrarian department (under L.A. Kruglyakov) of the Turkmen CP Central Committee are entrusted with the implementation of this resolution.

UzSSR: Samarkand Oblast Territory Transferred to Bukhara Oblast

18300686a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 May p 1

[Ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On the Transfer of a Part of the Territory of Samarkand Oblast to Bukhara Oblast"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium hereby resolves:

1. To grant the petitions of the executive committees of Samarkand and Bukhara oblast soviets of people's deputies to transfer a part of the territory of Samarkand Oblast, consisting of Kanimekhskiy, Kyzyltepinskiy, Navoiyskiy, Tamdinskiy and Uchukuduskiy rayons, including the cities of Uchkuduk, Navoi, and Zarafshan, to Bukhara Oblast.

2. To recognize the deputies of the Samarkand Oblast Soviet, who were elected from voting districts situated within the territory being transferred, as deputies of Bukhara Oblast.

[Signed] M. Ibragimov, chairman, Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

L. Bekkulbekova, secretary, Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Tashkent 16 May 1989

New Rayons Established Within Uzbek Oblasts

18300686b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
18 May 89 p 1

[Ukase of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On the Introduction of Changes in the Administrative Territorial Divisions of the Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium hereby resolves:

1. To ratify the Ukase of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on removing Nukusskiy Rayon from the administrative jurisdiction of the Nukus City Soviet of People's Deputies and transferring the administrative center of this rayon from the city of Nukus to the urban settlement [gorodskiy poselok] of Akmangit.

2. To grant the petitions of the executive committees of Andizhan, Bukhara, Namangan, Samarkand, Syr-Darya, Tashkent, Fergana, and Khorezm oblast soviets of people's deputies to form the following rayons as constituent parts of the Uzbek SSR:

Bozskiy Rayon, Andizhan Oblast, with administrative center in the urban settlement of Boz, having the villages [kishlaki] imeni Kirov, imeni M. Dzhahalov, and Khavast, previously of Komsomolabadskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction; the administrative center of Komsomolabadskiy Rayon being transferred from the urban settlement of Boz to the settlement [naselelennyy punkt] of Akaptyn.

Alatskiy Rayon, Bukhara Oblast, with administrative center in the city of Alat, having the villages of Bakhoristan, Gulistan, Denay, Dzhumabazar, Pakhtakor, Tal-kansayat, Chandyr, and Charbag, previously of Karakulskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction.

Peshkunskiy Rayon, Bukhara Oblast, with administrative center in the agricultural settlement of Yangibazar, having the villages imeni Abu Ali ibn Siny, Varakhsha, Dzhangelddy, Zandani, Kalaymirishkar, Peshku, and Yangibazar, previously of Pomitanskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction.

Narynskiy Rayon. Namangan Oblast, with administrative center in the city of Khakkulabad, having the villages of Leninabad, Narynkapa, Pakhtakishlak, Tuda, imeni U. Yusupov, and Uchtepa, previously of Uchkurganskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction.

Chartanskiy Rayon. Namangan Oblast, with administrative center in the city of Chartak, having the villages of Aykiron, Alikhan, Bagistan, Gulshan, Katraskan, imeni Lenin, imeni Narimanov, and Paramon, previously of Yangikurganskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction; the administrative center Yangikurganskiy Rayon being transferred from Chartak to the urban settlement of Yangikurgan.

Kashrabadskiy Rayon. Samarkand Oblast, with administrative center in the settlement of Koshrabad, having the villages of Aktepa, imeni Akhunbabayev, Zarmitan, Koshrabad, and the territory of the village of Kurli at the boundary of the Kommunist Sovkhoz, previously of Ishtykhanskiy Rayon, together with Kultusun Village, and a part of the territory of Leninism Village at the boundary of imeni XXV Partsyezd, previously of Payaryskiy Rayon, and also Dzhush Village, previously of Nuratinskiy Rayon.

Yazyavanskiy Rayon. Khorezm Oblast, with administrative center in the urban settlement of Yangibazar, having the villages of Ayakdorman, Bagalan, Bashkirshikh, Bozkala, imeni Gagarin, Uygur, Chubalanchi, and Shirinkugrad, previously of Urgenskiy Rayon, within its jurisdiction.

The territory of **Dzhizakskiy Rayon.** Sur-Darya Oblast, is hereby removed from the administrative jurisdiction of the Dzhizak City Soviet of People's Deputies, and the territory of **Yangiyulskiy Rayon.** Tashkent Oblast, is removed from the administrative jurisdiction of the Yangiyul City Soviet of People's Deputies. The administrative center of Dzhizakskiy Rayon is transferred from the city of Dzhizak to the agricultural settlement of Uchtepa, and the administrative center of Yangiyulskiy Rayon is transferred from the city of Yangiyul to the urban settlement of Gulbakhor.

3. To recognize the deputies of city and rayon soviets, elected within voting districts situated in the territories of the newly formed rayons, as deputies of these rayon soviets of people's deputies.

5. To have the executive committees of Andizhan, Bukhara, Namangan, Samarkand, Sur-Darya, Tashkent, Fergana, and Khorezm oblast soviets of people's deputies take all organizational measures necessary for the formation of the rayons indicated.

[Signed] M. Ibragimov, chairman, Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
L. Bekkulbekova, secretary, Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Tashkent 17 May 1989

**Journalists' Cooperative Plans Services to
'Compete' with TASS**

18300732 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 5,
May 89 p 35

[Interview with V. Fedinin, council member, doctor of economic sciences: "Glasnost—This is What Moscow Journalists Call Their Cooperative Agency"]

[Text] This is one of the youngest cooperative associations. It includes professional journalists of pension age who in the past have worked mainly for the central newspapers. Some of them have held leading management positions on the editorial staffs, there are candidates and even doctors of sciences, and many of them have been awarded honorary titles. So it is a quite solid and qualified collective. That which the journalist cooperative intends to engage in promises to be really useful and necessary. This is discussed by one of the members of the council, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Fedinin:

[Fedinin] The first question is probably why "glasnost"? It would be difficult to find a word that is dearer and closer to us journalists. Essentially, our profession cannot exist without glasnost. And we are engaged precisely in our professional work. With the indispensable condition that the results of our work are made public. Hence also "glasnost." Now about the agency's structure, and from it, incidentally, one can understand the goals and tasks of the cooperative. It has the following divisions: editorial; photo reporting and makeup; training and education; advertising and information; international ties; editorial and technical. And there is also public affairs—legal issues, protection of the rights of the individual and labor collectives, and consultation.

Everything would seem to be understandable or at least familiar. But with respect to a newspaper or publishing house. And in a cooperative, without its own printing base?...

We are a kind of intermediary, but mainly professional and not commercial like other associations. Our work, naturally, will be paid for, but it is journalistic work. The intermediary functions are secondary—the derived side of our activity.

[ZHURNALIST] Can you be more specific?

[Fedinin] Of course. This can be the editing of articles or books, their preparation for publication, and assistance in writing memoirs and monographs, or reviewing manuscripts... By agreement with the enterprises and departments we will write the histories of plants, factories, and kolkhozes [collective farms]...

[ZHURNALIST] And the publication? As it were, the final result?

[Fedinin] We shall help our clients to establish contacts with the press organs that are the most appropriate for the given work. After all, not to be immodest, but we know our way around in this world.

[ZHURNALIST] Your own creative work? Is it also given a place in the plans of the agency?

[Fedinin] Yes, and a significant one. We shall engage in analysis, study, and publicity of advanced experience of restructuring in economics and science and the development of modern management models. We shall prepare for the output of three annual subscription publications for the local press: 12 discussions of perestroika; 12 sets of articles on the subject "News in Sciences and Technology"; and sets of articles on the subject "Innovations in Science and Technology" for general newspapers.

[ZHURNALIST] What about TASS competition?

[Fedinin] Is that so bad? Over many years we have become well aware of what a monopoly and a dictatorship of the producer are and what these cost in terms of quality. The same laws are in effect for journalists. Let there be competition. We are ready to accept the challenge.

[ZHURNALIST] What areas of your work would you like specifically to mention? This interview is an advertisement to some degree.

[Fedinin] I shall not conceal the fact that we are very much in need of advertising: After all, nobody knows us. I should like for our colleagues to know about this. We are prepared to review newspapers and give recommendations about how to make them more interesting both in content and in external appearance. In conjunction with the local divisions of the Union of Journalists and the trade union central committees we shall conduct branch seminars for editors of general newspapers; we are prepared to represent the interests of one local publication or another in Moscow, with something like correspondence points, and to fulfill their one-time instructions—to order an article for the author, to visit press conferences, and so forth. We are even prepared to help purchase office equipment, or order tickets or a hotel... In their work journalists have to solve many mundane problems as well and everyone knows how difficult this is—why not help our colleagues?

[ZHURNALIST] This is a question that will probably interest everyone. This help, of course, is not free...

[Fedinin] Naturally. If there are state rates for the work we perform we shall adhere to them plus a small percentage for overhead. If there are no state rates we shall make our own calculations, but again they shall be so that everyone can afford our services. It is not without reason that our sponsor is the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Consumer Services and its board.

[ZHURNALIST] And an impertinent question...

[Fedinin] I know, about our earnings. So far we simply have none. To begin our group invested its own money in order to get off the ground. But we have already established the rules. The ceiling of our earnings is the monthly salary of a member of the editorial board of a central newspaper, that is, 400 rubles. If our work is successful we can be paid a monthly bonus, but no more than the salary. We shall not accept honoraria (unless, of course, it is our own article or other independent creative work). The staff of workers is limited, but as far as cooperation under contract goes—there can be as much of that as anyone wants! A certain percentage of the profit will be deducted into the fund for assistance to elderly journalists through the journalists fund. We want to establish one competitive stipend of a gifted student from a poor family.

[ZHURNALIST] One must say that the prospects look attractive.

[Fedinin] We find them so. It would be possible to discuss other areas of our work—advertising, communications with ministries and departments, but I am a journalist myself and I understand what a space on a page is. Therefore I shall limit what I say. I wish only to add that for those who are interested in our agency not only out of natural curiosity but also practically, the address is: 123242, Moscow, Ploshchad Vostaniya, 1, 1/ya 371. Journalist Cooperative Agency "Glasnost." Telex: 114040, "Archives." There are also telephones: 257-27-08; 257-29-06; 285-01-54. If there are any changes we shall notify you.

[ZHURNALIST] Well, all that is left is to wish Glasnost success.

[Fedinin] Thank you. We hope for it very much.

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Latvian, Lithuanian Journalists on Separation from USSR Journalists' Union

18300714 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 4, Apr 89 pp 40-41

[Interview with Viktor Avotins, chairman of the Latvian Union of Journalists, and Domiyonas Shnyukas, chairman of the Lithuanian Union of Journalists, by ZHURNALIST correspondent S. Borisova: "Facing One Another: The Chairmen of the Unions of Journalists of Latvia and Lithuania, Viktor Avotins and Domiyonas Shnyukas. Respond to Our Correspondent's Questions"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Recently, our colleagues have been asking the magazine's editorial staff the following question: is it true that your republic Unions of Journalists are dropping out of the USSR Union of Journalists?

[V. Avotins] I believe that the normal process of decentralization is occurring now. A charter for the republic union is being worked out, which will define our organization as a sovereign, voluntary and creative one, which Latvia's professional journalists will join. Breaking off relations with the USSR Union of Journalists, in my opinion, would mean taking a position which is short-sighted and detrimental for our profession. It is another matter to base these relations on mutually acceptable agreements.

The necessity for such a reorganization has been dictated by life and its purpose is to stimulate the creative activism of the mass media with the help of moral and economic levers. Up till now, this has not been the case. For example, the republic's highest-circulation newspaper, SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, operates under the same conditions as any unprofitable one. While bringing in large profits for the publishing house, the editorial office does not have the right, without special permission, to purchase an extra typewriter, to hire an associate not provided for by the table of organization or to organize a just payment for the correspondents in accordance with their ability and talents. It is no accident that it is precisely in this editorial office that the model of newspaper cost accounting was born and the journalists decided to lease their own newspaper and sign a contract with the publishing house wherein the rights and obligations of the contracting parties are clearly regulated.

Our evening paper, RIGAS BALSS, is also following its own path to cost accounting.

At an extraordinary congress of the republic's union in February, a lot was said about the need for direct ties with international journalist organizations. At present, we are permitted, for example, to accept an invitation from colleagues from any country only with the permission of the USSR Union of Journalists. Establishing international contacts each time through the USSR Union of Journalists, I would say, is inefficient and not the best way, this is an extra step. It seems to me that this situation migrated into our time of perestroyka from the stagnant past and it is based on a lack of trust in journalists locally. There is nothing surprising about the fact that this situation has been placed in doubt.

There have been a lot of debates about the republic's journalist fund. In our opinion, it is completely unnecessary. By using even part of this money, we could build housing for journalists, holiday hotels, houses of creativity and veterans' homes—in short, we could, in fact, carry out the social and economic program.

[D. Shnyukas] The discussions about the separation of the Lithuanian republic's union from the all-union organization are incorrect. Neither in the Charter of the Lithuanian Union of Journalists, adopted at the Eighth Extraordinary Congress in January nor in the congress' declarations is there such a statement. Article 29 of the charter states: "The Lithuanian Union of Journalists

regulates its own relations with the USSR Union of Journalists and with the unions of journalists of the union republics by agreements."

Both the adopted charter and the cited article do not signify any kind of separatism on the part of Lithuania's journalists, but rather, a logical consequence of the thinking of the time of perestroika, democratization and glasnost and a return to the Leninist understanding of the concept of a voluntary federation. Indeed, even the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established on the basis of an agreement, the principles of which were forgotten and trampled on during the years of Stalinism and, even now, have not been completely restored.

The USSR Union of Journalists was organized during the time of flourishing of the voluntaristic method of pressuring the apparatus of the elective organs. A charter was sent down from above, which ignored the federative structure of our country: the journalists of the largest republic—the Russian Federation—do not have their own union. Lithuania's journalists believe that the prestigiousness, cohesion and might of our union should be established not by efforts from above, but rather, by the common desires, goals and resourcefulness of our colleagues in the republics, krays and oblasts.

A creative union is not the army and not a state mechanism and its activities should be based on the principles of voluntariness and cooperation and not on subordination and blind obedience. Nothing seditious will occur if, in the future, the USSR Union of Journalists becomes an association of, say, workers from the press, the book-publishing houses, television and radio and regional or national journalist formations. The last word here should belong to the journalists themselves and not to the headquarters.

[Correspondent] In Lithuania, a charter for the republic's Union of Journalists has been adopted and, in Latvia, one is being worked out... How do your charters differ from the union one?

[V. Avotins] Our new charter is a reflection of the specifics of the regions and the special features of the present day in the republic. Being debated in particular is the question of membership in the Union of Journalists. The main condition for joining our association is a high degree of creative activism and full-fledged publication in the newspaper columns, on the television screens or on radio. But where you work—in the editing department of personnel or in a plant department—is of no importance.

The changes will also affect the television studio workers. I believe that the existing situation is unjust: only editors are accepted into our union. Are they better than the producers and the operators? Is it really possible to do a good program without their efforts? We are also

thinking about expanding acceptance into union to include workers from the chronicle film studios. Based on this very principle: the main condition is creativity.

Yet, all the same, it is early now to be talking about what our charter will be like in its final form. Several groups are now working on the draft and then it will be published in the republic's newspapers for widespread discussion. Only after this will the charter go into effect.

[D. Shnyukas] In principle, the charter adopted by us does not differ from the union one. Indeed, Lithuania's journalists have the very same goals as the journalists of the entire country—the struggle for perestroika, a national re-birth and the cooperation of the Soviet peoples and the spiritual renewal of society. Fixed in our charter are the national traditions and special features of Lithuanian journalism, the structure of the union and publishing and the publishing rights are clearly defined. The preamble states that our union is also the heir of the pre-war Lithuanian Union of Journalists, which was suppressed by the Stalinist officials in 1940. Its leadership included such subsequently well known people as Hero of Socialist Labor Yu. Paletskis, dramatist A. Gritsyus and many other talented writers.

Someone asked the question: "Why do you need this charter when there is an all-union one?" I usually respond: "Then why are there republic constitutions when there is an all-union one?"

I know that the journalists of Latvia and Estonia are working on their own charters and I see nothing bad in this: each republic has its own typical features and its own specifics. If this is reflected in the charter—what is so bad about this?

[Correspondent] How do you picture the relations under the new conditions of your journalist organization with the leadership of the USSR Union of Journalists?

[V. Avotins] I assume that the relations between us and the USSR Union of Journalists will be built on the basis of mutual agreements. If we do not turn our backs on one another, these will be normal, collegiate relations. I am certain that any questions, including monetary ones, can be solved not by dictate, but rather, by regulated contractual commitments.

[D. Shnyukas] How do I picture our relations? Well, it is not necessary to picture them, they exist—normal, business-like and, I would say, most cordial. In recent months, what has arrived from Moscow are not instructions, but rather, useful advice, on the possibility of jointly solving social problems and other questions of the life of journalists.

It is true that the legal registration of the new status of the Lithuanian Union of Journalists in the make-up of the USSR Union of Journalists is still ahead. Our

extraordinary congress instructed the board of the republic union to do this by means of an agreement with the USSR Union of Journalists. As I already stated, there is nothing in the charter of the republic's union, which contradicts the all-union one. Therefore, I see the agreement as being most elementary. But, as is well known, the conclusion of an agreement depends not just on the desire of one party...

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to my colleagues: do not fear our actions, trust us, come visit us! You will be convinced yourselves that, in our union, genuine searches for what is new are going on, searches for the realization of the ideas of perestroika.

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Uzbek Glavlit Official on Relaxed Press Censorship

18300650 Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA
in Russian 5 May 89 p 4

[Interview with Uzbek SSR Glavlit Deputy Chief Aleksandr Fedorovich Sileyenkov by correspondent Sergey Braginskiy : "A Man of Secrets"]

[Text] Not all that long ago to speak about the censorship organs was not a pleasant thing. Only journalists were well-informed about this service, and the rest of the people had only a vague idea... The curtain of secrecy seemed impenetrable. However, just last year, in an interview for IZVESTIYA, USSR Glavlit Chief V.A. Boldyrev stated that a proposal had been made to openly publish the Statute on Glavlit, and to provide for a mechanism for controlling the activity of Glavlit on the part of not only state organs, but the public as well, and above all the mass information media themselves.

KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, and no doubt other newspapers as well, has frequently felt the influence of censorship. Now, controversial situations arise much less often, although they do take place nevertheless. One such situation brought our correspondent to the Main Administration at the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers for Protecting State Secrets in the Press—Glavlit, to the office of Main Administration Deputy Chief Aleksandr Fedorovich Sileyenkov.

The topic of this conversation was the transition from a "cult of secrecy" to a secrecy of genuine state secrets, and to an information culture.

[Correspondent] Recently prominent Soviet commentators have increasingly called for abolishing all kinds of censorship, stating that this would best coincide with the laws of glasnost and democracy. How do you react to such sentiments?

[Sileyenkov] In principle, I can understand them. The press has in fact been discussing the question of transferring the protection of secrets directly to the publishers. But the fact of the matter is, and practical experience bears it out, that there is an objective need for our service. Every newspaper editor or publishing-house director has at his disposal a list of the information, the open publication of which is forbidden; nevertheless, articles are approved for publication which contain secret information. Not even the most experienced journalists and prominent scholars possess sufficient special knowledge on this subject. To this day our country suffers great losses both in the economic and in the defense arena, owing to materials finding their way into the press which should not have been allowed to do so.

Thus, on the whole, for the time being we must be the ones to protect state secrets in the press.

[Correspondent] I agree, if you are talking about genuine secrecy; but it happens that all this has been a lot like making a game of secrecy, and this disturbs the journalists very much. For a long time we were forbidden to write about the "Algoritm" Plant. And it took a visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev there to raise the curtain. The enterprise became the most popular and the most famous in the country, and all the country's newspapers wrote about it—about the shops at "Algoritm" which were still secret the day before, while photographers and TV cameramen were strolling about as if there never had been any secrets...

[Sileyenkov] Well, this was merely a coincidence. Prior to Mikhail Sergeevich's arrival the process of lifting the secrecy from certain previously-secret enterprises, ministries and agencies had already begun. Had that visit not taken place, journalists would have been given access to "Algoritm" and similar plants anyway.

[Correspondent] But why was it necessary to enshroud things in secrecy for many years in the absence of any secrets?

[Sileyenkov] That is the correct question—for what reason? You know, after all, that we do not compile the lists of bans and secrets. The compilers are the ministries and agencies themselves, whose interests were served by creating a curtain of secrecy around themselves, hiding behind it not so much state secrets, as much as their own shortcomings and violations.

There were quite a few zones closed to criticism. But the list has been re-examined and reduced by about one-third. Aeroflot, the USSR Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the army have been "opened up;" we can now speak about previously unpublicized ecological problems, and problems in health-care and education—and the world has not turned upside down.

[Correspondent] Understanding the senselessness and even the danger of such limitations, have Glavlit authorities tried to change the situation in any way?

[Sileyenkov] We have proposed that certain limitations be lifted, but not all came to pass. If we had begun to talk sooner about narcotics addiction and prostitution; if we had revealed the crime statistics—it would have been immeasurably easier to fight these illnesses.

[Correspondent] No doubt about it, it has become more interesting to work in the press; now we may speak about a great deal without fear. And nevertheless one still gets the impression that glasnost is being somehow regulated; the central publications are much bolder and open, but until now there were a lot of things we were not allowed to do.

Let me cite an example: upon the "suggestion" of the censors we lifted the word "promedol" (an analgesic) out of one of the columns of our article on narcotics addiction. The explanation ensued that, "It is not necessary," they said, "to call attention to this substance, as it contains a narcotic." As if the narcotics addicts did not know this better than we! And how we resented it, when literally a week later, Yuriy Shchekochikhin cited promedol and other medicinal preparations in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Forgive me, Aleksandr Fedorovich, but at that time we were referring to local Glavlit officials as hypersensitives.

[Sileyenkov] And in vain! I understood your question. It is a question of the so-called limitations of an arbitrary nature. In other words, about limitations, the removal of which requires official permission. It would have been sufficient for you to get permission from the USSR Ministry of Public Health... I understand. It was late at night, the column was being sent up for signature, and there was no one to be found at the Ministry. But—procedure is procedure.

It is easier, of course, for the employees at the central newspapers and magazines. All the ministries are close by, and one simply has to cross the street; and what's more they have greater prestige. What's there to talk about here? Probably one should take care of one's concerns about one's materials sooner.

[Correspondent] Very well then, here's another example. At a briefing attended by the deputy minister of the republic internal affairs ministry, the subject was raised of special MVD units for clearing mass disturbances, which were equipped appropriately. And so we wrote, "special units," but they said to us, "It is not allowed." Then we set out to see the general, even though it was midnight. After we found him, we explained the situation. Stating that "If it's not allowed, it's not allowed," the general wrote "special reaction groups," and signed his name.

So here's the question: what is the difference here? Does it make sense to substitute one completely acceptable definition for another?

[Sileyenkov] In this concrete situation maybe it doesn't. But let's look at it from another aspect. There are situations which are outside our competence. And then we must have the approval of higher authority. Incidentally, there is another variant too. Glavlit has a data bank, and can easily determine whether the information in question has been published before or not. If it has been published—no problem.

I would like to add something with respect to "regulation of glasnost," as you put it; although, the word "regulation" is not appropriate here. I am convinced that journalists should take the regional situation into consideration, anticipate the reaction to their publication, and display professionalism and responsibility. You will agree that sometimes it is easier for a local press worker to evaluate events in the republic than for a Moscow correspondent.

[Correspondent] I certainly have no objection to that. But just the same, I cannot escape the thought that we here are more dependent on the local authorities and censors than our colleagues from the central publishers.

But—Let's go on to the next question. We often encounter problems when publishing materials about shortcomings in the army and the old men who are in charge, and about the excesses of the military bureaucratic machinery. In spite of the fact that the material contains no military secrets whatever, Glavlit officials at times suggest that we appeal to the military censors. Why?

[Sileyenkov] If the publication contains no specific military information, Glavlit alone makes the decision. We send materials to the military censors only when we absolutely have to.

[Correspondent] You have said that the list of information that cannot be published has been reduced by almost a third. What sort of information is it?

[Sileyenkov] First of all, many agencies have been opened to the press which were not all that secret to begin with; as I've already said, that includes transportation and medicine; and statistics on the crime rate are now available... Additionally, Glavlit has ceased controlling literature on philosophical sciences, atheism, pedagogy and archeology. And we are not the "curators" of the majority of the mass-circulation newspapers. In a word, the list has been purged of branch and departmental limitations; and all information, the publication of which causes no harm to the nation's defense and economic interests—is open. Moreover, modern technical means permit foreign intelligence to acquire a certain amount of information, and a ban on its broad publication would now simply not make any sense.

I must emphasize that, essentially, censorship, in the ordinary sense of the word, does not exist. But protection of state secrets does exist. We do not become involved in the substance; we control only facts.

Journalists and editors should understand: there are things which we must protect; if only because of the fact that prominent foreign intelligence specialists acknowledge that the press provides up to 90 percent of the information they require—political, military, scientific-technical, and economic.

[Correspondent] In connection with reductions in the list of secret information, has there been a reduction of the Glavlit staff?

[Sileyenkov] Yes, and a significant one.

[Correspondent] How do you operate?

[Sileyenkov] There are no special preparatory courses for Glavlit workers; there is no such academic institution. We receive graduates from various VUZ's—specialists in the humanities and in the technical and natural sciences. We train them here on the job, by our own efforts.

By Way of Postscript. UzSSR Glavlit Deputy Chief Aleksandr Fedorovich Sileyenkov is at the same time also chairman of the republic inter-agency commission on translation of Soviet and foreign literature from special archives [fondy] for general-purpose library archives. We have accumulated quite a few questions on this aspect of his activities too. But that is a topic for our next conversation...

Uzbek Youth Newspaper Provides Content Analysis of Own Reporting

18300649a Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 5 May 89 p 4

[Article by Andrey Semerkin: "Veritas! Veritas? Veritas...: A Mirror for the Newspaper"]

[Text] "You criticize everybody, but who criticizes you?" This is a question that journalists often hear. Actually there is no shortage of people willing to criticize the press. We get criticism from our publishers, our readers, official agencies, specialists, retirees... Verbally and in writing; from the podium and on park benches; in official documents and in letters to the editor. We get criticism, but that is not enough for us. To be more specific, what we do not get enough of is not abuse (there is plenty of that!) but rather constructive criticism which can help us determine the strong and weak points in our work.

Fortunately there exists a science called sociology, with its method for the quantitative study of social information, or "content analysis." On the basis of a method for content analysis of newspapers which was developed by

Ukrainian scientist A. Barishpolets we have analyzed KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA's content during the first six months of last year.

A few words about methodology. After each issue of our paper is published a quick vote is taken among the editorial staff to pick the best article in that issue. A book recording the results of these votes helped us take the first step: selecting articles. Then all the articles thus selected were read and analyzed according to a number of parameters. What we finally came up with were sheets of paper covered with neat rows of figures representing information; this process took several months.

Then we used a computer to process this information, a step which took several hours. The machine was as coquettish as a woman, claiming that it did not have enough memory or that it did not understand what was being asked of it. Engineer Aleksandr Goldenberg, the program's designer, waited patiently for its mood to change.

That moment came around dawn. A few minutes later the task was complete. After shaking Aleksandr Goldenberg's hand the author of the article you are now reading went... not to bed, but instead to start translating the information from the language of numbers into human language.

At all stages of this task our editorial staff was aided by young scientists Alisher Ikhamov, a candidate of sciences from the sociology lab at Tashkent University, and Yevgeniy Savelyev, a psychologist. Now our editorial staff possesses fairly objective information regarding its work, or in any event regarding the content of our best articles.

So far as we know this is the first time that a study of this type has been conducted in Uzbekistan. The first time, but not the last—in the future KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA plans to continue this sociological self-examination, and our readers are going to be participants in this highly interesting process.

It was no coincidence that we launched this new undertaking today: Press Day has traditionally been regarded as a day for dialogue between journalists and readers on the subject of how the press functions. That is why we are publishing this summary of the findings of our editorial staff's content analysis on 5 May.

So, who is writing? Our analysis indicates that in a majority of cases the newspaper's own correspondents write its best articles. That is only natural; journalism is for journalists. But glasnost is not a narrow professional concept, and it is unfortunate that young scientists, writers, students, schoolchildren and young engineers and workers have still not become very eagerly or, perhaps, very skillfully involved in defending their interests in the pages of our newspaper.

What are they writing about? In 33 cases out of 100 about events occurring in Tashkent. Our newspaper is obviously not paying enough attention to Bukhara, Kashkadarinskaya, Surkhandarinskaya and Khorezm-skaya oblasts. The Fergana Valley, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, Tashkent Oblast and Samarkand Oblast have it best; we write about them most frequently.

It would be naive to hope that this situation can be rectified through more frequent visits by our correspondents to those areas which are not presently receiving enough attention. That is not the whole problem; the problem is also about ways to strengthen overall contacts between KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA and its readers. Perhaps young journalists working for oblast and city newspapers or on the editorial staff of radio stations could help us overcome this lack of information by more frequently calling or writing to the KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA editorial offices.

The following figures describe the overall status of restructuring. In 45 cases out of 100 we were still writing about restructuring as an urgent necessity, in 20 cases as a desirable idea, in nine cases as a process already in progress and in eight cases as actual proven experience.

In other words, in those areas where we reported to our readers that there was a need for restructuring only in nine cases out of 100 had the process of restructuring begun, and in only eight cases had this process begun to produce results. It appears that we do not need to be doing agitation work to promote restructuring; everyone is already in favor of it, but the job is not being tackled very energetically. Do you agree with this assessment of the situation?

It is clear that restructuring is a very complex process, a "voyage into the unknown," and that the path ahead is a thorny one. What sort of conflicts are arising along that thorny path? In 30 percent of the cases the conflicts were of a social nature and in 17 percent of the cases of a moral nature; domestic conflicts and production morals "achieved" 12 percent, and purely production-related conflicts comprised just six percent. Could it be that there are no conflicts in the production realm? There are, but since until recently economics was not among our newspaper's top priorities we somehow lost sight of them. Now that situation has changed, and we think our readers have noticed the change.

Who gets written about? Here is a gallery of our heroes (they are listed in descending order, with those who are featured in our paper most often listed first, followed by those who appear less frequently): educators, cultural workers, engineers, internationalist soldiers, blue-collar workers, scientists, caring family members, journalists, party workers, Komsomol workers and heads of enterprises.

And here is a gallery of our villains, arranged in the same order: heads of enterprises, religious figures, drug addicts, VUZ instructors, cultural workers, schoolchildren, soviet officials, officials of public organizations, engineers and blue-collar workers.

For honesty's sake we must admit that one encounters villains in our newspaper less frequently than heroes by a factor of two. This conclusion is also born out by other content analysis data. Either we lack the desire to study the psychology of villains, or else we are repelled by their loathsomeness... In any event, both galleries show who comes under our scrutiny.

What do we focus on when an article contains neither a hero nor a villain, but instead examines some situation?

We would like to present to our readers one more gallery, this one listing the topics of our articles, regardless of whether they contain heroes or villains. The principle according to which this gallery is arranged is the same as before: problems of young people's spiritual development, school problems, the "Afghanistan" topic, religion, ecology, our country's history, personal life, youth music culture, the problems of young workers, democratization of Komsomol affairs; physical culture, rural problems, VUZ problems, the theater, life in children's homes, drug addiction, Komsomol history, political education, informal organizations, the problems of tekhnikums, patriotic education issues, our country's history, movies, choreography, women's councils, democratization in our lives, teenage recreation, self-immolation...

Farther along in our gallery we find only empty frames with no portraits. Where we should find the problems of specialized vocational and technical schools, classical music.... zero. Does that mean that our newspaper does not write about those things? It does, but articles on those subjects did not make the list of our best articles. (Remember that this is not the way our newspaper is today. The subject of our analysis was our paper's articles during the first half of last year.)

Sometimes our paper is reproached for not devoting enough attention to the Komsomol. That is not exactly true; it depends on how broadly one interprets the subject. As our content analysis showed, in 27 cases out of 100 when one of our writers analyzes a subject he or she appeals to a sense of Komsomol duty as part of the solution to the problem in question. In other words, solutions to over one-fourth of all the problems we analyze in our newspaper are in one way or another connected with the Komsomol's activities. Following analysis of a situation our paper also often appeals to the conscience of both rank-and-file Komsomol members and Komsomol leaders in hopes that they will direct their attention to the problem in question and find ways of solving it.

Another problem is that our paper itself does not always know the answer to some questions. What can we do—our editorial staff does not include the position of oracle, assigned to provide all the right answers. But that is no reason to despair: a question properly posed is already halfway to a solution.

The content analysis provided us with more subjects to think about than we had expected. Cross-referencing of parameters turns up various aspects which we often find unexpected. This overview does not contain all the information which we obtained. We have already had a chance to discuss some of the data among our editorial staff, while some of it still remains to be interpreted. As you can see, we are not afraid to submit the innermost aspects of our creative efforts for public discussion. There is no need to keep our successes and failures a secret. On the contrary, we need to discuss publicly, frankly and constructively any of our positives and negatives which are of social significance.

**Specialist Views Status of Soviet "Videoculture,"
Pornography**

18300649h Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
6 May 89 p 4

[Interview with V. Yu. Borev, candidate of art studies, candidate of philosophical sciences and videoculture expert, conducted by S. Pluzhnikov and A. Trushkin of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Press Bureau: "Timely Interview: What Views on Video?"]

[Text] Even though they are not yet in every home, films on video are already presenting us with a great many problems: problems of a technical, legal, moral and creative nature. We attempted to come to an understanding of the current situation with the help of V. Yu. Borev, candidate of art studies, candidate of philosophical sciences and videoculture expert.

[Borev] According to very rough estimates there are over one million videocassette recorders in the USSR. Of those only 100,000 were produced by the Ministry of the Electronics Industry; the remainder are imported. Scientists suggest that approximately 20 million Soviets would consider purchasing at least a videocassette player. Our industry's present plans are such that this demand can be met in... 150 years. Our VCR production will be only 120,000 units a year by the end of the century.

But people want to watch videos. So what happens is that people get together in groups to watch them. We have witnessed the appearance of many video cafes, video auditoriums and video stores. However, many of these were closed in the wake of a USSR Council of Ministers decree restricting the activities of video cooperatives. Furthermore, many zealous local administrators have also shut down video viewing rooms at youth housing complexes, Komsomol youth centers and trade union clubs. Yet the state-run network for video production and rentals is virtually nonexistent...

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] People are saying that this USSR Council of Ministers decision was prompted by the fact that some cooperative has been taken to court for violation of Western copyright laws. There are rumors going around about that cooperative having to pay huge fines to the state in hard currency...

[Borev] No, no such hard-currency fines have been levied. The very existence of the alleged fines was dreamed up by one of the heads of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography [Goskino] and announced to the press and on television. In response to an official inquiry the All-Union Copyright Agency replied: "At the present time violations of copyright on works recorded on video obviously arise in connection with the fact that the copyright holders are not being paid, i.e. are incurring material damages. In view of this the copyright holders have a right to file suit to win compensation. We have no information regarding the existence of such suits or concerning the way in which they are conducted."

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] So does that mean that we are in fact violating international copyright laws in this regard?

[Borev] Of course, and not just in the video market. That is why we are currently drawing up regulations governing payment of royalties for the commercial use of Western and Soviet videos to those who hold the copyright on them. It has been suggested that royalties of 10 percent of receipts be paid to them through the All-Union Copyright Agency.

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] So we can hope that the problem of "video piracy" will soon disappear. But what about morality?

[Borev] That is a complex issue. Several years ago a very active struggle was being waged against so-called "video vipers." In 1987 alone 250 criminal cases were filed against VCR owners. The penalty for showing videos "promoting the cult of violence and cruelty" is severe: imprisonment plus confiscation of the video equipment. But each year the number of violators continued to rise. Then on recommendation from the USSR Procuracy a commission of experts was established under the USSR Academy of Sciences; this commission is comprised of sociologists, jurists, cultural specialists and art experts. The commission has already reviewed over 3,000 videos whose content was considered suspect, and not a single one has been declared illegal. A total of 60 "video cases" have been retried and sentences in those cases rescinded. A number of others are presently awaiting decisions. Article 228¹ of the RSFSR Criminal Code itself, upon which the indictments were based, does not stand up under criticism and therefore is not included in the present draft Basic Criminal Legislation.

Judge for yourself: if one follows the letter of the law then the list of banned films would include war movies, movies on historical and revolutionaries themes, detective films and even classics like "Battleship Potemkin." Just think about the scenes where sailors on the ship or the peaceful demonstrators in the city are shot down. Are those not scenes of violence and cruelty?

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] What about pornography?

[Borev] That depends on what you regard as pornography... In this country we have a very vaguely defined notion of the difference between pornography and erotic films. If we regard the showing of the naked female (or male) body as indecent, then we would have to ban a tremendous number of movies, both Soviet and foreign. They would include Fellini's "Casanova," "A zori zdes tikhie..." [But the Dawns Are Quiet Here...], "Malenkaya Vera" [Little Vera]...

Soviet art studies have long had a methodology developed by Goskino's Cinematographic Art Research Institute according to which a pornographic movie is identified by the following characteristics: anonymous authorship of the film, use of pseudonyms by actors and directors instead of their real names and presentation of sexual scenes as an end in themselves serving no artistic purpose. What else? Purely contrived connections between individual scenes, in which characters appear as nothing more than sexual caricatures, with passion substituted for character development. Predominant use of closeups and fixed lighting, use of direct camera angles during filming of scenes containing sexual acts.

Incidentally, similar methodologies also exist in foreign countries, where the Geneva Convention of 13 October 1923, to which the Soviet Union is a signatory, remains in effect. In 1981 Great Britain removed 15,000 videocassettes from distribution and filed 31 criminal cases. In 1985 President Reagan signed a bill providing penalties of \$100,000 and 10 years imprisonment for the making or distribution of child pornography.

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] What is the current situation in regard to the supply of and demand for movies in our video market?

[Borev] Analysis of the operations of state-run video stores (of which there are approximately 140 in the USSR) indicates that just a little more than five percent of VCR owners make use of their services. The rest trade on the "black market," the present volume of which is approximately 30,000 hours of viewing time. Unfortunately, the All-Union Videofilm Creative PO has not proven capable of performing its assigned tasks.

A great deal may be achieved by a young people's video information agency recently established by the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. Its staff plans to deal with the problems which arise when culture and technology intersect. That means new video programs for young people, a video rental network, production of clips and much more. A Videoculture and Young People Research Center was recently established in our country; it is part of the Integral Youth Center. The center is working to develop new recreational uses of video, analyzing the "black" video market, and offering methodological literature on evaluation of videos and establishment of video clubs and a bibliography of materials about video published in our country. The center can be contacted at the following address: 129301, Moscow, B. Galushkin Street #3, Building 1.

[Pluzhnikov and Trushkin] Tell us in more detail about the video programs currently under development. How can they be viewed?

[Borev] Soon video fans will be able to watch the original variety program "Feyerverk 1" [Fireworks 1] featuring Alla Pugacheva and the films "Plastika sovremennogo tantsa" [Contemporary Dance Movement], on the methods of renowned Dutch dancer B. Felixdal. Not only music and entertainment will be offered on video, but also documentary films as well.

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee' video agency has produced videocassettes of shows at the Sovremennik Theater—"Zvezdy na utrennem nebe" [Stars in the Morning Sky], "Kvartira Kolombina" [Kolombina's Apartment]—plus musical programs featuring rock groups.

Aytmatov Interviewed on Effects of Perestroika
*18001126 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in
Russian 4 Apr 89 p 3*

[Interview with Chingiz Aytmatov, writer and president of the Issyk-Kul'skiy Forum, elected people's deputy of the USSR from the CPSU, by Yu. Razgulyayev: "The Wings Are Free But the Legs Have Not Yet Come Out of the Fetters of Stagnation"; data and place not given]

[Text] Chingiz Aytmatov, the writer and president of the Issyk-Kul'skiy Forum who was elected people's deputy of the USSR from the CPSU, covered more than 2,000 km on the roads around Lake Issyk-Kul, Tyan-Shan and the Chuyskaya and Talasskaya valleys in the days before the election. As a candidate deputy, he met with voters in villages and cities, presented his preelection platform and answered questions. Some of them were the basis for our conversation.

[Razgulyayev] Chigiz Torekulovich, allow us, first of all, to congratulate you on your election. I noticed that at almost every meeting the people ask: Why were you elected on the party list?

[Aytmatov] I answered that this was something that I did not expect and that such questions need to be addressed to the party organizations that considered it necessary to put forward my candidacy. Finally, this was the competence of the CPSU Central Committee. But I gave my own opinion on this. The fact that a group of party deputies included scientists, writers, performers and artists—in short, representatives of the creative intelligentsia—indicates, it seems to me, precisely that the party is avoiding what the masses secretly fear—a "nomenclature of the elite." For it is well known that formerly a high post invariably presupposed a parliamentary status and automatically guaranteed those in power a mandate as deputy. A "priority" of this kind, of course, diminished the possibilities of the voters to express their will. This time, the party list was made up of representatives of the most varied occupations and different social, national and age groups. This is a manifestation of the characteristics of the new policy—the course of democratization and enrichment of the social palette of perestroika.

It also seems to me that, if one takes a broad view of the current election campaign, the combination of different active forces of the society more and more fully meets the concept of the contemporary national party of communists acting under the conditions of the postindustrial epoch, when the former ideology of a narrow class dictatorship is no longer in a position to unite differences and to ensure the full-value resolution of universal social tasks in their total interdependence and mutual acceptability. For it is no accident that a fundamental reassessment of all historical experience is now taking place in an honest and unbiased manner. We are all part of this process. Life is changing us and we are changing life. At

the same time, objectivity, constructiveness and a critical spirit in this matter are not mutually exclusive. This is one of the main conditions for the success of perestroika. And here it is very important to consider the opinion of people who in their own practice have come to know the quasi-demagoguery of stagnation, when illusions were raised higher than realism in the planetary as well as local senses.

For so much time has passed while we competed in the pronouncement of fervent slogans, in convincing the whole world, and above all ourselves, that everything in our country could not be better and that we are going from victory to victory, and in calling for others to follow us without fail. Alas, the result is well known. Let us be honest. The country is seeing the severe consequences of stagnation. Wherever you turn, you run into its perhaps broken but still obstructing fence.

It is extremely necessary at long last to realize that, in freeing ourselves from the many years of obstacles from political dogmatism and demagoguery in this respect, the freedom of the person and society are the paramount immutable objective and very most important meaning of existence and that there can be nothing more important in a historical sense. It is the very most important means of progress and therefore of the well-being of the state. The fact that the individual did not in accordance with his convictions choose what coercion and circumstances forced him to do is never embodied in his essence, does not grow into his spirit and state and remains a permanently foreign matter for him. Hence the discord. I am not going to look far and wide for examples. What role, for example, was assigned in those times to writers and the creative intelligentsia? The role of service personnel. For you and I were called "party helpers." Not independently thinking personalities with our own opinions and rights and with an obligation to look the truth in the eye critically but precisely "helpers." And this defined the place and functions that were assigned to the intelligentsia. Hence the nihilism, dissidents and expulsion of undesirables from the country under the hooting of those same "helpers." On the other hand, the open time-serving, the sale of their own talent (or, conversely, work for food), the generation of a lively tribe of "justifiers" prepared without hesitation to find an ideological basis for any, even a doubtful, undertaking of the authorities. Our fellow journalists went to the greatest extremes, justifying in every way in the press the entrance of the troops into Afghanistan (I regret that abroad, in response to a direct question, I once had to mutter something indefinite in this regard and to this day I cannot free myself from this shame).

Still, the truth was revealed in the traditional struggle of good and evil this time as well. Perestroika did not drop out of the sky. We gained it through much suffering and there could be no other way out for socialism. We were able to free ourselves from the hypnosis of self-deception and from the psychology of administrative commands and this in itself is a great achievement. We were able to

look at our by no means rich life organized in by no means the best manner. This truly selfless act did not repel people from the party, as some suppose who are still under the drug of stagnation and nostalgic for the benefits from the table of ranks, and it did not disappoint the people in our main objective of arriving at a society of truly civilized freedom and economic well-being through socialism. Yes, we assumed that our Soviet model for organizing the society is the only possible way to freedom and we tried to subordinate history to it. It is not the only way but one of the ways requiring continuous improvement.

[Razgulyayev] Does it not seem to you that from the thoughtless denigration of everything "foreign" we are now often going to the other extreme of enthusiastic emotion and admiration for the "imported" style of life? Yes, their counters are breaking under the weight of all kinds of things. But behind the rich counters we should somehow not lose sight of the real human pain and grief from which, alas, the people there are also not free....

[Aytmatov] I understand that I am taking the risk of having the most horrible political label in our country attached to me and of acquiring the reputation of being a "restorer of capitalism." But one should not therefore ignore the fact that in Sweden, Finland, Holland, Austria and several other countries a significant share of the working people has a high degree of well-being and an improving social and legal situation. Should we not take an interest without excessive class arrogance in how these benefits were achieved? In the final analysis, after all, it is not a matter of terminology but of which social model is most productive, most responsive to the labor and capital invested in it, most progressive in the development of new technologies and, finally, most humane and fair.

Perestroika has brought us to new thinking. We no longer have a right to hide in the bushes of social demagoguery. We face an open dialogue with the West and a mutual search for a world status acceptable to all. Everyone understands that there is no other way. And it is essential in this connection to realize that the fate of perestroika is not just a matter of internal importance but a global factor in the contemporary history of humanity. Can we, being a socialist giant, turn perestroika to the advantage of the country and people, having converted a military superpower into an economic superpower, and thereby raise civilization to a new technological, ecological and cultural level? For we, not to mention all the rest, occupy one-sixth of the planet and this gives us a quite special responsibility: we are responsible to mankind for our intellectual progress and for the productivity of this huge part of the world, where large amounts of raw materials and great energy resources exist and where a great multinational state has come into being, for our potential wealth—material and intellectual—belongs not only to us but to all of mankind, just as the wealth of other parts of the world in a planetary sense relates to us in the universal circulation

of life. If things work out for us in our country, this will certainly be a boon for all of our contemporaries on earth as a new supplemental force of civilization reducing the danger of a confrontation of worlds. If, on the other hand, perestroika gets bogged down in the drifts of a stagnation that has not been overcome, this will be an underlying threat to all of history.

Can writers who do not suffer from social egocentrism or political sectarianism stand apart from the interpretation of the developing events of this kind—of the worldwide turn in human civilization, above all of the role of perestroika, the most important component of this process—and can they conceal their thoughts and not try to help the common cause? I believe that they cannot. It is for this reason that I gratefully accepted by nomination in the party list so that I can be in the thick of events and help the party to the extent that I can.

[Razgulyayev] In this case, what do you think about the possibility of a radical rise in the country's economy?

[Aytmatov] I, of course, am not a specialist but as any reasonable person I understand that this is the question of questions and the beginning of all beginnings, because in the final analysis it all boils down to the most vital thing in the society and to a factor that cannot be replaced by anything else—physical production. But when you think how we live and how we can live, your soul aches. Having freedom of thought, unprecedented before, we could not in these years—I have to put it this way—get the economy off dead center. And for this reason our society seems to me to be like a bird whose wings are free but whose feet are still caught in the fetters of stagnation. It flaps and beats its wings but cannot take off, the economy does not allow it. But the economy is an absolute truth. Here, as they say, you cannot add anything or take anything away—everything is apparent. And we all understand that the situation in the economy can be changed in a favorable direction not through a verbal wind or verbal sails but only through the specific labor of people, only through a continuous increase in labor productivity, only through the introduction of progressive technologies and only through contemporary economic thinking. This is the main thing for any social system. Labor resolves the country's fate.

But any state still has its own internal reserves, its own large and small channels of expenditures. And here politics and economics must find a common language to the benefit of the people and to the benefit of those who are now thriving. I stress, now thriving, for we always fought most for the priority of a bright future. It is a good intention but a bright future depends upon those thriving today, about whom one should not forget. Every person needs happiness in his own time above all. Is our life full in this sense?

It seems to me that we are bearing heavy military expenditures, even with the efforts and unilateral initiatives wisely undertaken by M.S. Gorbachev in this area.

Under the current historical conditions that are becoming more and more humane for the purpose of survival and the inevitable vital necessity of developing a common planetary economic concord dictated by an indivisible ecology and indivisible problems common to all mankind and with all the ideological conflicts, discrepancies and complications, military expenditures are as anachronistic as yesterday. I do not see any serious reasons why any countries—I mean highly developed countries—would want to unleash a war against our country. There are no economic reasons. These countries are drowning in their own abundance of goods and products. If there is anything they need, it is markets for sales and nothing more than that. I am told that they want to grab our raw materials. Since they are using foreign exchange to buy as many raw materials as they need from us at a low price, why would they grab what they can buy? I am told that they want to dominate the world. Why would anyone want such a universal burden when it would only mean plunging with this load into an abyss of immense uncontrollable economic and national catastrophes! Nor is there any reason of a territorial nature. The present-day technologies that arose because of the great intensification of labor and science do not require the vast spaces inherent in extensive systems. Why do they need to fight when they fit very well within their own vital boundaries? And finally, if there are disputes, as practice shows, they can be resolved through political means.

These simple arguments do not pretend to be an exhaustive international and strategic analysis. Things are doubtless more complicated than this. Nevertheless, it would be an unforgivable retrogression not to take advantage of the unique chance presented by history at the end of the 20th century—a new global situation establishing a new era in the long-suffering history of humanity as a result of the discovery of nuclear superenergy, which, in turn, engendered a fundamentally new quality of planetary thinking that views wars and arms as primitive savagery. I repeat that it would be an unforgivable self-punishment to maintain an army of many millions in our time and to make huge military expenditures. It is necessary to overcome the stereotype of fear and mistrust and the doctrines of deterrence cultivated over many years. All of this is very costly in our time.

The highest organ of power, the USSR Supreme Soviet, must set reasonable limits for defensive needs. The introduction of troops into Afghanistan was done without the agreement of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is necessary to pass a categorical law prohibiting the taking of troops beyond the borders of the state under any pretense regardless of any invitations and appeals from whomever they might come. Our losses in Afghanistan—killed, wounded and prisoners—have now been published. One would like to know what price the Soviet people had to pay for this rash action, erroneous from the start, which brought grief and suffering to many Soviet families.

I dare say that it is also necessary to give considerable thought to the astronomical expenditures for the exploration of space. The storming of space is indisputably a prestigious matter and certainly the scientific-technical investigations and discoveries in this area do serve progress. But there is a time for everything. Let us leave the cosmic heights and return to the sinful earth. The current state of the economy is such that almost half of the country's population is living in extreme poverty and, it seems to me, does not have the necessary power to be engaged in such expensive, albeit important, programs without harming national life. It is not without reason that it has been said: stretch your legs to fit your clothes. This applies to the state as well. It would be worthwhile for a time to refrain from the task of the intensive development of space that is beyond our economic means.

The same thing can be said about one of the programs costing many billions—the "Buran" space shuttle. The priority of this program is by no means supported by broad public opinion. I am in agreement with the publicists, economists and political scientists who think that we need to clamp down on some capital-intensive efforts, including land-management projects, secret space operations and gigantic plants for tractors and other things. Megalomania is a sign of backwardness, when a compact computer is worth as much as an entire plant.

I would like to take this opportunity to share still another consideration that goes along with what has been said. There are times in the life of a society burdened with shortages when it is necessary to take special economic measures. It is a matter of external credit and foreign exchange, with which one could purchase consumer goods abroad. I do not argue the fact that it is a complex matter and many do not agree with going into debt. And this is understandable. But it is better to be a debtor, in time alleviating the shortages and thereby organizing one's own production of goods at an up-to-date technological level, than to continue to kindle unsatisfied demands in the public. This is my personal opinion.

[Razgulyayev] Excuse me for interrupting. Let us suppose that the society begins to have significant supplementary means through the reduction of military and other expenditures. Where, from your point of view, should they be used?

[Aytamatov] I will tell you without hesitation. Primarily into education—schools, occupational and technical schools and institutes. This is where we have the greatest shortcoming and lag farthest behind the advanced countries of the world. A new epoch has already arrived, in which the means of the state must be invested above all in the qualitative increase and formation of the intellect of a modern-day young generation capable of assimilating and creating advanced technologies. Otherwise we will not be able to make progress and we will not be able to move away from the export of raw materials to that of

industrial goods. Consequently, our economic backwardness will become greater and greater. One must keep in mind that vanguard technologies bring unavoidable changes to public and individual life and thereby appear as a decisive material factor in the formation of the future life style of mankind. Do our schools and educational system in general meet these urgent demands of the time on the threshold of the third millenium? It has been known for a long time that they do not. Nevertheless, we are continuing the unreasonable and stingy economizing in schools and in the utilization and remuneration of teachers. World practice shows that there should be no more than 15 students in a school classroom, this being the optimum number both for the pupils themselves and for the teacher. The teacher is not the driver of a bus, in which the more passengers the more receipts. And the task is not to bring them up to the 10th grade and then let them out wherever they want to go but to impart the appropriate knowledge to each individual, preferably in accordance with his inclinations. Our classes very often have 30 or 50 students, whereby the children learn in 2 or even 3 shifts. The teacher receives little and the equipment of the schools is antediluvian. Let us look at things realistically. To economize in the schools is equivalent to cutting off the branch that you are sitting on.

Another area suffering from poverty and meagerness of wages for physicians and nurses is public health and medical services for the population. This is where capital investments are needed in the direct and figurative sense of the word! For so many years we never tired of talking about the free nature of Soviet medicine as an important social achievement. But the mindless praise is leading to the opposite results. And it turned out that they began to write off all the confusion through the general accessibility of our medicine: "Whatever you take from it, it is all free." I will allow myself to object that it is not free at all. The hospitals, equipment and wages of physicians all represent our hard-earned money. And if today the legitimate dissatisfaction of the population with the level of medical care is growing, any person has a right to ask: "Why is my money being spent so ineptly and so irrationally? To this I would add that we need a significant redistribution of the budget categories in the direction of public health precisely through a reduction of costly programs and military expenditures. Just as in the field of public education, the priority of expenditures must affirm the principles of democratism and the new approach in the assessment of historical phenomena.

There are, of course, other urgent matters in our being. They include the food problem—a great country cannot feed a great people by itself—and the construction of housing, which have become proverbial. And there are the roads. From the point of view of present-day road building, we are a roadless country. In Moscow itself in this sense, not to mention other places, the roads and streets are a legacy from the last century. A great deal of money and manpower is needed here too. It is said that there is enough work for young people in road building until the end of the century.

And what kind of state are our airports and railroad stations in? It seems to me that the matter of aircraft construction is especially acute. How much longer can we put up with the fact that millions of Soviet people cover tremendous distances in antediluvian, technically worn-out and—even to the nonprofessional eye—neglected and dirty aircraft that Aeroflot is also lacking? A report recently appeared in the press that our aircraft industry will deliver new passenger airliners for sale abroad, in particular in India. We should be pleased; it is, after all, some kind of a sign of a transition from the export of raw materials to the export of technology. So we can be competitive too! In my soul, however, I did not take pleasure: we ourselves remain behind the times and the new aircraft are going somewhere else. Is this fair to the Soviet people? Should we not first supply the domestic airlines with an adequate number of new aircraft and then sell them abroad?

[Razgulyayev] Let us turn from general to local themes, to one of the preelection meetings. Do you remember when you were asked about the place of the republic in the country's national economy?

[Aytmatov] Yes, we were then talking about the somewhat one-sided development of Kirghizia. Heretofore we have been exporting a significant part of the output in the form of raw materials or at best semifinished goods. Take, for example, fine wool, a very valuable product. The republic occupies third place in the country in its production. The prices for products from this form of natural raw material are rising all the time. A kilogram of wool goes for one suit of good quality that costs as much as 200 rubles in a store. But we sell a kilogram of wool for practically nothing, just 8 to 10 rubles. Many of those speaking at the meeting simply demanded that we fight for fair price-setting. One can understand them. But I see a larger problem in this: we need to convert to republic cost accounting.

Kirghizia is a republic that is very rich in natural resources. The climate here is favorable and the people are industrious. There is also every possibility for self-sufficiency and to make a significant contribution to the country's economy. It is for this reason that the inhabitants of Kirghizia are so offended that the republic has heretofore been receiving a sizeable subsidy from the union fund—more than 500 million rubles.

But let us take a look at this sum. We have many solid enterprises subordinate to the union in operation—mining, gold mining, metallurgical and machine building enterprises. By-passing local authorities, large profits sail away directly to the center. And then from there they "trickle down" when the kind uncle feels generous on behalf of Gosplan. In Kara-Balta, for example, the inhabitants complained bitterly that the nearby mining combine, a huge rich enterprise exploiting our resources for more than 40 years, does not want to help the city at

all either in the construction of housing or in the development of the infrastructure. Many other "union enterprises" behave just as selfishly. Therefore, to provide firm support to the idea of republic cost-accounting, it is necessary to have a constitutional strengthening of the sovereignty of the local soviets and of the priority development of the social sphere.

By the way, today's very acute and simply painful ecological questions also have their roots in narrow departmental group interests. For so many years now we have been struggling to preserve Lake Issyk-Kul in its original state as a blue pearl. Many of its problems come from our own mismanagement and lack of order. The animal-breeding farms and shepherding stations on the shore do not, of course, beautify the lake and do not protect its flora and fauna. On the other hand, however, the unique resort zone does not receive the proper structuring because of the quite inexplicable dictates of the center.

We could attract a huge quantity of foreign exchange here. The foreign tourists are eager to come to Issyk-Kul and foreign firms are prepared to build boarding houses, bases and moorings—for Soviet people too, by the way. But each time an inexplicable barrier comes down in front of them. "You cannot, it is not permitted." And no objections of local authorities are taken into consideration. Thus, they make an absurd secret out of the empire—well known to every child in the district—of one of the defense ministries at Issyk-Kul, which took over the shore at Koy-Sara, praised even in ancient sagas, for industrial facilities. I am also convinced that the shores of Issyk-Kul, as scarce as gold, are not the place to put military subunits, which certain military institutions are trying with enviable stubbornness to do, despite the will and desires of the local population. The sunny beaches and pure mountain air are predestined by nature itself for rest and happiness, for contact with the sea and for the restoration of health but not for tactical exercises and exhaust gases. Will it not be absurd if such a thing happens?

And lastly, I am concerned about the increasingly frequent appeals of late to restrict glasnost, and not just from the authorities. I explain such a turnaround by the fact that stagnation is not merely a painful state of the society. It is also a decomposing disease arising from self-deception, self-seduction and groundless self-aggrandizement. Like a narcotic, it creates the illusion of well-being where the threat of collapse is at hand. But it is a painful process to give up a narcotic.

It is simply easier for many people who grew up in the years of the addictive stagnation to live in deception than to take the course of a real struggle to get out of the crisis. But we do not have any other course that is less difficult. And when one hears opinions that it is time to clamp down on democracy, for we are seeing the excessive unleashing of the destructive forces of the society speculating with perestroika, especially centrifugal

forces that have acquired the nature of an opposition that we are not accustomed to, overcoming the call of prohibitions and the administrative fist on the table, it is necessary to recognize that this is our heavy cross of incipient democratic reforms with a huge historical delay. If we want to move forward, we have to reconcile ourselves, study, organize and find reasonable measures in relation to the costs of democracy, for there is no other way. There is, to be sure, the way back to authoritarian dictatorship and the military political regime. But as the experience of world history shows, a dictatorship can only temporarily establish strict order and thereby paralyze the future. Such were the dialectics of the contemporary social development of humanity. Simplifying the situation, I would put it this way: democracy is children in the family with their troubles, impudence, conflicts and discoveries. Dictatorship is the sterility of history and it is repression.

But, of course, there must be self-discipline in democracy. And this is a great art. The society must possess this art of democratic self-discipline if it wants to survive and if it dreams of happiness for today and for tomorrow.

Stalin's Bodyguard Provides New Material for Film

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[Article by correspondents M.Ilyina and K.Klyuyevskaya: "I Served as Stalin's Personal Bodyguard: a New Lenfilm (Panorama Studios) Documentary"]

[Text] He is over 80 years of age, but spry. He dresses modestly, even though when he dons his holiday suit his chest is covered with medals. His apartment, where he tells his story on camera, is also quite modest: two abutting iron beds, a piece of oilskin on the table and a doormat on the floor. Chairs are mismatched. No, he did not make a fortune.

But fate was kind to him in other ways, endowing him with a unique life and prodigious memory at an advanced age. Never losing the thread of the story, he speaks clearly and concisely, saying exactly what he means to say, and he speaks and speaks.

He is Major (Retired) Aleksey Trofimovich Rybin. For over 20 years he served as Stalin's personal bodyguard.

"How did you find this unique character?" we asked Semyon Aranovich, the film's director.

[Aranovich] The journal SOTSIALISTICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA recently published Rybin's memoirs. It was a very interesting work, especially in its details. For instance, he wrote how for the first time Malenkov entered the room where Stalin's body lay. He took off his squeaky shoes, but did not hazard leaving them, carrying them instead under his arm; this was how he walked into the room.

I decided to look up that Rybin. I found him but at first he refused to talk: "Everybody distorts my words," he said. I swore that I would not. Then he allowed me to visit him and agreed to be filmed. He said: "I will speak but do not interrupt me and do not make any comments." I gave him a promise and kept my word. He said: "I will talk because if I do not, nobody will and who knows what may happen." Mark these words; I think that this is one of the most important reasons why he decided to talk.

For an hour and ten minutes Rybin speaks of those whom he guarded in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. He was Ordzhonikidze's personal driver. He knew Kirov. He providing security for Stalin. He worked at the Near Dacha. He accompanied Kalinin on trips. He was a military official in charge of security at the USSR Bolshoy Theater.

Having agreed to do the film, he worked full-time despite his 80 years of age. On the first day, the most difficult one, the filming lasted eight hours. And all that time he spoke continuously.

To the accompaniment of his words, years and personalities come to life.

We see Stalin and Kirov, on holiday together. The famous Near Dacha. Alliluyeva with a daughter in her arms. A sea party for government officials. Stalin with members of his family. Molotov at a banquet. A scene from the Bolshoy production of the "Queen of Spades" and its performers at a target shooting drill.

[Correspondents] How did you find this unique documentary footage?"

[Aranovich] Better ask me what we did not get. It turned out that only Lieutenant General N. Vlasik, the head of security, was allowed to film party leaders on holiday. After the war he was purged. His wife is still alive, but she refuses to show anything to anybody. Kaganovich, too, probably has much that is interesting in his personal archive, but he does not let anyone into his house. Lately, he has even stopped going out. Antonov-Ovseyenko, the consultant to our film, went to see him but did not get past the dark entrance hallway; Kaganovich refused to speak to him.

We used everything we could find after the Krasnogorsk archive was opened, or rather half-opened, to the public. But it is too little. It should be noted that members of Stalin's entourage were very concerned about the way they would be preserved for posterity, so that the documentary footage of the time is very official. It mostly covers sports parades, air shows and ceremonial processions. We had to cut and paste using this kind of material.

It should be noted that the director cut and pasted very skillfully. Semyon Aranovich is a very experienced, masterful film journalist. He put every frame and every photograph to use, compelling us to see their hidden psychological meaning. And he was able to take what we saw to the level of metaphorical generalization.

The film contains previously unknown footage and photographs. But there are also other, familiar shots. Some of them we have seen before, probably many times. But in this film they appear in a different, more profound context. It is well known that the great law of cinema, that of editing, can enrich the sum of components and bring out an unexpected meaning, which would be more interesting than the one we have grown used to.

For only a few seconds we see a unique shot of Stalin's mother. With measured, unhurried motions she ladles something from one jar to another. What is it—preserves, beans? The face of the mother and the son overlap. There is resemblance. Then once again there is the slow swaying of the ladle. This is how she used to feed him. The same shot appears later in the film: the ladle goes up and down between jars. But a different image is evoked. Was it not in a similar accidental way—or on the whim of her son—that human lives were decided: who would stay here and who would go elsewhere?

There is also a photograph of Beriya holding a small girl in his arms. An idyllic picture in which everything breathes calm; yet, by forcing us to take a closer look at the man's hand clasping the child's little body, the camera makes an important statement.

The most frequently recurring shot in the film is Stalin's smiling face. Shots of Stalin as he really was are rare in the film, there is only a handful of them. The camera closes in on the by-now familiar portrait. The face grows larger and larger. The lips, which are stretched into a smile, disappear. We now see only the eyes, under the spread of thick eyebrows. The eyes of an implacable, cruel, pitiless man.

Innocent and bright images of a May sports parade: happy faces of people who believe in their country's bright future. The leader is atop the Mausoleum. He applauds, greets, cheers people on with his smile. He raises his hands in time to the music. He does it several times over, as though he is playing an invisible accordion. Rybin, too, plays the accordion in the film, and talks of Stalin's and Zhdanov's musical talents: how they used to sing along with Bolshoy soloists.

It may well be true: Stalin may have been versed in solfège. Yet, when Rybin plays the accordion and we hear the music and see Stalin surveying the holiday parade, other thoughts come to mind. When he waves to the marchers from atop the Mausoleum as though he plays the accordion along with the sounds that rise from the square and when he points as though singling out one or another of the

marchers from the crowd, it suddenly seems that the entire parade, or even the entire country, marches to the beat that he alone sets while his pointing finger picks out this or that marcher for life in another world.

[Correspondents] Rybin's tale is full of convincing details. Is there some danger perhaps that some viewers would take his every word at its face value?

"Of course there is a difficulty here," admitted the screenplay writer Yuriy Klepikov. "Someone may misunderstand our cinematic device and mistake the film for a tribute to Stalin.

"This is because Rybin seems to speak the truth. Did Stalin have bad feet? Indeed he did. Did Stalin walk around with holes in his shoes? He did. He says that Stalin was very intelligent, kind, cooled quickly in anger and never raged at people. He liked fried eggs sunny side up, buckwheat kasha and dry-fruit compote. He wore a modest uniform and did not like fancy suits. He never once put on his second Hero of the Soviet Union star. And yet, almost everything Rybin says is only partially true. We understand that both men are working to create the same legend. They are forging the same myth, that of a good Stalin."

[Correspondents] In other words, Rybin carries out what he said he would do: "I will speak because if we remain silent, who else would say it?" This accords with Academician A.M. Samsonov's observation that many memoirs note that at the end of his life Stalin was greatly concerned about his image for posterity. He himself skillfully directed the creation of the myth about him. Did not Aleksey Trofimovich Rybin fall for it?

[Klepikov] The film has a secret meaning, if you will. Our commentary is hidden, but it is there and anyone who is attuned to the context of the times can easily detect it. Our hero is imbued with a special stalinist consciousness, and once it gradually becomes clear, everyone will see his tale in this light.

I think that every viewer looking closely at Rybin and thinking of what he says will eventually begin to mistrust him. The breaking point will be different for everyone. The trick is that Rybin calmly talks about things which from the standpoint of general human morality should seem monstrous. Yet, to him they are normal.

"My dear little friend, my kind little shepherd," we hear Tchaikovsky's pure, magical tune. It is a Bolshoy performance of the "Queen of Spades". Charmed, we listen to the familiar pastoral melody. How difficult it is to imagine that secret service soldiers are standing there, behind the curtain, armed with automatic weapons. In the boxes sit opera lovers of both sexes, with guns in their purses and under their jackets. Rybin does not hide the

fact that he commanded that special detachment. He seems to brag about it. "I used to work with those opera lovers. I used to conduct interrogations. Terrorism was my specialty."

The film's dramatic high point comes in the second part, when we see Rybin with children, to whom he not only teaches the accordion but also imparts advice about life. This he does in his own special way. At the music class he introduces a marching drill, claiming that rhythm is easier to memorize while goose-stepping. Those who do not want to participate are brought, to use the teacher's own expression, under guard. Those who cannot march well have to give a written promise to improve. At last, the re-educated kids, raising trustingly their clear eyes to the teacher, recite verses that he himself composed. This is how the film's inner thread is tied into a tight knot. This film is calm in tone but tragic in content. This is how the normal logic of a man's natural behavior is turned into a grotesque. Beyond everyday reality a nightmare is gaping. And now, as though in memory, we see on the screen similar young pioneers running toward the stands and declaiming with their pure voices memorized reports of achieved victories.

[Correspondents] Your film does not have a single horrible shot and you do not mention a single tragic event of that period. But we doubt that even a superficial viewer would take it for a tribute to the leader of all times and all peoples.

[Klepikov] Nevertheless, people thought that we should have given it at least an appropriate epigraph, or else stated at the end how many people were killed in the camps and purged during that period. Some proposed to insert counterpoints into the film. But we made every effort to avoid being straightforward. We trust our viewers.

[Correspondents] Was there much that did not find its way into the film? It lasts a little over an hour, whereas over six hours of film was made.

[Klepikov] We tried to include the most interesting things into the film. But of course many stories had to be left out. Rybin has a large archive. It is hidden in a cellar specially set off from his room. I suspect that he keeps files on everyone he met and official reports on those he served with. He claims that he has unknown documents related to the deaths of Kirov and Ordzhonikidze. However, as you can see for yourselves, it is hard to tell how reliable those documents are.

He even made files on everyone in our film crew. He demanded that we all show him our passports and give our profession and address. All this data he also hid in his cellar.

The mentality bred by Stalin's rule is difficult to eradicate. The painful issue of the relationship between individual and common guilt arises.

Today, when our society is being restructured and we are learning about democracy, the attitude toward Stalin and those tragic pages of our history are a litmus test of our courage, moral sensitivity and maturity of consciousness. Wise words from another film, "Repentance", come to mind: "As long as you defend him, he is alive and continues to spread rot in society."

The film can be seen today, at 7:50 p.m., at the "Lenin-grad" cinema.

Kazakh Literature 'Stagnant', Devoid of Contemporary Themes

18001125a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Kh. Sadykov, docent at the Women's Pedagogical Institute: "Inertia of Half-Truth"]

[Text] It was at the beginning of last year. The republic television was showing a "round table," where the directors of creative unions and the mass media were gathered. One of the viewers asked: "Do your editor's lists of books to be published include the works of Kazakh writers that did not reach the readers during the years of stagnation? If so, when do you intend to publish them?" The answer was unequivocal: "No." That is, neither in the 1960's nor in the 1970's did any Kazakh author write a work that might have borne the "greasy cross" of a bureaucrat for literature.

At first glance, that is all there is to it. Still, it is vexatious that no "Belyye odezhdyy" [White Clothes] or "Deti Arbat" [Children of Arbat] have been discovered in my native literature and that no honest and courageous books written in the atmosphere of the command and bureaucratic regime have escaped from oblivion.

Times have now changed. The process of perestroika is proceeding in all directions. To be honest, we expected from the Kazakh and, more broadly, from the entire multinational literature of Kazakhstan if not stunning revelations, at least interesting attempts to embody the real artistic truth, the essence and meaning of which are revealed in the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress and 19th All-Union Party Conference. Looking closely at contemporary prose, however, it must be noted that many works are marked by yesterday's view of the world.

I want to make it clear from the outset that my assessment of contemporary Kazakh prose is somewhat subjective. And I, of course, admit the existence of a different, perhaps even opposite, point of view on particular works examined in the article.

The republic's writers have a great devotion to the themes of the romantic past, to myths and legends, and to different creeds and sentimental stories with a banal love fable. Many authors are also attracted by recent

historical events, in particular the 1920's and 1930's with their acute class struggle and formation of a new individual. No one, of course, doubts the need for and urgency of such themes.

Unfortunately, however, it is still true that only individual works of our authors can claim a certain boldness and urgency in reflecting themes that were formerly "forbidden." Among them, one can name S. Yelyubayev's novel "Belaya yurta" [White Yurt], which came out last year in the Kazakh language. The book tells about the difficult fate of one mountain village, whose inhabitants could in no way adjust to the new settled life style and to the new conditions after the revolution and in the period of collectivization. The "methods of force" on the part of the authorities who were trying to accelerate events in the building of socialism in the remote steppe only aggravated the situation. The nomadic village, stunned by the violent events around it and by the "cavalry raids" of zealous workers, in its fear and confusion flees wherever its eyes look. This is the dramatic basis of the novel.

S. Yelyubayev uses psychological methods rather skillfully in depicting characters and does not strive to make events fit. It is important for him to create and define the precise social and psychological situation justifying the actions and thoughts of the heroes. Why do they act in one way rather than another? What is behind their elementary feelings? And it must be said that in many ways the author is able to create full-blooded images and to show dramatic human conflicts.

In most of the works telling about the events of past years, however, we most often encounter well-known themes, images and conflict situations that set one's teeth on edge. Clearly showing through in them are those same "white spaces" and delicate omissions that we perceive today as an obvious anachronism. They include "Ploshchadka" by S. Sanbayev, "Golybaya kolybel" [Blue Cradle] by A. Tarazi, "Ogni mednykh gor" [Fires of the Copper Mountains] by A. Aziyev or the stories "Lonesome Rider" by K. Karamanuly and "Dawn" by B. Togyzbayev.

Take the stories and novels about our recent past, in particular about the period of collectivization and the prewar years. What shortcoming do I see in them? It is above all the light-weight and standard-illustrative depiction of the life of that time, with a "clear arrangement" of the opposing forces and with a painstaking departure from the critical and truly dramatic collisions of time. Thus, in S. Sanbayev's novel "Ploshchadka" telling about the construction of the Balkhash Metallurgical Combine in the 1930's, the heroes are unequivocally divided into "their own" and "strangers," into conscientious workers and engineers and saboteurs. There is an intense class struggle under way, in the background of which the figure of the police chief Filippov stands out distinctly.

But the modern-day reader comparing history with the course of perestroika also knows about something else: about the horrible Stalinist repression, about the years of hunger that took hundreds of thousands of human lives in our republic alone, and about the command-bureaucratic system of administration that created barracks socialism in the 1930's. But we will search in vain for even a hint of these facts in Sanbayev's novel. The author's optimism does not subject either the political or the moral atmosphere of the epoch to doubt.

In looking at contemporary Kazakh literature, one gets the impression that many of its representatives, both veterans and young people, became somewhat disconcerted in the face of perestroika and were not internally prepared for it. How were things yesterday? Often—why hide it!—the themes and problems of literature arose in the heat of different campaigns and public slogans.

Here it is also necessary to mention our old costs in the understanding of what is truly great literature, in particular the literature of socialist realism. We have talked a lot about the "tradition" and "creative training" of the masters of the older generation. Yes, there were things to learn from them. But only on the basis of worthy and mature models of literature. But we for some reason shamefully failed to mention that our so-called "classics" were far from uniform in their significance and ideological-artistic level. Along with truly strong and talented works such as, for example, "Kommunistka Raushan," "Botagoz," "Probuzhdenyy kray" [Awakened Kray], "Put Abaya" [The Road to Abay] and "Krov i pot" [Blood and Sweat], we also know many that, to put it mildly, are somewhat weak, contrived and far from life but that were put together in accordance with all the rules of socialist realism.

After "Botagoz," Sabit Mukanov wrote the frankly weak novel "Syr-Darya." It seems that the novels "Millioner" and "Karaganda" by G. Mustafin, in which the actuality of the working theme is in no way supported by artistic conviction, received marks that were too high. But how many poems and dastans do we know from the 1930's, 1940's and subsequent periods, in which the adulatory and victorious tendency and the false-epic monumentalism got the upper hand over artistic truth? Putting it in the words of one critic, they presented a "mythologization of life" instead of the life's truths. Unfortunately, however, such poems (according to our previous understanding) were the core of the literature of socialist realism, for they fully met the requirement for a "historically specific depiction of life in its revolutionary development."

Some may object and say to me that I am not taking into account the time and historical conditions in which Kazakh Soviet literature formed and developed or those works about which it is said that for their time they were also a definite achievement of our writers. It might be possible to agree with this point of view if in the numerous literary works and textbooks on Kazakh literature our

authors would resort a little less to an unrestrained laudatory and complimentary tone and would show restraint and scientific objectivity in their evaluations.

And what is sad, this theory did not go into oblivion with Stalin. It turned out to be tenacious. And even now, in the age of the new political thinking, many writers cannot fully free themselves from old, outdated "traditions" and methods and from yesterday's view of socialism. It would seem that no one is now brandishing slogans or issuing directives "from above" on what to write about and what not to write about. Write, as they say, how your own conscience and civil duty dictate to you. And this is the main thing.

Alas, however, by no means everyone was prepared for the restructuring of his creative "self" and to the mastering of a new consciousness. Many seemingly stopped in their meditation or are continuing, as if nothing had happened, to vary the previous known themes. This alone can explain the stagnation and poverty of the contemporary themes in our literature. Novels, stories and tales are multiplying like mushrooms after a rain. The republic journals ZHULDYZ and PROSTOR for 1987, for example, published as many as 20 novels and more than 40 stories, not counting tales. And even those few of them who we call "contemporary" are often far removed from the urgent problems of our days: trivial subject matters, excessive description and rhetoric, in the slime of which even the good intentions of authors get bogged down.

The story "Street of Happy Reflections" by Engels Gabbasov published in PROSTOR seems, at first glance, to be up-to-date and written critically. After all, it speaks of present-day young people and of the moral costs in their education. But how is this problem being resolved? We learn of an ordinary story about how one adroit villain deceived a trusting girl and took her money and about how the local Sherlock Holmes's nimbly solved this crime. The "confession" of the girl who accidentally stumbled by believing a swindler is perceived more like a tearful melodrama.

Another story, "Languor" by Aldan Smailov, which appeared in the journal ZHULDYZ, was also kneaded in the "dough" of love. Before us is a "love triangle" with all of the attributes needed for this case: hot passions, unfaithfulness, tears and, finally, the declaration of the feelings of a "true trick rider." Smailov's story also has a "winning" background: the love story unfolds not just anywhere but on a livestock farm among young herdsmen. There are also some signs of the herdman's labor and even "painful" problems (the attempt of farm managers to achieve records and honors through ostentation). But all of this production outline of the story is perceived precisely as a background, a decoration attached to a banal love story.

To be frank, I did not recognize Sain Muratbekov, a writer who is generally thoughtful and strict in his choice of life's collisions, either when I read his story with the somewhat elegiac title "Toy pamyatnoy zimoy" [That Memorable Winter] (PROSTOR, No 2, 1988). The author appealed to a traditional (in many works) theme: the remote Kazakh village of the hard years of the war, a difficult childhood, wise grandmothers and grandfathers who gave the grandchildren moral lessons.... But all of this, as we know, was not always at the level of great generalizations. For this reason, I expected from Muratbekov's story, presented to the judgment of Russian readers in 1988, a new turn of the theme and new touches of the time not yet pointed out by anyone. Otherwise how can one get hold of today's reader caught by the winds of revolutionary perestroika?

It must be noted that other authors are experiencing an uncontrollable inclination toward intimate themes, toward tearful melodrama. Someone loved someone else, someone made a mistake about someone else, a broken heart, a woman suffering in silent pride.... And that is not all. But heroes live in a vacuum, as it were, and do not see and hear anything other than their own inclinations and sufferings.

This is precisely the life lived by the heroes of the two stories by Farida Zhanuzakova included in her collection "Vtoroye rozhdeniye" [Second Birth] (Alma-Ata, "Zhazhushy," 1987). Imagine this picture: a compassionate woman—the heroine of these stories—relates a sorrowful family drama over 350 pages, in which the main object is her beloved husband, who is distinguished by poor health. She self-sacrificingly fights for his life and cares for and raises her children, not sparing herself, whereas he, the beloved husband, up and leaves for another woman. This is the drama. And although he and she work in the field of journalism, this does not seem to interest the author very much. The pages of the stories are full of particularly personal problems: friends, relatives, illnesses, offenses, concern for the children and lengthy conversations on everyday matters. The feeling is that you have been given someone's guileless diary, in which various trivialities of life have been written from day to day. Only it is incomprehensible why someone else's diary should be presented for general review. The book by F. Zhanuzakova is in striking contrast to what is now taking place in our country.

No one, of course, will dispute that the problem of the family and the interrelationships of fathers and children were always current and of general interest and remain so today. But the entire question is where the impulses of this problem go and how significant is its impact in the public. I think that readers paid attention to the story "Prigovor" [The Verdict] by the writer Yuriy Gert, which came out as a separate book. It is also about a family and about children but not only that. Rather, it is not about a family in the ordinary sense of the concept.

The story forces one to think about the civil and spiritual face of our contemporaries and about those serious moral losses that took place in our society in certain periods.

The author of one critical article dedicated to contemporary Soviet literature concludes his thoughts with the following words: "I dream of reading a novel about my own time that would appear as the result of the historical development of the nation and even of humanity, a novel in which prophecies would be heard...."

I do not know about "prophecy" and "humanity" but about the powerful and brilliant works of literature that have come from the pen of Kazakh writers, works in which the living pulse of the time beats and there is a sense of the unprecedented dramatism of the age, and I must admit that I, like others, also dream. And I have been dreaming for a long time. But for this purpose, it is clearly time to free ourselves from the load of yesterday's energy and the stagnant psychology of stereotypical thinking and provincialism. It is necessary to change our somewhat distorted notion of the writer's talent and mastery. We have dissipated too many of our efforts on these categories. There are many talents, it seems, but just one or two books worthy of attention.

And time is of the essence.

From the author. I request that the fee for this article be transferred to account No 700844 of Zhilsotsbank in Alma-Ata, to "Nevada," a public movement for a nuclear-free world.

Kazakh Filmmakers Congress, Notable Films Reviewed

18001125b Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by film critic K. Aynarulova: "So As Not to Work for the 'Shelf': Congress of Kazakh Filmmakers Opens Today in Alma-Ata"]

[Text] Discussions, ideas, search—all of this led to the holding of the extraordinary congress of filmmakers of Kazakhstan. There it is planned to discuss matters of a constructive nature: to reorganize the production structure of the cinema of the republic, to review the functions of the Union of Cinema Workers to carry out relections of the leading bodies of the cinema and other urgent problems in the professional work of all links of the cinematic process. But what is taking place on the republic screen and with what creative results have filmmakers come to their "restructuring" congress?

The present day is the output, for example, of the last two 2 years, produced in the process of the preparations for the congress during the "reporting period," in a manner of speaking, after the last congress of republic filmmakers. But today's movie production is still the cinema of the age of perestroika. And, taking into

account the individual features of the development of the republic cinema, this is also the time of the coming of a new generation to the Kazakh cinema, which they have awaited with impatience and faith in its innovativeness.

Let us recall that "shelf" films have come to the screen: "Funeral Banquet" and "Where the Mountains are White." As you know, not just weak works from a professional-artistic point of view reached the "black lists" of films not making it to the screen in time but also works essentially not understood that were made during the wave of artistic search. Thus, for the time of its creation—the early 1970's—the picture "Funeral Banquet" produced by B. Mansurov and filmed by the cameraman V. Osennikov was an innovative work from the point of view of the reading of national historical material. In its style, however, the film has lost nothing of its professional and esthetic value for the present day either.

The tendency to create poetic works of this kind was expressed in the 1988 picture "Higher Than the Mountains" by B. Omarov, where through the fate of the hero we trace different stages in the development of our society. The film contemplates the fate of a simple working person.

Proceeding from S. Bodrov's film "Nonprofessionals," it is possible, although, of course, in some way conditionally, to isolate another trend in the development of the republic's cinema. The picture "Nonprofessionals," produced in a documentary manner through the means of the interpretative cinema, is dedicated to present-day young people. In giving the viewer the right to make an independent judgment on the reproduced situation in life, the authors gradually encounter the idea that the social and moral infantilism of young people was engendered by the negative nature of situations in public life.

This picture begins the list of films produced at Kazakh-film on youth as it is. Young people encountering their first contacts and conflicts with the reality around them are the heroes of the films "Brother-in-Law from the Province," "Shanyrak," "Men to Sixteen," "The Needle," "The Balcony" and "The Color of the Fern." We assembled these films in accordance with formal topical characteristics but these works are very different in the sense of their artistic solution.

K. Salykov's picture "The Balcony" made in the retrospective style is dedicated to the youth of the 1950's. The film precisely conveys the spiritual atmosphere of life in Alma-Ata in those years, an atmosphere recreated in the poetry of O. Suleymenov. Here there are echoes from the war and the consequences from the time of repression and the horribly "serious house politics".... But from this "chaos" is extracted a whole pattern of the globality of the mysterious accomplishments of spiritual life and the persistence of the world of the sun-worshippers, who, without themselves realizing it, taught boys with "Finnish knives" in their pockets to be poets.

The picture "The Needle" was shown successfully on the screens of the country. It is an unusual film for the republic screen and became an event in the cultural life of our multinational cinema. The style of the film can be defined by the fashionable term "kitsch." Several genres are interwoven in it: realism and abstractness; there is the somber truth of the fact of the moral sphere of life in the society; new ideological strata of social consciousness are revealed and new musical rhythms that have gradually matured sound freely.

But all of these "ultrafashionable" attributes are not a goal in themselves. They are given in a precise dose of irony toward the criteria of existence. The main thing in the picture is the realism of human relations, in which there is love and hate, cruelty and compassion. A major merit of the film is its triumphant attractiveness for viewers from the most varied social classes and ages, which is easily explained—this picture fully meets the requirements of the time professionally as well as ideologically and artistically. The film gives reason to assert that in the person of the debutant R. Nurmanov, the producer, an interesting master of cinematic directing came to the national cinema.

The sore points in the cinematic process in the republic are covered in the problem of working out the genre of pictures. A number of attempts to create comedies, musicals, adventure and historical films and the film-narration failed.

The melodrama "Shanyrak" by the director Ye. Bolysbayev can be related to the success of the genre solution. Details from ordinary life appear in the film in the sphere of epic generalization. The action details, the behavior of characters, the general style, and the rhythm of the narration are contained in the key of a unique national ring, which for today's republic cinema is a phenomenon that is just as pleasing as it is rare. In this connection, mention should be made of the short pictures "Two Rode a Motorcycle" by S. Apymov and "Shilde" by D. Omirbayev. These films reproduce an atmosphere of life in the remote province.

The film "Come out of the Forest into the Clearing" by Ye. Shinarbayev stands alone among the new works. This picture is part of the search of young Soviet directors that developed under the influence of the filmmaker A. Tarkovskiy and is represented by the "complex" films of A. Sokurov, I. Dykhovichnyy, A. Kaydanovskiy and other cinema masters who dedicated their creativity to the search for specific means of the cinema—expressiveness and ways to express pure militant spirituality on the screen. In our view, the film "Come out of the Forest into the Clearing" loses in comparison with the previous work of Ye. Shinarbayev "My Sister Lyusya" from the point of view of the dramaturgical solution. But the film itself is quite interesting as a version of the artistic search.

Still another artistic film that must not be overlooked is the just-produced film "Last Stop" by S. Aprymov (the working title of the film is "November Vacation"). I will take the liberty to say that this is practically the first truly realistic work of the national Kazakh cinema.

The changes in the social life of the country had a noticeable effect on the appearance of the documentary cinema. There was a great flood of films about previously forbidden subjects. The heroes of the best films today are people who are by no means successful, people who are certainly not heroes in the respectable sense of the word. They are people who have failed in life, unrecognized talents, victims of repression and, along with them, bureaucrats and officials as well as those who have simply come down in the world, sick with alcoholism and drugs, criminals and time-servers.

Frequently, however, "perestroyka" films are such only externally. Created at different studios in the country but similar to one another, they differ only in their themes. Forbidden themes are rapidly becoming fashionable and films that expose the facts are replacing the monotonous flow of films that praise facts. Whereas only recently the manager of an enterprise was shown on the screen in a fog of greatness and blamelessness, now we can see him in the light of a critical attitude that is most often expressed in the camera angle.

The same set of problems is described in the republic documentary cinema, which is not surprising. A huge republic requires many newsreels. The republic documentary cinema is continuing to develop traditional subjects

for our newsreels—the "national economy," "culture," "art," "the social sphere," "nature".... But now all of this is being filmed with the pathos of a critical glance.

Let us recall that Kazakhfilm made one of the first Soviet films that began a wave of publicist activity on social and domestic themes. It is "The Kumshagalskaya Story" by I. Vovnyanko. And another of his pictures, "Tengiz," is attractive for its artistic and publicistic incandescence. It examines the problem of the collision of the "old" and "new" with a question mark. O. Rymzhanov and B. Mustafin made a brilliant publicistic film—"Saty. A chronicle of a Quiet Village," where with pain and anger they showed the difficult living conditions of people in remote areas. The film "Bayterek" by A. Shazhimbayev and cameraman N. Paisov, integral in its form and idea and developing the idea of the imperishability of the sources of national culture and morality, was an impressive event for the documentary screen.

The republic's documentary cinema sealed various stages in its development in interesting film portraits. Today this tradition is continued in the films "The Artist and Time" by M. Vasilyev on P. Zaltsman, "Barefoot in the Snow" by V. Tyulkin on the writer I. Shukhov, "The Life of Moliere" by Yu. Piskunov on the actor N. Zhanturin.... Obvious in the films is the difference in creative methods—the critical essay, publicistic sketch and the psychological portrait.

Today the republic's documentary screen, which also includes television newsreels with their own traditions, faces the complex problem of the reinterpretation of facts of history and the present day. In this connection, the documentary specialist has the burden not only of the artist but of the citizen as well. It is naive to assume that a qualitative leap will take place immediately. But the time of renewal is putting its own special demands on filmmakers as well.

Letters to Editor on May Day Hooliganism in Ashkhabad

18300669 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 11 May 89 p 3

[Letters to editor by T. Dzhalalov, chairman of the Council of Representatives of the Housing Operation Sector No 7, war and labor veteran; R. Toshchakov, head of the Department of Surgical Illnesses No 1 and Urology of the Turkmen Medical Institute, professor; L. Georgiyeva, war and labor veteran; and M. Niyazova, mother of a 10-year old son, staff member of the Institute of History imeni Sh. Batyrov of the TuSSR: "Hooligans, Thugs and Their Leaders—Let's Call Them to Account!"]

[Text] Our editorial office continues to receive letters whose authors condemn the hooliganist escapades of the group of young people in Ashkhabad on May Day.

It is necessary to wage an effective and decisive struggle against the sources of this evil. As S. A. Niyazov, the first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, noted in his speech on television, these are "various sorts of embezzlers and bribe-takers, speculators and blackmailers, bigwigs in the "shady" economy, in other words, all those who are at odds with Soviet laws and the norms of communist morality."

Not only the Law must help in the struggle against them, but also our collective condemnation of the so-called "respected people," and to put it more simply—of the self-interested. We will not allow them to torpedo the work of the party in regard to the restructuring of our society and our life!

I have lived in Ashkhabad since 1925. I studied here, received a higher education here, and was a teacher here; from here I went to the front, and with decorations I returned again to my home town, to my beloved pedagogical work. I was taught and brought up by the hospitable Turkmen people.

The people who live in Turkmenistan are very simple, friendly, and cordial. The Turkmen people have a fine national tradition: Honor and respect for guests, the doors for them are always open. In Turkmenistan, the other peoples that live here have always been treated well. And the Turkmen have still another fine tradition: The children in the family always respect their elders.

So what happened? We, the elderly people, have never seen the kind of disgraceful phenomenon that took place after the May Day demonstration. A large group—children, adolescents, and some adults—without any cause engaged in out-and-out hooliganism. The hooligans threw stones into the windows of numerous kiosks and the Ovadan Consumer Services House and they also broke glass in the building of the Secondary School No

11 and in the Boarding School at the Gaudan, at the market they threw fruit at the vendors... In short, they inflicted great damage on the townspeople.

Who are these youths? Basically, there proved to be among them those who live in the territory of the Sovetskiy Rayon of the city, in the Khitrovka. As it turned out, these are sons of the well-to-do, prosperous parents. These parents do not refuse their children anything, they give them freedom and do not control them at all. And this lack of control was utilized by anti-social elements and criminals, who used the energy of boys for their purposes.

The parents do not know with whom their children are linked, whether they go to their lessons, how they are doing in their studies, do not check their grade books, and do not meet with their class teachers. But at the same time, the school is educating the children in a formal way. Some teachers simply give lessons, but they do not engage in educational work, and they do not know how to persuade adolescents.

The public organizations and the Komsomol also did not rise to the occasion. One can draw the conclusion that in the schools where the young hooligans are studying the parents' councils lead only a formal existence, the representatives of the rayon organizations visit the school infrequently—only to register that they were there...

Thus, there are many who are responsible. But I believe that the parents, first of all, are at fault. They should bear material responsibility for the actions of their children and pay compensation for all the damage. Such parents should be discussed in the collectives where they work.

It seems to me, it is necessary to raise the authority of the councils of representatives at the place of residence. Where these councils function to produce results, there are not negative phenomena.

Many of these boys and hooligans have relatives and grandfathers who are participants of the war. Why are they so indifferent to the upbringing of the rising generation? And where are you, communists and labor veterans? Where is your influence on your relations, on your family?

T. Dzhalalov

As a physician, I would like to note the main thing: It is a good thing that the sad event that took place during the May Day holiday in the capital passed by without victims and great injuries. It could have been worse, for the consequences of the unrestrained force of the young people, guided by adults, could have assumed much greater and tragic dimensions.

I do not know the details of the event, but I know, as we all do, that it was adults who were the organizers of this, all in all extremist, action of young people. One cannot, of course, consider the young lads to be conscious extremists. But the adult instigators and organizers of the

disturbance knew very well what they were doing and what they came for. And they should be held responsible seriously.

R. Toshchakov

The house in which family lives was occupied almost 25 years ago. The nationality composition of its tenants is many-sided. Among my neighbors are Turkmen, Armenians, Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, and Azeris. For a quarter of a century, I have been sharing with them my joys and misfortunes. Many children were born here, grew up together, and became adults. We have celebrated birthdays and weddings together, have seen sons off to the army and met them after their service. We have given daughters in marriage and married sons and have rejoiced at the birth of grandchildren. Together we have accompanied our relatives on their last journey. We have lived like one great family, in difficult moments I have always felt the support of my neighbors.

And suddenly my neighbor hides his eyes. Hooliganist adolescents have insulted him. It is a shame and it is painful! But let us think, what is the source of the cruelty of children? Are we ourselves not at fault?

We have grown accustomed to live quietly, we try not to notice that a great deal that is alarming has appeared. Boys torture animals—and no one rebukes them. Children ask for money for the hit of the season, which is shown to them in the video shop—we give it to them. Why are they, they say, worse than others? We clothe them in everything that is expensive, many simply do not know how their father and mother receive a kopeck. And in the parents a psychology is working which has been developed by years of a difficult life: We did not see anything, so let our children live differently. And they do live differently. Look at whom the militia has taken away, and who has turned his apartment into a hang-out. Trifles? By far not harmless ones, and of this we had to become convinced when the young people engaging in hooliganism spoiled the bright May Day holiday for us.

Who are these lads? Yes, they are our children! What happened is a rebuke to us for the fact that we have let them out from under our influence.

I think we do not need to argue a great deal about this. I have an effective proposal. In every housing operation sector there are party organizations at work, whose membership includes communists who are on pension. Who better than the people with great life experience to take under their care the work with children at the place of residence? How this is to be done needs to be carefully thought through. But the concern for the rising generation has always been a paramount task of the party.

L. Georgiyeva

One of the roots of the evil is the special position which boys occupy in the national family. I have repeatedly had the occasion to observe large Turkmen families, in which the girls have been constantly occupied with work:

Cleaning, sewing, knitting, embroidery, and looking after younger brothers and sisters. While their brothers of adolescent age ride about on mopeds, motorcycles, and even in cars—luxuriously dressed, satisfied, they do not have any obligations—full of contempt for women, frequently permitting boorishness even with respect to their own mother!

They believe that they are better than their sisters because they are men! It is too late when parents begin to understand that idleness is the mother of all misfortunes. You see, as a rule, they not have either trouble or worries with the girls. They grow up with work, frequently heavy work not in line with their age, but in the family they do not have any rights—only duties, while the boys do not know how to kill the time. What is more, teaching does not have any meaning for those who are not used to work, not only physically but also intellectually. A "high" to music of inconceivable loudness (even if the are sick people and small children in the apartment), endless going back and forth "to visit" each other, where the difference in the repertoire is minimal—it lies only in the quantity of alcohol and cigarettes. This is how they spend the time until they are called into the army, but even the service there does not correct them.

Frequent and pointless fights among each other, the plundering of small schoolboys—especially immoral because of practical impunity—this is, I am convinced, what all of the "heroes" of the May Day event had gone through. They had gotten used to impunity, they had become accustomed to the fact that they could do anything.

Respect for other nations cannot be taught without respecting other people, one's own sisters! You see, the simplest thing is to accuse "strangers" of all sins, without taking the trouble to be a man. This is terrible!

I think our sociologists and ethnographers have not yet studied such, let us say, phenomenon—"the only younger son in a large Turkmen family," but this deserves attention. What is more, not the only sons in paternal families feel themselves to be "princes", who have servants in the person of sisters (and frequently even the mother and grandmother!). But can they respect them when they observe our celebrated "feudal-bai" [bai = rich landowner in Central Asia] of the mother by the father?

I thought it necessary to express myself and I do not claim the "truth in the highest instance. I am saying what pained me.

M. Niyazova

Transportation Officials Reprimanded For Bus Driver Strike

18300691 *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 19 May 89 p 1*

[KirTAG report: "The Conflict Did Not Have To Occur"]

[Text] On 16 May, departure of buses of the Frunze Passenger Transport Enterprise No 1 buses to line No

211 was held up for four hours. Thousands of city dwellers were late for work which inflicted significant damage on the city's economy.

What was the cause of this incident? The bus drivers, having exhausted, it seemed to them, all possibilities of changing the system of organizing labor and payment, decided to resort to this extreme measure. Having held up the departure of buses, they presented a list of 11 demands to their bosses.

First of all, the drivers think that the sales plan for bus passes and transfer passes should be eliminated. Furthermore, a wage system should be introduced based on the number of hours worked, routes driven, and quality of service. Among other issues were problems of spare parts, organization of quality food at terminal stops, and provision of travel authorizations for relaxation, health, and other purposes.

A. Dzhumagulov, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, A. Yordan, deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, U. Chinaliyev, first secretary of the Frunze party gorkom, A. Muraliyev, gorispolkom chairman, and D. Ubyshev, chairman of the republic State Committee for Transport and Highways arrived at the enterprise in connection with the conflict which arose on that day.

A heated, impartial conversation took place during which there were moments when emotions manifested by the drivers were soothed by common sense. As it turned out, the conflict could have also not occurred if the leadership of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways and the Chuyskiy Passenger Transport Production Association had informed transport enterprise workers in a timely manner about all steps directed at improving work organization and wages. Really, a portion of the workers' demands were fulfilled before they parked their vehicles for the strike. But because of the habits established by years of looking at subordinates from the top down, laxity, and certain leaders' irresponsibility, the information did not reach rank and file workers.

But this, as they say, is one side of the coin. The conversation showed that among the workers there were those whose ambitions did not allow them to soberly evaluate the situation and really look at their demands taking into account the current difficult period of perestroyka. There are people—and the voices of the shouters are always heard more—who forgot that you need to earn the money before you receive it. But this did not trouble them, the main thing for them was the "Give!" principle.

A frank exchange of opinions brought to light that among the issues raised by the motor transport workers were also those which require the most rapid, basic resolution. In the city's bus depots, there are insufficient spare parts and unqualified repairmen who are frequently yesterday's drivers who could not handle their duties.

It is just to also talk here about the fact that the plan must be real and capable of being fulfilled even if it does require intense work.

This whole situation which arose at the motor transport enterprise became the subject of keen analysis at a Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers Presidium session which convened the next day.

It was emphasized that city general use passenger transport activities do not meet the requirements for providing transportation at the present time.

The Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways (Comrade Ubyshev) is not taking proper steps to eliminate existing shortcomings in city passenger transport's operations. Issues of rational organization and coordination of transportation, use of advanced forms of organization of labor and wages, and also providing effective monitoring of transport operations are being unsatisfactorily resolved.

Frunze gorispolkom and the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways are not taking adequate measures to improve working and recreation conditions for drivers and line operations personnel and provide them with apartments and children's preschool institutions.

An extremely unsatisfactory situation has arisen in the Chuyskiy Passenger Transport Production Association. During the first quarter of 1989, this association did not fulfill all main planned technical, economic, and operating indicators and a reduction of the transport utilization level was allowed in contrast with the first quarter of 1988.

Instead of conducting systematic explanatory and educational work with driver personnel, the leadership of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways and the Chuyskiy Passenger Transport Production Association set out on the path of administrative decree. A spirit of compromise arose toward violations of labor discipline.

All of this also led to a serious conflict at the bus enterprise.

The Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the issue examined.

Comrade Ubyshev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Goskomtransavtodor [State Committee for Transport and Highways] was reprimanded and Comrade Savchenko, chief of the Chuyskiy Passenger Transport Production Association, was severely reprimanded for unsatisfactory management of the operations of sub-departmental organizations and for not adopting appropriate measures for timely elimination of deficiencies in their activities.

Comrade Smankulov, deputy chairman of Goskomtransavtodor, deserves to be removed from his position, but since he has been working in this post for a short period of time, he was severely reprimanded.

The Frunze gorispolkom's substandard work level for organizing passenger transport was noted. Comrade Abankirov, deputy chairman of the Frunze gorispolkom, was reprimanded for failure to take steps for correcting operations of the city passenger motor transport and for not improving the drivers' working and living conditions.

Attention was also directed to the fact that the transport and communications section of the Administration of Affairs (Chief Comrade Kurmankozhoyev) and Comrade Iordan, deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers who oversees this portion of work, still inadequately manage the local state of affairs and do not maintain proper communications with collectives of the sector's largest enterprises.

The Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways Collegium was tasked with investigating and making responsible officials accountable who are guilty of allowing this case of disruption of city bus operations on the morning of 16 May 1989 and attaining city passenger transport's stable and reliable operation.

Republic Goskomtransavtodor and Frunze gorispolkom are obligated to ensure development and implementation of measures for improving the organization and increasing the population transport volume by city passenger transport, development of a route system, construction and repair of roads and major highways, and priority development of electric transport in 1989-1995.

It was emphasized that special attention needs to be devoted to providing city transport workers with housing, dormitories, children's preschool institutions, and improved working, living, and recreation conditions for this category of workers.

It was proposed that the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways prepare and introduce a draft resolution, for review by the republic's government, on increasing city passenger transport workers' material vested interests.

Gosplan, Minfin [Ministry of Finance], and Kirghiz SSR Goskomtransavtodor must introduce a proposal to the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers on the issues of covering city passenger transport losses. Gosplan and Kirghiz SSR Gossnab must also insure allocation of necessary material and technical resources for accelerating ACU-AP's [Automatic Transfer Point Control System] introduction into operation in Frunze in accordance with the motor transport sector's orders.

The Ministries of Trade, Culture, Population Social Services, Communications, and Kirgizpotrebsoyuz [Kirghiz Consumer Union] were assigned a specific task and

were jointly called upon, with the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways, to resolve the issue of selling transfer passes through the trade network.

Frunze gorispolkom was tasked with studying modes of operation of enterprises, organizations, and institutions and to take steps for putting them in order with the goal of reducing passenger loading problems in city passenger transport.

The Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Transport and Highways and republic oblgorispolkoms were warned that they should not permit diversion of buses carrying out city passenger transportation to other purposes and should ensure departmental buses are used for transporting passengers on city and suburban routes.

Hostage-Taking Plagues Labor Camps

18001144 Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 May 89 p 4

[V. Belykh and A. Vasilyev report and interview with I. Katargin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for Correctional Affairs: "Expecting an Attack"]

[Text]Yesterday our newspaper related the tragic events played out in a correct-labor colony in Dzerzhinsk city in Donetsk Oblast where three inmates seized two female hostages from among the maintenance personnel. But this was only 1 crime out of 12 similar crimes in the last week alone in places where people sentenced to deprivation of liberty are being held. There have been 32 such cases since the beginning of the year.

And everywhere the convicts have threatened reprisals against the hostages if their illegal demands are not met. Two Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] workers have already been killed while freeing innocent people: Lieutenant Nemechenok and Major Romanov.

Here are some of the tragic examples.

Ust-Kamenogorsk

Dolgikh, Nikiforov and Savshin, in a strict regime colony for robbery, larceny, rape and destruction of state property, using threats with sharpened metal sticks, seized six women teachers in a school building on the territory of the colony. The criminals laid down conditions that they be given a vehicle to leave the "zone," along with firearms and bulletproof jackets. The terrorists surrendered after almost 4 hours of negotiation.

Semipalatinsk Oblast

Armed with "sharpened sticks" [zatochki] in a strict regime colony Kurochkin and Khorin (sentenced for murder) and Ryzhkov (robbery and theft) barricaded themselves in a room in the technical control section of

the production zone along with five women workers from the technical control section. They demanded drugs, money, firearms, a bus, handcuffs and an aircraft.

Negotiations yielded no results. There was a real threat to the lives of the hostages, some of whom had already received stab wounds. Staff members of the internal affairs organs decided to use firearms. As a result, one gangster was killed and a second was wounded. Major Romanov was killed during his heroic handling of the operation.

Rostov-on-Don

While being held at a detention center under suspicion of larceny and assault, while taking exercise Polyakov and Isayev attacked two female controllers, threatening them with the same "sharpened sticks"... An operation was undertaken to seize the criminals. As a result one of the terrorists was wounded but the hostages were unharmed.

This sad list could be continued. But it should be noted that the criminals' demands have never been met. When there is a threat to the life or health of the victims firearms have been unhesitatingly used by the special groups.

We asked Lt Gen of Internal Services I. Katargin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for Correctional Affairs, to comment. This what he reported.

[Katargin] It must be said that there has recently been a sharp increase in the aggressiveness of offenders held in correctional labor establishments and in detention centers during investigations. Over the past 3 years eight MVD staff members have been killed by criminals and more than 130 have received injuries, and more than 300 people have been attacked during the same period.

[Belykh/Vasilyev] In all cases of hostage seizures the gangsters have threatened them with knives and the so-called "sharpened metal sticks." How is this possible in prisons?

[Katargin] There is always a production facility in the corrective labor institutions, equipped with all kinds of machine tools and instruments. So that technically it is not complicated to fabricate weapons in them. True, knives are today a rarity because fabricating and storing them is a criminal offense. But the "sharpened sticks" can be made from a broken spoon, a piece of wire, a rod from a fitting... Only the threat of disciplinary punishment can be made for possessing them.

[Belykh/Vasilyev] However, this does not relieve us from our duty to keep track of our "wards", who, as a rule, are not distinguished by their meek dispositions.

[Katargin] Of course even we have gullible people. But judge for yourself: following the amnesty 40 percent of offenders were freed from the colonies. And our budget

was cut a corresponding 40 percent by the Ministry of Finance. And so the guards have been significantly reduced. Now it is not always possible to have the proper number of workers in the surveillance service. How, then, can we keep track of everyone?

The amnesty has also had other consequences. Virtually all offenders with a positive record were released. And we are happy for them. But to make up for that there is a greater proportion of offenders sentenced for murder, grievous bodily harm, robbery... It is mainly precisely these people who have also formed the gangster groups that have been taking hostages. Moreover, during the first 4 months of this year there has been a sharp rise in the level of crime in prisons and there are now many more premeditated murders and escapes... Many offenders have been regarding the humanization of our society as license to do anything. And this, incidentally, has been helped by the various kinds of "authorities" on thieves. The television program "Operation Thunder," about the Yakshyanets criminal gang played an unexpected role. Many offenders concluded that the reason for the failure of his group was merely poor knowledge of the geography and political situation in the world. If it had been in a different place, they say, everything would have been fine. Even though today under existing international law any state will deport terrorists from its territory.

But unfortunately, these conclusions do not convince everyone. The more so since one third of our "wards" are people with various kinds of psychological disorders.

[Belykh/Vasilyev] It is the more strange that many women are hired to work in prisons, and not only teachers and physicians but also controllers, that is, to use the old word, warders. In the No 1 Moscow detention center on Butyrskiy Val alone, 30 percent of them are women.

[Katargin] There are detention centers in Siberia and the eastern regions of the country, for example, where up to 60 percent of the controllers are members of the "weaker sex." Now we are taking steps but... The post of controller is not well paid. And strong, healthy men are needed for this. To the point, when criminals have not been under the supervision of women they have seized men as hostages.

Work is being intensified to train all staff in self-defense methods, set up special hostage-seizure groups, and introduce into the colonies the post of psychologist, in order to reduce stressful situations.

But these are all half-measures. What is really needed is greater legal and technical protection for our workers.

From the Editor. It seems to us that both the amnesty and the television program on operation "Thunder" are not the only reasons for the situation that has taken shape in the corrective labor establishments. The mass taking of hostages virtually simultaneously in different places does not

appear to be some random event. As if working to a single plan they make us think of concerted actions aimed at destabilizing the situation in the country. Further investigation will show whether or not this is so. But this entire sequence of acts of terrorism in prisons does suggest the thought that there is yet another reason for it—less discipline among the staffs of the corrective labor establishments, as a rule leading to tragic consequences.

Incidentally, while this commentary was being prepared two people in a strict regime colony in the city of Ust-Kut in Irkutsk Oblast previously sentenced for theft and robbery—Beloborodov and Khoroshikh—armed with the "sharpened metal sticks" broke into a produce stall, seized the saleswoman and demanded a vehicle from the administration for an unhindered escape beyond the territory of the "zone." Fortunately, this time it did not lead to bloodshed: after 40 minutes of negotiation the criminals surrendered themselves.

Restraint Urged in Judging Methods of Labor Colony Staffers

18001252 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
15 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by V. Savelyev, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent, North Kazakhstan Oblast: "Behind the Barbed-Wire Fence: What We Know and How We Judge About People For Whom the Colony is Their Place of Work"]

[Text] You, of course, remember how V. Shukshin's excellent film "The Cranberry Tree" begins. Yegor Prokudin, nicknamed "Gore," gets his freedom. His whole life lies ahead of him. He has the choice: either he can live until his next sentence, or he can live among good people and the fields.

In the YeS institution, which is simply called the colony for criminal minors, and which is situated within the city limits of Petropavlovsk, a movie was also made. A documentary. Its frames are no less impressive, inasmuch as the director for this film was life itself. Here are the faces of those who are still serving their time, and then those who are going to be leaving soon. An imperceptible pause, and suddenly a young man—really, just a kid—breaks out of the formation and throws himself on the chest of the person in charge—Colonel Mikhail Vasilyevich Gurov, the chief of that very YeS.

Quite a touching scene, don't you agree? Alas, very few holidays like this happen here. For the most part, the days here, which in freedom are sometimes worse than bitter radish, are altogether like horseradish in the zone, if one recalls the saying about these two unsweet Russian vegetables.

We are making judgments about this now not on the basis of hearsay. Dozens of articles in all kinds of publications have been devoted to life behind bars. Motion pictures have been made about that life. The first

curiosity, it would seem has been satisfied. Public opinion has begun forming about the not very attractive phenomenon in our life. Now is the time for the justice system to have its turn at becoming embarrassed and listening to the valuable advice and criticism from a member of the public. There is apparently no particular harm in this. Because I want everything to be better for us than it is. Including the places of confinement. The editorial office has been receiving a torrent of letters, many authors of which, having learned from the press what life is like for their compatriots behind the barbed wire, appeal for mercy. As concerned human beings, they pity those unfortunate prisoners. Because there is an absolutely disgraceful situation with the food, the bed linen, and outer clothing! The everything life is gloomy and gray, the attendants are uncultured and make life hard for the prisoners...

It is sinful to speak ironically about people's good feelings. But falsehood is also a sin. Yes, of course, a prison is not a sanatorium. To put it honestly, life is pretty bad there. But not too long ago I happened to visit a certain rural PTU [vocational-technical school], tasted the food in the local dining hall, and looked at the students' work clothes, and compared everything with what I saw at Gurov's place. There proved to be very few differences. So now I think: could it be that first we feed and clothe these people properly, and then the other people? Otherwise something awkward happens. The kids, I agree, are all ours. Both groups of them. But, after a certain period of time, the kids in the first group will have to go to the furrow in order to feed a minimum of 15-20 people, but no one knows where the kids in the other group will go. The mercy must be specifically addressed, rather than thrown to the wind.

Yes, we have a large number of disgraceful situations. Including those in the field of law. But, personally, I would not hasten to point the finger of blame at the MVD, saying, "You're doing things wrong with the guards—you should go easier." At first I would try, for at least a quarter of it (about five years), to live among those who constitute the object of its daily concerns and nightly vigils. Needless to say, the situation with regard to reindoctrination in the colony is bad. The contingent consists entirely of repeat offenders. Well, what is to be done? Should we accuse only Gurov or his indoctrinator-officers? Over a period of 17 years, the family, the public, and the street have turned a young man into a miserable piece of scum, into a bandit, and we want the colony to release him to us three years later, to use a figure of speech, as a dove. As the saying goes, it doesn't do any harm to want something. But is real life actually like this?

On the average, the adolescents stay with Gurov for 6-8 months. Some of them are given a provisional early release. Some of them, after reaching the age of majority, are sent on to adult colonies. Their places are taken by new arrivals. Last year, for example, 489 persons entered through the gates of the YeS institution, and 650 left.

Who would attempt, in half a year, to grab by the tail and turn around the soul of a person who is almost an adult citizen? In this whirlpool of fates? And especially if one considers that the authorized number of officers for a detachment of 80-100 prisoners is only three or four. There can be attempts, but no serious effect exerted.

Gurov points to a thief and rapist, for whom things will always be bad at Gurov's place. Considerably worse than on the outside. Otherwise everything would become awkward: prison is better than the person's own home! Better than life on the outside itself! The period of humanization of the living conditions at the places of confinement (the Petropavlovsk colony is one of the first ten in the country to be conducting this experiment) has been bringing changes. The prisoner identification labels have disappeared. The "skinhead" haircuts have been eliminated. Prison bars have become fewer, although there are still a sufficient number of them. And the high fence, topped with barbed wire. And restricted areas. Because there are instructional guidelines that Colonel Gurov is obliged to follow. Guidelines for maintaining the criminals. And, thank God, this measure of providing social protection is still being entrusted to professionals, rather than to casual do-gooders.

I have been told that he, of course, is somewhat of a bumpkin, that he lacks education, that he does not have a pedagogical base. That may be. It really may be... But what was he supposed to do? When he, an up-and-coming brigade leader at one of the plants, was pulled off the job and sent here, to the colony, no one asked him about any "base." He was told at the party's gorkom: "You have to go!" So Gurov went. Although his comrades, with whom he could no longer drink beer after getting his meager lieutenant's pay, told him outright, "You're a fool, Mishka... You've been put in prison yourself."

God, he wanted everyone to have a good, calm life! He wanted the inmates to be clean and neat, to speak to one another using the formal mode of address, instead of the informal mode, to be respectful in class to the women teachers, to refrain from using vulgar language when addressing the female workers in the shops, and to march crisply when performing their drill exercises, and, during their free time, to sing about the mellow chime at sunset.

But life rarely presents one with such holiday tidbits. In the zone, the ordinary way of life asserts itself with the fist. Or sometimes also with the feet.

Excerpt from a statement by I. Ginenko, acting procurator for Northern Kazakhstan Oblast: "Over a period of three weeks, prisoner Ashetov (the names of the "colonists" have been changed), feeling completely unjustified animosity toward newly arrived prisoner Turoshnikov, who was distinguished by shyness and modesty, beat him repeatedly, inflicting blows with his hands and feet to various parts of Turoshnikov's body. These blows

included a blow with the elbow in the Adam's apple area, after first forcing Turoshnikov to hold his head back. And also blows with a rolled-up floor mat in the back of the neck."

"But what were you waiting for?" On Captain S.'s rippling muscles you could probably flatten lead bullets. We are standing in a shop and he is pointing out a lanky fellow. "Do you know what kind of person he is? As a group, they met a couple of girls in the public garden. First it was a girl, and then... Do you want to write it down? I'll dictate it to you..."

"And what about this one?" the colonel asks, slapping the next file onto the desk. "Do you want to tell what he did to two children in a dark alley in Tselinograd?"

With undisguised horror I look at the young man, wordlessly asking, "Is it really possible that you did this?" The young man stares unflinchingly at me. And I recall the words, from Shukshin's "Wolves," "It is still possible, at the very last instance, to stop the most ferocious dog somehow: by fear, a kind word, a person's unexpected peremptory cry. This one, with a singed snout, could be stopped only by death... And the glance of his round yellow eyes was direct and simple."

And it was here that the terror lay—in the fact that it was "direct and simple." But I am still in favor of having the expression in a person's eyes, that reflect his cruel consciousness, be analyzed by specialists. By psychologists and jurists. People should not approach this with a marmalade of dilettantish advice. Because we are not discussing the technological problems of linking up space ships. Are things really any simpler here?

It is a good thing that there have not been any zones that are restricted with regard to criticism. The excursions to Gurov's colony are more frequent than those to the oblast museum. A fellow journalist is going there. So is an ideological worker, and also simply a curious comrade. He keeps twisting and turning around, keeps asking questions, and then he terrifies his neighbors and his fellow workers by saying, "This is a concentration camp, where they have dogs and soldiers and prisoners—such skinny little boys." Take, for example, this item published in a newspaper: "Unlimited violence! Arbitrariness! Rule by boorish soldier-boys!" So an officer whose hair has turned gray in the zone mumbles, "How could I do anything else, once this was printed in the newspaper? My wife looks at me out of the corner of her eye and says, 'You're taunting those kids there...'"

Or could it be that things aren't really like that in prison? They go there on the run, and they leave there on the run. A few people argue that the people who are sitting there are also our fellow citizens. They are being kept behind the fence and guarded so that they won't run away. And there are plenty of tears there. And an unlimited amount of desperation. But they themselves made that choice. Why was it that, out there on the outside, they repeatedly

forgot about mercy, but here, in the colony, they must appeal for it on an extraordinary and mandatory basis. They are not the persons who have suffered.

Was a mistake made? Well, that happens. From prison and from the beggar's pouch, as the expression goes... The colony is a chance. And whoever wants to, can use it, without complaining about the strictnesses, but accepting them as one's fault. And whoever "runs a movie," after demanding that a color television set be put in the recreation room, will chuckle and demand that steaks be served for lunch by waiters wearing starched aprons. I am not exaggerating any of this. People like this have their own rules: if you bow down, you can rot; if you have made a concession once, then you will give some more slack; the slop bucket is standing over there, waiting. Hidden away from the eyes of the administrators, they use medieval means of "reindoctrination"—hitting the person with a piece of plywood until it breaks, riding a person like an animal, poking needles in him, holding him down. Putting it in human terms, they beat up people and mock them in any way that they can. It is impossible to listen without shuddering to the story of "held-down" Blinov, about whom it was stated at the medical center, "He is a passive homosexual, belongs to the high-risk group for venereal diseases." You feel sorry for the unfortunate victim. But, after all, he is a criminal. How does one forget that, when one remembers that everyone is equal before the law?

It is stupid to assert that every step taken by the inmates is under the scrutiny of the colonel and his officers. The dual life of the colony is a fact. One life is the one that is on display. The other life, the twilight life, begins during the hours when the yellow lantern of the moon hangs over the zone. The administrators can exert an influence on this life only indirectly, by way of the "aktiv" that has been elected by the inmates from among themselves. It would seem to be a support, but who vouches for its absolute reliability. From whom is it chosen? I leaf through the social and criminal history of the inmates. Of the total number, more than 120 proved to be behind bars by failing to take advantage of having served their sentence and by breaking the law again. Half of them are from bad families. Approximately 60 of the kids are identified as being socially and pedagogically neglected or as having psychiatric deviations, and have been treated for alcoholism. They have their own concepts about honor, comradeship, and legality. And so, with this situation, it is necessary to seek adherents. The aktiv is a solid guarantee of conditional early release. Therefore all kinds of people strive to get into it. How, then, does one insure himself against errors?

From a statement: "In August 1988 convicts Balabayev and Mavruzov killed convict Krugin. In the same month convict Mishkin committed an act of heinous hooliganism and perverted actions with respect to two inmates. Convict Isetov was brought to criminal responsibility for having committed two acts of heinous hooliganism, for

beating people, for sodomy, and perverted actions. Thus, seven of the eight crimes that occurred last year were committed by Mishkin and Isetov."

What is important for us to note in the statement is that both of these miserable individuals belonged to the "aktiv." The indoctrinators had overlooked their flaws—that is obvious. But until the true core of the "activists" was revealed, the kids remained silent, accepting the unwritten laws, which are merciless to the "stool pigeon." It is also necessary to take this into consideration when making any fully substantiated claims against the administrators in this instance. Therefore one should not hasten to make any generalizations concerning the "unlimited violence" in the colony.

I believe that the boss there—both because of his official status, and also in the prison argot—is Colonel M. Gurov. He is the person who is responsible first of all for the inmates. He issues the orders, commands, and punishments. He attempts to lure the uncurious sponsors and the oblast Komsomol that is fighting somewhere on distant "fronts." He is free to play a game of checkers with a young criminal, and he does so frequently with obvious pleasure. He can put anyone in solitary confinement for several days. But it is without any pleasure. And he can raise the question of the cherished UDO—conditional early release.

There is a lot that the chief of the YeS institution can do. But neither he nor his entire staff are capable of giving a complete guarantee that, when they release a kid, they are saying goodbye to him for ever. There is no such guarantee. There is not even a "fifty-fifty chance" that, if he is honest, he will be lucky. Therefore we should not require the indoctrinators to perform a pedagogical miracle.

We throw onto their shoulders a burden that we do not want to carry ourselves, and that we do not know how to carry. Why, then, should we hasten to make reproachful statements? Perhaps we ought to listen to those who work behind the barbed-wire fence as they attempt to correct the evil. We ought to listen in order to understand how serious everything is there, on the other side of good.

Extradition Of "War Criminal" From Canada Requested

18001141 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
18 Apr 89 p 3

[Report by RATAU correspondent A. Yanushevskiy: "Voice Of A Grim Memory"]

[Text] Zhitomir Province—There are many villages with quaint names in Popelnyanskiy Rayon, Zhitomir oblast, among them Mirolyubovka, Golubyatin, and Lipki, the village of Krasnogorka, the settlement of Belaya Krinita. And 15 km from the rayon center, not far from the old Belaya Tserkov road, lies the sprawling village of Novoselitsa. Outwardly, the village is not particularly

distinguishable from many others, with the same small whitewashed houses set amid gardens and stands of lilac, the same sturdy public buildings and commercial and industrial structures.

Today no one talks about the war, which swept through Novoselitsa like a fiery squall. Its inhabitants endured much grief. During the difficult fighting, they did everything in their power to help the partisans, tending the wounded and taking bread into the forest. The fascists, in a frenzied rage, took brutal revenge against the villagers, setting many houses afire and shooting dozens of totally innocent people. The polizei—Ukrainian nationalists—wreaked special havoc in these parts, conducting roundups, beating and torturing people suspected of ties with the partisans, and pillaging. Many of the butchers escaped punishment by fleeing to the West. They include Novoselitsa native P. F. Glushanitsa, who now lives in the Canadian city of Toronto.

War and labor veterans proposed that the village soviet of people's deputies hold an assembly and demand that the Canadian government turn the war criminal over to Soviet justice. And such an assembly was held. Residents of Novoselitsa and the surrounding villages acquainted themselves with exhibits of photographs and documents recounting the crimes committed here by the Hitlerites and by the traitors to the people who served as their lackeys.

After deserting from the Red Army at the start of the war, P. Glushanitsa returned to Novoselitsa, where he volunteered for service with the fascists. V. G. Khidchenko, O. D. Babchuk, A. Ya. Bitavskaya, V. G. Boyko, and many others who addressed the assembly told how the traitor, along with other renegades like himself, had taken part in arrests, torture, and the deporting of civilians to Germany for forced labor.

P. Glushanitsa personally tortured and killed more than 20 of his fellow villagers.

"In early December of 1941," recounted labor veteran V. G. Khidchenko, "polizei Glushanitsa road up to our house in a wagon. He arrested my father, G. T. Khidchenko, who was a communist and an organizer of the local collective farm. The monster demanded that my mother given him five geese and a sheepskin coat, ostensibly in order to bribe the gendarmes. The polizei took father to Popelnya, where the gendarmerie and police had their headquarters. The next morning we learned that father had been shot.

Labor veteran M. Ye. Mikhalechenko told of P. Glushanitsa's involvement in deporting young people to Germany. In 1943, the veteran recalled, Glushanitsa seized his wife, who was carrying their small child in her arms, and sent her to the station. There the young woman was separated from the child and sent to Germany for forced labor, where she lost her health. She died shortly after returning home after the war. I and my children, Mikhalechenko declared, curse Glushanitsa for having brought so much grief on our family.

T. A. Ilchenko, former commissar of the Skvirskiy partisan brigade, read to the assembly the memoirs of his former comrade in arms, N. D. Zadorozhnyi, concerning the death of the courageous partisan scout and messenger Galina Slimenko. P. Glushanitsa had killed the patriot. Another witness, P. K. Shabatin, told, for example, how the polizei had shot at him but missed, hitting instead a woman who was trying to run away and gravely wounding her. Glushanitsa's fellow villagers testified that he also took part in the shooting of a group of activists in the summer of 1942, at a stadium.

It was recounted at the assembly how, after making his way abroad, the killer and butcher became an active functionary in the extremist Bandera-ite organization known as the Ukrainian Liberation League. In Toronto, he owns a printing house that he has used to print anti-Soviet literature for the Association of Ukrainian Nationalists, and he has often delivered slanderous commentaries aimed against the Ukrainian people on the radio. Glushanitsa has also blatantly falsified our country's history in his "works." In his book "The Third World War of Pavel Glushanitsa," which has been published in Ukrainian and English, the renegade even tries to portray himself as an innocent "victim of fascism." His period of service in the Popelnya police is for some reason missing from his "account." He carefully conceals his participation in atrocities. Nor does the book reflect the events connected with the fascist criminal's flight in December of 1943, alongside the retreating Hitlerites. It is now known that in April of 1944, P. Glushanitsa, then in Estonian territory, was assigned to the Wehrmacht's 374th Infantry Regiment and took part in combat operations against the Soviet Army in Moldavia.

The assembly's participants called attention to the fact that many other war criminals who committed atrocities in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory are in Western countries as well. In 1987 the Canadian government passed a law that requires the prosecution of persons in Canadian territory who are guilty of crimes against humanity. In March 1989, an international conference was held in Washington in which officials of the justice departments of the United States, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain and representatives of the USSR Procuracy took part. A joint declaration was adopted in which the parties pledged to assist one another in the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of Nazi war criminals and their accomplices. But, unfortunately, not all governments are adhering to international legal documents.

The assembly's participants adopted an appeal to the Canadian Prime Minister in which they urge him to turn war criminal Pavel Glushanitsa over to Soviet justice. "We are convinced," the document states, "that all people of goodwill in Canada, including the thousands of Canadians of Ukrainian descent who made a substantial contribution to the victory over fascism, will welcome practical actions by your government aimed at purging Canada of Nazi war criminals.

Republic Preliminary Census Data Published

Armenian SSR

18300657 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
13 May 89 p 1

[Report by Armenian SSR Goskomstat: "Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census in Armenian SSR"]

[Text] The Armenian SSR State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] has worked up the preliminary results of the All-Union Census conducted in January 1989 on population figures for the Armenian SSR, cities with population of 50,000 or more, and rayons, with a breakdown by urban and rural and by sex.

The 1989 census was conducted in the Armenian SSR in an exceptionally difficult situation. The destructive earthquake and the events in and around Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast resulted in an intensive relocation of large numbers of the population both on the republic's territory and beyond it.

By special order of the USSR Council of Ministers, the time period for conducting the census in the rayons of the Armenian SSR that suffered from the earthquake was set at 12 January through 11 February (instead of 12-19 January for all other places). In addition, the census program was simplified in the rayons and cities of the republic that suffered the most—only 6 questions were asked of the populace instead of the established 25.

There are plans to conduct a new census in the Armenian SSR after cleanup operations are completed and migratory mobility has eased. The materials from this census will give more complete and reliable information about the size, settling, and socio-demographic structure of the republic's population.

1. According to preliminary data of the All-Union Census, the size of current population of the Armenian SSR as of 12 January 1989 was 3.283 million people. This figure does not include those evacuated from the earthquake zone.

Changes in the population figures for the Armenian SSR during the postwar years are characterized by Table 1.

Table 1.

Census Date	Population
15 January 1959	1,763,100
15 January 1970	2,491,900
17 January 1979	3,030,700
12 January 1989	3,283,000

In the 10 years since the 1979 census, the republic's population increased by 252,300 people, or 8.3 percent.

2. Changes in the urban and rural population distribution of the Armenian SSR are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Year	Total Population	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	1,763,100	881,900	881,200	50	50
1970	2,491,900	1,481,500	1,010,400	59	41
1979	3,030,700	1,992,500	1,038,200	66	34
1989	3,283,000	2,224,600	1,058,400	68	32

3. The change in the number of males and females is shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Males	Females	Number of females per 1000 males		
			Entire Population	Urban	Rural
1959	842,400	920,700	1093	1088	1097
1970	1,217,200	1,274,700	1047	1043	1053
1979	1,474,800	1,555,900	1055	1065	1035
1989	1,618,000	1,665,000	1029	1045	995

The number of females begins to exceed the number of males at age 30 and is caused by the higher level of

mortality of the male population, and in the older ages it is the result of the large losses of males during the war.

4. Table 4 gives census data on the number of existing population by rayons of the republic (including republic-subordinate cities).

Table 4.

	Population as of 1 Jan 89 (thousands)			1989 in percentage of 1979 (total population)	Percentage of total population			
	Total	Urban	Rural		Urban (1989)	Rural (1989)	Urban (1979)	Rural (1979)
Abovianskiy Rayon	121.7	74.1	47.6	138.5	60.9	39.1	54.9	45.1
Azizbekovskiy Rayon	23.9	15.6	8.3	110.9	65.3	34.7	46.0	54.0
Amasiyskiy Rayon	6.3	-	6.3	30.7	-	100.0	-	100.0
Aniyskiy Rayon	23.8	8.2	15.6	134.4	34.4	65.6	27.2	72.8
Aparanskiy Rayon	21.3	7.0	14.3	118.8	32.9	67.1	33.3	66.7
Aragatsskiy Rayon	13.5	-	13.5	100.9	-	100.0	-	100.0
Araratskiy Rayon	87.5	33.5	54.0	121.3	38.3	61.7	31.8	68.2
Artashatskiy Rayon	106.7	32.1	74.6	132.5	30.1	69.9	20.8	79.2
Artikskiy Rayon	60.2	28.8	31.4	141.5	47.8	52.2	44.7	55.3
Akhuryanskiy Rayon	38.9	-	38.9	108.8	-	100.0	-	100.0
Ashtarakskiy Rayon	66.9	23.7	43.2	133.3	35.4	64.6	32.6	67.4
Bagramyanskiy Rayon	20.6	-	20.6	163.2	-	100.0	-	100.0
Vardenissskiy Rayon	31.5	13.9	17.6	55.9	44.1	55.9	20.1	79.9
Gorissskiy Rayon	41.3	23.9	17.4	114.6	57.9	42.1	48.3	51.7
Gugarskiy Rayon	20.6	0.4	20.4	74.9	1.9	98.1	1.2	98.8
Gukasyanskiy Rayon	10.3	-	10.3	110.7	-	100.0	-	100.0
Yekhegnadzorskiy Rayon	36.5	10.3	26.2	103.5	28.2	71.8	19.4	80.6
Idzhevanskiy Rayon	45.8	22.7	23.1	110.9	49.6	50.4	42.6	57.4
Kalininskiy Rayon	30.6	10.4	20.2	88.3	34.0	66.0	27.8	72.2
Rayon imeni Kamo	61.7	31.1	30.6	124.6	50.4	49.6	47.0	53.0
Kafanskiy Rayon	55.5	50.1	5.4	95.8	90.2	9.8	76.1	23.9
Krasnoselskiy Rayon	16.5	7.2	9.3	62.7	43.6	56.4	23.8	76.2
Martuninskiy Rayon	75.3	12.3	62.5	113.2	16.9	83.1	14.3	85.7
Masissskiy Rayon	76.5	27.6	48.9	134.3	36.1	63.9	29.4	70.6
Megrinskiy Rayon	14.4	10.3	4.1	98.2	71.5	28.5	56.3	43.7
Nairiyskiy Rayon	56.6	14.4	42.2	149.6	25.4	74.6	25.4	74.6
Noyemberyanskiy Rayon	34.0	8.8	25.2	107.6	25.9	74.1	23.2	76.8
Oktemberyanskiy Rayon	130.5	58.9	71.6	130.2	45.1	54.9	39.2	60.8
Razdanskiy Rayon	122.7	98.0	24.7	138.2	79.9	20.1	76.8	23.2
Sevanskiy Rayon	44.8	28.2	16.6	121.0	62.9	37.1	57.9	42.1
Sisianskiy Rayon	29.9	15.7	14.2	93.3	52.5	47.5	35.1	64.9
Spitakskiy Rayon	12.0	3.6	8.4	28.5	30.0	70.0	34.6	65.4
Stepanavanskiy Rayon	27.6	9.7	17.9	82.8	35.1	64.9	49.4	50.6
Talinskiy Rayon	39.9	13.2	26.7	119.9	33.1	66.9	27.1	72.9
Tumanyanskiy Rayon	62.6	33.8	28.8	111.3	54.0	46.0	52.8	47.2
Shamshadinskiy Rayon	34.8	10.4	24.4	102.5	29.9	70.1	25.1	74.9
Echmiadzinskiy Rayon	139.6	60.8	78.8	130.4	43.5	56.5	41.1	58.9
Dilizhanskiy City Soviet	30.4	23.7	6.7	114.4	78.0	22.0	77.5	22.5
Yerevanskiy City Soviet	1215.5	1207.4	8.1	117.7	99.3	0.7	99.3	0.7
City of Leninakan	120.0	120.0	-	58.1	100.0	-	100.0	-
City of Kirovakan	74.3	74.3	-	50.9	100.0	-	100.0	-

The consequences of the earthquake and the massive relocation of population in 1988 resulted in sharp changes in the population figures in individual rayons and cities compared with 1979.

5. At the beginning of 1989, the republic had 27 cities, 22 of them republic-subordinate cities, 31 urban settlements, 919 rural populated areas, and 479 rural soviets.

Changes in the population size of cities with 50,000 or more residents are shown in Table 5.

Table 5.

City	Population size (thousands)		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Yerevan*	1032.8	1215.5	118
Leninakan	206.6	120.0**	58
Kirovakan	146.0	74.3**	51
Abovyan	38.4	58.3	151
Razdan	41.4	60.7	147
Echmiadzin	44.0	60.8	138

*Including populated areas subordinate to a city soviet.

**Not counting people evacuated.

More detailed and updated census data in a territorial context with population classification by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, population housing conditions, and other indicators are being drawn up by the USSR and Armenian SSR Goskomstat and will be published in the handbook "The 1989 All-Union Census."

Azerbaijan SSR

18300663 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian
17 May 89 p 1

[Report by Azerbaijan SSR Goskomstat: "On Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census. Azerbaijan SSR Goskomstat Report."]

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR Goskomstat has worked up preliminary results of the All-Union Census conducted in January 1989 on the population figures for the Azerbaijan SSR, Nakhichevan ASSR, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the city of Baku, and administrative rayons and cities with a population of 50,000 or more, with a breakdown of population into urban and rural population and by sex.

1. According to All-Union Census data, the population of the Azerbaijan SSR as of 12 January 1989 was 7,029,000.

Changes in the population of the Azerbaijan SSR according to censuses during the postwar years are characterized by the data in Table 1.

Table 1.

Date of Census	Population
15 January 1959	3,698,000
15 January 1970	5,117,000
17 January 1979	6,028,000
12 January 1989	7,029,000

In the 10 years that passed since the 1979 census, the republic's population increased by 1,001,000, or 7 percent.

2. Changes in the distribution of the population of the Azerbaijan SSR into urban and rural population is shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Year	Total Population	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	3,698,000	1,767,000	1,931,000	48	52
1970	5,117,000	2,564,000	2,553,000	50	50
1979	6,028,000	3,200,000	2,828,000	53	47
1989	7,029,000	3,785,000	3,244,000	54	46

As a result of a noted migratory outflow in the republic, compared to 1979, the urban and rural population

increased only due to natural growth by 585,000 and 416,000, respectively.

3. Changes in the number of males and females are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Males	Females	Females per 1000 Males		
			All Population	Urban	Rural
1959	1,757,000	1,941,000	1105	1114	1097
1970	2,483,000	2,634,000	1061	1043	1079
1979	2,939,000	3,089,000	1051	1023	1084
1989	3,421,000	3,608,000	1054	1037	1076

There are 187,000 more females than males, which is the result of a higher level of mortality and intensive migration of the male population, and in the older population it is the result of losses during the war.

4. Census data on the population figures for the Azerbaijan SSR, Nakhichevan ASSR, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the city of Baku, and republic-subordinate rayons are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

	Population as of 12 January 1989			1989 in percent of 1979	In percent of total population			
	Total	Urban	Rural		Urban 1989	Rural 1989	Urban 1979	Rural 1979
Azerbaijan SSR	7,029,000	3,785,000	3,244,000	117	54	46	53	47
Nakhichevan ASSR	295,000	89,000	206,000	124	30	70	26	74
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast	188,000	89,000	206,000	117	52	48	44	56
Baku (including populated areas subordinate to city soviet)	1,757,000	1,757,000	-	113	100	-	100	-
Republic-subordinate rayons	4,789,000	1,842,000	2,947,000	117	38	62	37	63

5. Dynamics of the population of city soviets and administrative rayons of the republic are characterized by the data in Table 5.

Table 5.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979*
	1979	1989	
Azerbaijan SSR	6,028,000	7,029,000	117
Baku City Soviet	1,550,000	1,757,000	113
Ali-Bayramli City Soviet	65,000	85,000	131
Kirovabad City Soviet	232,000	279,000	120
Mingechaur City Soviet	60,000	85,000	143
Sumgait City Soviet	205,000	255,000	125
Rayons:			
Agdamskiy	108,000	131,000	122
Agdashkiy	68,000	74,000	109
Agdzhabedinskiy	68,000	90,000	132
Apsheronkiy	61,000	82,000	134
Astarinskiy	60,000	69,000	116

Table 5.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979*
	1979	1989	
Akhsuinskiy	48,000	54,000	114
Bardinskiy	85,000	109,000	128
Beylaganskiy	56,000	69,000	123
Belokanskiy	59,000	69,000	116
Vartashenskiy	30,000	31,000	105
Geokchayskiy	77,000	85,000	111
Dashkesanskiy	33,000	27,000	82
Dzhalilabadskiy	106,000	133,000	125
Dzhebrailskiy	43,000	49,000	114
Divichinskiy	59,000	68,000	115
Yevlakhskiy	75,000	94,000	125
Zakatalskiy	79,000	93,000	117
Zangelanskiy	30,000	33,000	108
Zardobskiy	35,000	39,000	111
Imishlinskiy	71,000	86,000	120
Ismailinskiy	54,000	62,000	116
Kazakhskiy	116,000	134,000	116
Kasum-Ismailovskiy	66,000	77,000	117
Kakhskiy	40,000	43,000	108
Kedabekskiy	76,000	76,000	100
Kelbadzharskiy	40,000	44,000	109
Kubatlinskiy	27,000	28,000	105
Kubinskiy	104,000	112,000	107
Kusarskiy	67,000	67,000	100
Kutkashenskiy	60,000	73,000	121
Kyurdamirskiy	69,000	76,000	110
Lachinskiy	45,000	47,000	106
Lenkoranskiy	140,000	164,000	117
Lerikskiy	45,000	54,000	120
Masallinskiy	122,000	144,000	117
Mir-Bashirskiy	47,000	54,000	114
Neftechalinskiy	54,000	61,000	113
Pushkinskiy	49,000	61,000	125
Saatlinskiy	52,000	66,000	128
Sabirabadskiy	100,000	121,000	121
Salyanskiy	90,000	109,000	122
Tauzskiy	106,000	126,000	118
Udzharskiy	56,000	63,000	112
Fizulinskiy	76,000	89,000	117
Khanlarskiy	76,000	84,000	111
Khachmasskiy	105,000	118,000	112
Shamkhorskiy	114,000	147,000	128
Shaumyanovskiy	20,000	21,000	105
Shekinskiy	120,000	139,000	116
Shemakhinskiy	95,000	100,000	105
Yardymlinskiy	34,000	40,000	118
Nakhichevan ASSR	239,000	295,000	124
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast	161,000	188,000	117

*Rate of growth is determined based on absolute population figures without rounding off.

6. There were 65 cities at the beginning of 1989. Of them, there were 8 with a population of over 50,000, including 3 with a population of over 100,000.

Compared to 1979, the population of Baku increased by 13 percent; the population of large cities (50,000 or more) increased by 27 percent.

Changes in the population of cities with 50,000 or more residents are shown in Table 6.

Table 6.

City	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Baku	1,550,000	1,757,000	113
Including populated areas subordinate to Baku City Soviet	1,022,000	1,150,000	113
Kirovabad	232,000	278,000	120
Sumgait	190,000	231,000	122
Mingechaur	60,000	85,000	143
Nakhichevan	40,000	60,000	150
Ali-Bayramly	42,000	59,000	141
Stepanakert	39,000	57,000	146
Sheki	49,000	56,000	114

7. According to data published by the USSR Goskomstat, the country's population as of 12 January 1989 was 286,717,000.

Belorussian SSR, oblasts, and cities with a population of 50,000 or more, with a breakdown of the population into urban and rural population and by sex.

Detailed census data in a territorial context with a breakdown of the population by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked up by the USSR Goskomstat and the Azerbaijan SSR Goskomstat and will be published in the handbook series "Results of the 1989 All-Union Census."

1. According to data from the All-Union Census, the population of the Belorussian SSR as of 12 January 1989 was 10,200,000.

Changes in the population of the Belorussian SSR according to censuses during the postwar years are shown in Table 1.

Belorussian SSR

18300663 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 11 May 89 pp 1, 3

[Report by Belorussian SSR Goskomstat: "On Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census for the Belorussian SSR. Belorussian SSR Goskomstat Report."]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Goskomstat has worked up preliminary results of the All-Union Census conducted in January 1989 on the population figures for the

Table 1.

Date of Census	Population
15 January 1959	8,055,700
15 January 1970	9,002,300
17 January 1979	9,560,500
12 January 1989	10,200,200

In the 10 years that have passed since the 1979 census, the republic's population increased by 639,700, or 6.7 percent.

2. Dynamics of the population of oblasts are characterized by the data in Table 2.

Table 2.

Oblast	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Belorussian SSR	9,560,000	10,200	107
Brest Oblast	1,363,000	1,458,000	107
Vitebsk Oblast	1,385,000	1,413,000	102
Gomel Oblast	1,599,000	1,674,000	105
Grodno Oblast	1,131,000	1,171,000	103
City of Minsk*	1,276,000	1,612,000	126
Minsk Oblast	1,557,000	1,587,000	102
Mogilev Oblast	1,249,000	1,285,000	103

*Including populated areas subordinate to city soviet.

Natural growth was the main factor in the population increase.

3. Changes in the distribution of the population of the Belorussian SSR into urban and rural population are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Total Population	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	8,055,700	2,480,500	5,575,200	31	69
1970	9,002,300	3,907,800	5,094,500	43	57
1979	9,560,500	5,263,400	4,297,100	55	45
1989	10,200,200	6,676,300	3,523,900	65	35

Compared to 1979, the urban population increased by 1,412,900, 726,800 due to natural growth, and 686,100 due to migratory inflow and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas.

As a result of migratory outflow and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas, the rural population decreased by 773,200.

4. Changes in the male and female population figures are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

Year	Males	Females	Females per 1000 Males		
			All Population	Urban	Rural
1959	3,581,500	4,474,200	1249	1245	1251
1970	4,137,800	4,864,500	1176	1129	1213
1979	4,442,400	5,118,100	1152	1125	1186
1989	4,783,700	5,416,500	1132	1118	1160

In 1959, there were 892,700 more females than males. In subsequent years, there was a gradual leveling off, and in 1989 this figure was reduced to 632,800 more females. Females

begin to outnumber males at age 30 and is caused by the higher death-rate of the male population, and in the older population it is the result of large losses during the war.

5. Census data on the population figures by oblasts are given in Table 5.

Table 5.

Oblast	Population as of 12 January 1989			1989 in percent of 1979	In Percent of Total Population			
	Total	Urban	Rural		1989 Urban	1989 Rural	1979 Urban	1979 Rural
Belorussian SSR	10,200,000	6,676,000	3,524,000	107	65	35	55	45
Brest Oblast	1,458,000	824,000	634,000	107	57	43	45	55
Vitebsk Oblast	1,413,000	911,000	502,000	102	64	36	56	44
Gomel Oblast	1,674,000	1,070,000	604,000	105	64	36	52	48
Grodno Oblast	1,171,000	670,000	501,000	103	57	43	44	56
City of Minsk*	1,612,000	1,612,000	0	126	100	0	100	0
Minsk Oblast	1,587,000	744,000	843,000	102	47	53	36	64
Mogilev Oblast	1,285,000	845,000	440,000	103	66	34	57	43

*Including populated areas subordinate to city soviet.

6. There were 99 cities as of the beginning of 1989, 12 with a population of over 100,000. The number of people living in these cities increased by 33 percent compared to 1979.

Changes in the population of cities with 50,000 or more residents are shown in Table 6.

Table 6.

City	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Minsk	1,262,000	1,589,000	126
Gomel	383,000	500,000	131
Mogilev	290,000	356,000	123
Vitebsk	297,000	350,000	118
Grodno	195,000	270,000	139
Brest	177,000	258,000	145
Bobruysk	192,000	223,000	116
Baranovich	131,000	159,000	122
Borisov	112,000	144,000	129
Orsha	112,000	123,000	110
Pinsk	90,000	119,000	132
Mozyr	73,000	101,000	137
Novopolotsk	67,000	93,000	138
Soligorsk	65,000	93,000	142
Molodechno	73,000	92,000	126
Lida	66,000	91,000	139
Polotsk	71,000	77,000	108
Rechitsa	60,000	69,000	115
Svetlogorsk	55,000	69,000	127
Slutsk	45,000	57,000	127
Zhlobin	35,000	57,000	160
Zhodino	34,000	54,000	158

Detailed census data in a territorial context with a breakdown of population by sex, age, nationality, lan-

guage, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked up under a program established by the USSR Goskomstat.

Georgian SSR

18300657 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Apr 89 p 1

[Report by Georgian SSR Goskomstat: "Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census for the Georgian SSR"]

[Text] The Georgian SSR Goskomstat had worked up preliminary results of the All-Union Census conducted in January 1989 on the size of the population for the republic, autonomous republics, autonomous oblast, and cities with 100,000 or more residents, with a breakdown by urban and rural and by sex.

1. According to census data, the size of the population of the Georgian SSR as of 12 January 1989 was 5.449 million people.

Changes in the republic's population size according to census data during the postwar years are characterized by the figures in Table 1.

Table 1.

Census Date	Population
15 January 1959	4,044,000
15 January 1970	4,686,400
17 January 1979	5,014,800
12 January 1989	5,448,600

In the 10 years following the 1979 census, the republic's population increased by 433,800 people, or 8.7 percent.

The main factor for the population increase is natural growth.

2. Changes in the urban and rural distribution of the Georgian SSR population can be seen from the figures in Table 2.

Table 2.

Year	Total Population (thousands)	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	4,044,000	1,712,900	2,331,100	42	58
1970	4,686,400	2,239,800	2,446,600	48	58
1979	5,014,800	2,600,500	2,414,300	52	48
1989	5,448,600	3,032,500	2,416,100	56	44

Urban population increased by 432,000 compared to 1979, including by 263,100 due to natural growth and 168,900 due to migratory flow and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas.

increased by 1,800 people. This is explained by the higher natural growth and also by measures conducted in the republic to regenerate some of the deserted rural populated areas.

Despite the migratory flow and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas, the rural population

3. Changes in the number of males and females are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Males	Females	Number of females per 1000 males		
			Entire Population	Urban	Rural
1959	1,865,000	2,179,000	1168	1198	1147
1970	2,202,000	2,484,000	1128	1141	1118
1979	2,355,000	2,660,000	1129	1156	1114
1989	2,574,000	2,875,000	1117	1148	1079

The number of females begins to exceed the number of males at age 30 and is caused by the higher level of

mortality of the male population, and in the older ages it is the result of the large losses of males during the war.

4. Table 4. gives census data on the size of the population by autonomous republics and autonomous oblast.

Table 4.

	Population as of 1 Jan 89 (thousands)			1989 in percentage of 1979 (total population)	Percentage of total population			
	Total	Urban	Rural		Urban (1989)	Rural (1989)	Urban (1979)	Rural (1979)
Georgian SSR	5,449	3,033	2,416	109	56	44	52	48
Abkhaz ASSR	537	256	281	106	48	52	47	53
Adzhar ASSR	393	181	212	111	46	54	45	55
South Osetian Autonomous Oblast	99	50	49	102	51	49	42	58
Tbilisi (City Soviet)	1,264	1,264	0	118	100	0	100	0

5. As of the beginning of 1989, the republic had 62 cities, 1 with a population over 1 million and 4 with a population over 100,000.

The size of the population living in cities with 100,000 or more residents increased by 16 percent compared to 1979, and in Tbilisi it increased by 18 percent.

Changes in the population of cities with 100,000 or more residents are shown in Table 5.

Table 5.

City	1979 Population	1989 Population	1989 in percentage of 1979
Batumi	123,000	136,000	111
Kutaisi	194,000	235,000	121
Rustavi	129,000	159,000	123
Sukhumi	114,000	121,000	106
Tbilisi	1,066,000	1,260,000	118

Working up of detailed census data in a territorial context on classification of population by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators continues.

As of 12 January 1989, according to preliminary census data, the population of Kazakhstan was 16,538,000, of which 8,026,000 (48.5 percent) were males and 8,512,000 (51.5 percent) were females.

The dynamics of population size of the Kazakh SSR according censuses conducted during the postwar years is characterized by the data in Table 1.

Table 1.

Kazakh SSR

18300657 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 May 89 pp 2-3

[Report by Kazakh SSR Goskomstat: "Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census"]

[Text] The Kazakh SSR Goskomstat had worked up preliminary data of the All-Union Census conducted as of 12 January 1989 on the overall population size in the republic, oblasts, and cities with 50,000 or more residents, with a breakdown by urban and rural and also by sex.

Census Date	Population
15 January 1959	9,295,000
15 January 1970	13,009,000
17 January 1979	14,684,000
12 January 1989	16,538,000

In the last 30 years, the republic's population has increased by 7,243,000 (78 percent); in the decade following the 1979 census, it increased by 1,854,000, or nearly 13 percent.

The average annual rate of population growth was 3.10 percent during the 1960's, 1.35 percent during the 1970's, and 1.20 percent during the 1980's.

The change in the population of oblasts and the republic's capital between the last census, that is, during the past decade, is characterized by the data in Table 2.

Table 2.

Oblast	1979	1989	1989 in percentage of 1979
Aktyubinsk Oblast	629,000	738,000	117
Alma-Ata Oblast	852,000	978,000	115
East Kazakhstan Oblast	877,000	934,000	107
Guryev Oblast	622,000	755,000	121
Dzhambul Oblast	932,000	1,050,000	113
Dzhezkazgan Oblast	450,000	496,000	110
Karaganda Oblast	1,258,000	1,352,000	107
Kzyl-Orda Oblast	566,000	651,000	115
Kokchetav Oblast	616,000	664,000	108
Kustanay Oblast	1,083,000	1,221,000	113
Pavlodar Oblast	806,000	944,000	117
North Kazakhstan Oblast	570,000	600,000	105
Semipalatinsk Oblast	774,000	838,000	108
Taldy-Kurgan Oblast	660,000	721,000	109
Ural Oblast	581,000	631,000	109
Tselinograd Oblast	927,000	1,002,000	108
Chimkent Oblast	1,567,000	1,831,000	117
City of Alma-Ata	914,000	1,132,000	124
Kazakh SSR	14,684,000	16,538,000	113

The main factor of the population increase was natural growth.

Distribution of population by urban and rural is shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Entire Population (thousands)	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	9,295	4,067	5,228	44	56
1970	13,009	6,539	6,470	50	50
1979	14,684	7,920	6,764	54	46
1989	16,538	9,465	7,073	57	43

Urban population increased by 1,545,000 compared to 1979, including 1 million due to natural growth and the rest due to migratory influx and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas.

As a result of a significant migratory outflow and administrative-territorial transformations, rural population in the republic increased by only 309,000 through natural growth.

Changes in the number of males and females in the republic are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

Year	Males (in thousands)	Females (in thousands)	Number of females per 1000 males		
			Entire Population	Urban	Rural
1959	4,415	4,880	1105	1115	1098
1970	6,263	6,746	1077	1075	1080
1979	7,084	7,600	1073	1099	1043
1989	8,026	8,512	1060	1094	1017

The number of females begins to exceed the number of males at age 35 and is caused by the higher level of mortality of the male population.

Preliminary data from the latest census on the size of the urban and rural population by republics and the capital of the republic are shown in Table 5.

Table 5.

Oblast	Population as of 12 Jan 89 (in thousands)		1989 in percentage of 1979		In percentage of total population			
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban (1989)	Rural (1989)	Urban (1979)	Rural (1979)
Aktyubinsk	339	339	134	102	54	46	47	53
Alma-Ata	216	762	133	111	22	78	19	81
East Kazakhstan	607	327	114	95	65	35	61	39
Guryev	548	207	125	113	73	27	71	29
Dzhambul	498	552	119	107	47	53	45	55
Dzhezkazgan	388	108	111	106	78	22	77	23
Karaganda	1,147	205	107	108	85	15	85	15
Kzyl-Orda	422	229	119	108	65	35	63	37
Kokchetav	260	404	122	100	39	61	34	66
Kustanay	616	605	124	103	50	50	46	54
Pavlodar	605	339	132	97	64	36	57	43
North Kazakhstan	287	313	115	97	48	52	44	56
Semipalatinsk	429	409	116	101	51	49	48	52
Taldy-Kurgan	325	396	125	99.0	45	55	39	61
Ural	269	362	123	99.7	43	57	38	62
Tselinograd	572	430	115	99.7	57	43	53	47
Chimkent	745	1,086	120	115	41	59	40	60
City of Alma-Ata	1,132	-	124	-	100	-	100	-
Kazakh SSR	9,465	7,073	119	105	57	43	57	54

As of the beginning of 1989, the republic had 84 cities: Alma-Ata with a population over 1 million; Karaganda with over 600,000; and Chimkent, Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, Ust-Kamenogorsk, and Dzhambul with over 300,000.

Compared with 1979, the size of the population living in cities with a population of 100,000 or more increased by 27 percent, and by 5 percent in cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000.

Changes in the population of cities with 50,000 or more residents are shown in Table 6.

Table 6.

City	1979	1989	1989 in percentage of 1979
Alma-Ata	910,000	1,128,000	124
Aktyubinsk	191,000	253,000	133
Arkalyk	48,000	62,000	130
Balkhash	78,000	87,000	111
Guryev	131,000	149,000	114
Dzhambul	264,000	307,000	116
Dzhezkazgan	89,000	109,000	122
Zhanatas	30,000	53,000	177
Zyryanovsk	51,000	53,000	103
Karaganda	572,000	614,000	107
Kzyl-Orda	136,000*	153,000	112
Kentau	63,000	64,000	102
Kokchetav	103,000	137,000	133
Kustanay	165,000	224,000	136
Leninogorsk	68,000	69,000	101
Nikolskiy	49,000	59,000	120
Pavlodar	273,000	331,000	121
Petropavlovsk	207,000	241,000	117
Rudnyy	110,000	124,000	113
Saran	55,000	64,000	116

Table 6.

City	1979	1989	1989 in percentage of 1979
Semipalatinsk	283,000	334,000	118
Taldy-Kurgan	88,000	119,000	136
Temirtau	213,000	212,000	99.7
Turkestan	67,000	78,000	117
Uralsk	167,000	200,000	120
Ust-Kamenogorsk	274,000	324,000	118
Tselinograd	232,000	277,000	119
Shakhtinsk	50,000	65,000	129
Shevchenko	111,000	159,000	144
Shchuchinsk	48,000	56,000	116
Chimkent	322,000	393,000	122
Ekibastuz	66,000	135,000	205

*According to methodology used in 1989 census.

Detailed data on the 1989 All-Union Census in a territorial context, with classification of the population by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators, are being worked up by automated method at the Main Computer Center of the USSR Goskomstat and will be published in a handbook series "Results of the 1989 All-Union Census" and also in similar special collections of the Kazakh SSR Goskomstat, which will come out in 1990-1993.

[Text] 1. An all-union census was conducted in January 1989. According to its data, the republic's population as of 12 January 1989 was 2,681,000. In the 10 years since the 1979 census, the population increased by 160,000, or 6 percent.

The population dynamics of the Latvian SSR is characterized by the data in Table 1.

Table 1.

Census Date	Population
9 February 1897	1,929,000
12 February 1935	1,905,000
15 January 1959	2,093,000
15 January 1970	2,364,000
17 January 1979	2,521,000
12 January 1989	2,681,000

Latvian SSR

18300657 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
11 May 89 p 3

[Report by Latvian SSR Goskomstat: "Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

2. Changes in the urban and rural population distribution for the Latvian SSR are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Year	Population	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1897	1,929,000	542,000	1,387,000	28	72
1935	1,905,000	708,000	1,197,000	37	63
1959	2,093,000	1,114,000	979,000	53	47
1970	2,364,000	1,477,000	887,000	62	38
1979	2,521,000	1,726,000	795,000	68	32
1989	2,681,000	1,907,000	774,000	71	29

Due to natural growth, migratory influx, and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas, the urban population increased by 181,000 compared with

1979, or 10 percent. As a result of migratory outflow and transformation of rural populated areas into urban areas, rural population decreased by 21,000.

3. Data on the population for republic-subordinate cities and rural rayons are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

City/Rayon	Population	Urban Population	Rural Population	1989 in Percentage of 1979 Population		
				Entire Population	Urban	Rural
Riga	915,200	915,200	-	110	110	-
Daugavpils	126,700	126,700	-	109	109	-
Liyepaya	114,500	114,500	-	106	106	-
Yelgava	74,700	74,700	-	110	110	-
Yurmala	66,000	66,000	-	108	108	-
Ventspils	50,400	50,400	-	106	106	-
Rezekne	42,500	42,500	-	114	114	-
Aluksnenskiy Rayon	28,800	12,600	16,200	98	107	91
Balvskiy Rayon	33,900	14,100	19,800	91	113	80
Bauskiy Rayon	55,900	16,100	39,800	108	117	105
Valkskiy Rayon	37,500	19,400	18,100	99.8	103	97
Valmiyerskiy Rayon	62,900	36,700	26,200	108	112	102
Ventspilsskiy Rayon	15,700	1,200	14,500	109	129	108
Gulbenskiy Rayon	30,100	10,600	19,500	101	108	98
Daugavpilsskiy Rayon	46,700	4,400	42,300	95	108	93
Dobelskiy Rayon	44,700	19,900	24,800	104	113	97
Yekabpilsskiy Rayon	61,800	35,500	26,300	105	117	92
Yelgavskiy Rayon	38,900	8,100	30,800	101	180	91
Kraslavskiy Rayon	41,400	15,900	25,500	93	115	83
Kuldigskiy Rayon	40,500	20,600	19,900	103	111	97
Liyepayskiy Rayon	54,300	19,300	35,000	99	105	95
Limbazhskiy Rayon	41,000	17,600	23,400	102	114	94
Ludzenskiy Rayon	42,100	17,500	24,600	90	107	80
Madonskiy Rayon	49,300	19,700	29,600	101	111	95
Ogrskiy Rayon	66,100	41,300	24,800	114	122	103
Preylskiy Rayon	45,700	21,800	23,900	103	132	85
Rezeknenskiy Rayon	43,500	7,900	35,600	88	104	86
Rizhskiy Rayon	152,200	40,700	111,500	119	115	120
Saldusskiy Rayon	39,200	16,200	23,000	108	107	109
Stuchkinskiy Rayon	44,400	24,400	20,000	106	125	88
Talsinskiy Rayon	49,700	23,500	26,200	102	113	94
Tukumskiy Rayon	59,000	26,300	32,700	107	113	103
Tsesisskiy Rayon	65,300	25,000	40,300	104	104	103

Population distribution for cities and urban settlements is shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

	Number of Urban Settlements		Number of Residents	
	1979	1989	1979	1989
All urban settlements	92	93	1,726,000	1,907,000
those with population:				
up to 3,000	42	39	76,000	73,000
3-5,000	18	20	66,000	77,000
5-10,000	10	8	78,000	61,000
10-20,000	11	14	134,000	172,000
20-50,000	6	6	185,000	177,000
50-100,000	2	3	129,000	191,000
100-500,000	2	2	223,000	241,000
over 500,000	1	1	835,000	915,000

4. Changes in the number of males and females are shown in Table 5.

Table 5.

Year	Entire Population	Male	Female	Percent Male	Percent Female
1959	2,093,000	919,000	1,174,000	43.9	56.1
1970	2,364,000	1,081,000	1,283,000	45.7	54.3
1979	2,521,000	1,161,000	1,360,000	46.0	54.0
1989	2,681,000	1,249,000	1,432,000	46.6	53.4

In 1959, the number of females exceeded the number of males by 255,000. There was a gradual leveling out in subsequent years, and by the 1989 census this difference decreased to 183,000.

5. The population density of the Latvian SSR increased from 33 people per square kilometer in 1959 to 42 in 1989.

Detailed census data in the territorial context with classification by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked up and will be published in the handbook "Results of the 1989 Census for the Latvian SSR."

Lithuanian SSR

18300663 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
30 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[Report by Lithuanian SSR Goskomstat: "On Preliminary Results of 1989 All-Union Census."]

[Text] The All-Union Census was conducted in January 1989. This was the fourth one in Lithuania during the postwar years.

According to preliminary census data, the population of the Lithuanian SSR as of 12 January 1989 was 3,690,000. In the 10 years that have passed since the 1979 census, its population increased by 292,000, or 8.6 percent.

Changes in the population, according to census data, are shown in Table 1.

Table 1.

Date of Census	Population
15 January 1959	2,711,000
15 January 1970	3,128,000
17 January 1979	3,398,000
12 January 1989	3,690,000

Population growth in the last 10 years is equal to the average level for the union and somewhat exceeds this indicator in neighboring republics.

Table 2.

Republic	Population, as of:		1989 in percent of 1979
	17 January 1979	12 January 1989	
USSR	262,436,000	286,717,000	109
Lithuanian SSR	3,398,000	3,690,000	109
Latvian SSR	2,521,000	2,681,000	106
Estonian SSR	1,466,000	1,573,000	107
Belorussian SSR	9,560,000	10,200,000	107

Changes in urban and rural population are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Total Population	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	2,711,000	1,046,000	1,665,000	39	61
1970	3,128,000	1,571,000	1,557,000	50	50
1979	3,398,000	2,062,000	1,336,000	61	39
1989	3,690,000	2,509,000	1,181,000	68	32

In the last 10 years, urban population increased by 447,000, or 22 percent; rural population decreased by 155,000, or 12 percent. The increase in urban population was due to natural growth (193,000) and migration of population and administrative transformations (254,000). There was virtually no natural growth of population in rural areas during this period, and the population decreased due to migration.

Population density increased from 52 people per square kilometer in 1979 to 57 in 1989.

There are 1,750,000 males and 1,940,000 females. The changes in the percentage of males and females in the last 30 years are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

Year	Percent Male	Percent Female	Number of Females per 1000 Males
1959	45.9	54.1	1178
1970	46.9	53.1	1131
1979	47.2	52.8	1119
1989	47.4	52.6	1109

Males comprise 47.2 percent of the urban population and 47.9 percent of the urban population.

The gap between the number of males and females, which formed as a result of the large losses of the male population during the war, is gradually reducing.

The nationality composition of the population is characterized by the data in Table 5.

Table 5.

Year	In Percent of Population				
	Lithuanians	Russians	Poles	Belorussians	Other Nationalities
1959	79.3	8.5	8.5	1.1	2.6
1970	80.1	8.6	7.7	1.5	2.1
1979	80.0	8.9	7.3	1.7	2.1
1989 (preliminary count)	80	9	7	2	2

Census data on population figures for republic-subordinate cities, rayons, rayon centers, and cities with 5,000 or more residents are shown below in Table 6.

Table 6.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Republic-subordinate cities:			
Vilnius	481,000	582,000	121
Kaunas	370,000	423,000	114
Klaypeda	176,000	204,000	116
Shyauliyay	118,000	145,000	123
Panevezhis	102,000	126,000	125
Alitus	55,000	73,000	132
Mariyampole	38,000	51,000	131
Druskininkay	17,000	22,500	133
Palanga	13,700	19,400	142
Neringa	2,200	2,500	111
Birshtonas	3,400	4,100	123
Rayons:			
Akmyanskiy	40,400	37,800	94
urban population	23,600	23,400	99
N. Akmyane	14,400	13,700	95
rural population	16,800	14,400	86
Alitusskiy	38,600	32,700	85
urban population	3,500	4,100	116
rural population	35,100	28,600	81
Anikshchyayskiy	43,000	38,300	89

Table 6.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
urban population	13,100	14,600	112
City of Anikshchyay	10,600	12,900	122
rural population	29,900	23,700	79
Birzhayskiy	40,700	38,600	95
urban population	17,300	18,700	108
City of Birzhay	14,800	16,100	109
rural population	23,400	19,900	85
Varenskiy	41,400	38,400	93
City of Varena	8,200	12,300	151
rural population	33,200	26,100	79
Vilkavishkiy	53,700	52,200	97
urban population	20,500	22,600	110
City of Vilkavishkis	12,100	14,000	116
City of Kibartay	6,800	7,000	103
rural population	33,200	29,600	89
Vilnyuskiy	91,700	93,900	102
City of Nemenchine	4,200	5,700	135
rural population	87,500	88,200	101
Zarasayskiy	28,400	25,900	91
urban population	9,700	10,900	113
City of Zarasay	7,600	9,200	120
rural population	18,700	15,000	80
Ignalinskiy	37,300	59,000	158
urban population	13,000	39,800	300
City of Ignalina	5,300	7,100	133
Urban-Type Settlement of Snechkus	6,000	31,500	500
rural population	24,300	19,200	79
Ionavskiy	46,900	54,000	115
City of Ionava	28,500	36,300	127
rural population	18,400	17,700	96
Ionishkiy	32,200	32,900	102
urban population	12,900	14,500	113
City of Ionishkis	9,800	11,800	121
rural population	19,300	18,400	95
Kayshyadorskiy	41,800	40,200	96
urban population	12,200	14,700	120
City of Kayshyadoris	9,600	11,200	116
rural population	29,600	25,500	86
Kaunasskiy	77,800	85,500	110
urban population	16,700	19,800	119
Urban-Type Settlement of Garlyava	9,300	12,300	132
rural population	61,100	65,700	108
Kedaynskiy	67,500	69,400	103
urban population	29,300	35,000	119
City of Kedaynyay	28,100	34,100	122
rural population	38,200	34,400	90
Kelmeskiy	46,400	42,900	92
urban population	13,800	15,700	114
City of Kelme	9,300	11,500	124
rural population	32,600	27,200	83
Klaypedskiy	44,500	45,000	101
urban population	11,900	15,200	128
City of Gargzhday	10,000	13,400	133

Table 6.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
rural population	32,600	29,800	92
Kretingskiy	41,900	44,100	105
urban population	18,300	22,000	120
City of Kretinga	16,000	19,600	123
rural population	23,600	22,100	93
Kupishskiy	26,100	25,700	99
urban population	8,000	10,300	129
City of Kupishkis	6,500	8,900	137
rural population	18,100	15,400	86
Lazdiyskiy	38,700	33,400	86
urban population	6,500	7,700	119
City of Lazdiyay	4,600	5,600	121
rural population	32,200	25,700	80
Mazheykskiy	47,900	61,200	128
urban population	27,900	45,400	163
City of Mazheykyay	26,100	43,900	168
rural population	20,000	15,800	79
Mariyampolskiy	52,600	49,200	93
urban population	12,700	13,500	107
City of Kazlu-Ruda	6,600	7,800	118
City of Kalvariya	6,100	5,700	94
rural population	39,900	35,700	89
Moletskiy	30,900	27,300	89
City of Moletay	5,500	6,900	126
rural population	25,400	20,400	80
Pakruoyskiy	32,600	30,700	94
urban population	7,100	8,400	118
City of Pakruois	5,000	6,300	125
rural population	25,500	22,300	87
Panevezhskiy	43,800	41,900	96
urban population	3,200	2,900	90
rural population	40,600	39,000	96
Pasvalskiy	39,200	36,800	94
urban population	9,600	10,800	113
City of Pasvalis	7,700	9,200	119
rural population	29,600	26,000	88
Plungeskiy	53,800	53,900	100
urban population	23,000	27,300	119
City of Plunge	18,900	22,800	121
rural population	30,800	26,600	87
Prenayskiy	40,600	39,600	98
urban population	13,400	15,600	116
City of Prenay	9,700	12,100	124
rural population	27,200	24,000	88
Radvilishskiy	55,400	54,700	99
urban population	23,700	25,600	108
City of Radvilishkis	19,500	21,300	109
rural population	31,700	29,100	92
Raseynskiy	49,100	46,200	94
urban population	15,600	17,500	113
City of Raseynyay	11,800	13,400	114
rural population	33,500	28,700	85
Rokishskiy	48,100	47,800	99
urban population	19,500	24,400	125
City of Rokishkis	13,800	18,700	135

Table 6.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
rural population	28,600	23,400	82
Skuodasskiy	28,100	26,500	95
City of Skuodas	7,400	8,800	119
rural population	20,700	17,700	86
Tauragskiy	50,700	52,600	104
urban population	28,500	32,500	114
City of Taurage	25,800	30,000	116
rural population	22,200	20,100	90
Telshyayskiy	56,500	59,200	105
urban population	29,100	35,400	122
City of Telshyay	26,900	33,700	125
rural population	27,400	23,800	87
Trakayskiy	72,400	81,700	113
urban population	39,700	55,300	139
City of Trakay	6,000	7,200	120
City of Lentvaris	10,200	12,700	125
City of Vevis	4,500	5,600	124
Urban-Type Settlement of Elektrenay	8,700	15,800	182
Urban-Type Settlement of Grigishkes	8,100	11,500	142
rural population	32,700	26,400	81
Ukmergskiy	53,100	52,500	99
City of Ukmerge	27,000	30,700	114
rural population	26,100	21,800	83
Utenskiy	46,300	52,300	113
City of Utena	23,700	34,400	145
rural population	22,600	17,900	79
Shakyayskiy	43,800	41,700	95
urban population	10,500	12,100	115
City of Shakyay	6,200	7,300	119
rural population	33,300	29,600	89
Shalchininkskiy	43,100	41,500	96
urban population	8,700	11,600	133
City of Shalchininkay	4,200	6,600	159
rural population	34,400	29,900	87
Shvenchyenskiy	38,400	37,800	98
urban population	19,300	21,600	112
City of Svenchyenis	5,600	6,600	118
City of Pabrade	6,900	7,300	106
City of Svenchyenelyay	6,800	7,700	113
rural population	19,100	16,200	85
Shilalskiy	33,500	31,700	95
City of Shilale	4,400	6,500	146
rural population	29,100	25,200	87
Shilutskiy	68,600	69,000	101
urban population	24,400	28,700	117
City of Shilute	16,300	21,100	129
rural population	44,200	40,300	91
Shirvintskiy	22,600	21,500	95
City of Shirvintos	5,200	7,500	143
rural population	17,400	14,000	81
Shyaulyayskiy	51,100	49,900	98
City of Kurshenay	13,300	14,600	110
rural population	37,800	35,300	93

Table 6.

	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
Yurbarkskiy	39,900	40,200	101
urban population	11,600	15,200	131
City of Yurbarkas	10,800	14,400	133
rural population	28,300	25,000	88

In the 10 years that have passed since the last census, the population of the urban-type settlements of Snechkus (5-fold) and Elektrenay (1.8-fold) and the cities of Mazhaykyay (1.7-fold), Shalchininkay (1.6-fold), Varena (1.5-fold), and Utena (1.5-fold) has increased considerably.

The population of the city of Vilnius increased by 101,000 during this period, or 21 percent. The rate of population growth of the city of Vilnius was higher than that of the cities of Riga (10 percent) and Tallinn (14 percent). The rural population decreased in almost all rayons, except for Vilnyusskiy and Kaunasskiy rayons. The greatest reduction was 21 percent in Varenskiy, Ignalinskiy, Mazheykiy, Utenskiy rayons and 20 percent in Zarasayskiy, Lazdiyskiy, and Moletski rayons.

The preliminary data was calculated by census workers and by the republic Goskomstat.

Detailed census data in a territorial context with a breakdown of the population by sex, age, nationality, native language, education level, marital status, family structure, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked up and will be published in the appropriate statistical handbooks.

Years	Total Population, thous. people		In Percent of Total Population		
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	
1959	2884.5	642.3	2243.2	22	78
1970	3568.9	1130.1	2438.8	32	68
1979	3947.4	1551.1	2396.3	39	61
1989	4341.0	2037.0	2304.0	47	53

As compared with 1979, the urban population increased by 485,900, including owing to natural growth, by 226,600 and owing to the migratory inflow and transformation of rural into urban centers, by 259,300.

Moldavian SSR

18300662 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 30 Apr 89 p 3

[Report by the Moldavian SSR State Committee for Statistics: "On Preliminary Results of the 1989 All-Union Population Census in the Moldavian SSR"]

[Text] 1. In January of the current year a regular all-Union population census was taken and preliminary results concerning the population broken down by cities and rayons with a distribution into urban and rural and by sex were worked out. On 12 January 1989 the actual population of the Moldavian SSR totaled 4.341 million.

2. The change in the republic's population according to censuses is characterized by the following data (thous. people):

1959 (on 15 January)—2884.5 1970 (on 15 January)—3568.9 1979 (on 17 January)—3947.4 1989 (on 12 January)—4341.0.

During the 10 years following the 1979 census the republic's population increased by 393,600, or by 10 percent.

3. The change in the distribution of the urban and rural population of the Moldavian SSR can be seen from the following data:

During that period the natural growth of the rural population totaled 225,600. However, owing to the above-stated reasons, the rural population did not increase, but decreased by 92,300.

4. The number of men and women changed as follows:

Years	Thous. People		Number of Women per 1,000 Men		
	Men	Women	Total Population	Urban	Rural
1959	1333.8	1550.7	1163	1186	1156
1970	1662.3	1906.6	1147	1135	1153
1979	1858.4	2089.0	1124	1130	1120
1989	2061.2	2279.9	1106	1087	1123

The census data show a stable excess of the number of women over the number of men. The excess begins from the age of 30 and is due to the higher level of mortality in the male population and in older ages, in addition, to the consequences of its big losses during the war years.

5. The dynamics of the population in the republic's cities and rayons is characterized by the following data:

	Population, thous. people		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Total population	3947.4	4341.0	110
Kishinev city soviet	547.8	720.0	131
City of Kishinev	502.8	665.0	132
Beltsy city soviet	127.8	162.0	127
City of Beltsy	125.1	158.9	127
Bendery city soviet	108.9	138.5	127
City of Bendery	101.3	130.0	128
Tiraspol City Soviet	152.8	200.4	131
City of Tiraspol	138.7	182.3	131
City of Dubossary	30.9	35.9	116
City of Kagul	33.1	43.0	130
City of Orgeyev	25.5	32.0	125
City of Rybnitsa	41.8	61.4	147
City of Soroki	30.4	42.5	140
City of Ungeny	25.8	38.0	147

Rayons:

Bessarabskiy	42.9	44.1	103
Brichanskiy	82.6	84.9	103
Vulkaneshitskiy	58.7	61.6	105
Glodyanskiy	66.6	65.9	99
Grigoriopolskiy	51.8	53.1	103
Dondyushanskiy	73.6	69.2	94
Drokiyevskiy	77.0	79.9	104
Dubossarskiy	41.7	42.7	102
Yedinetskiy	86.4	89.5	104
Kagulskiy	42.1	43.6	104
Kalarashskiy	90.2	85.7	95
Kamenskiy	65.2	61.1	94
Kantemirskiy	56.3	59.0	105
Kaushanskiy	71.5	73.8	103
Komratskiy	65.5	70.2	107
Kotovskiy	112.6	113.6	101

Kriulyanskiy	95.2	105.0	110
Keinarskiy	42.0	43.2	103
Lazovskiy	87.4	89.7	103
Leovskiy	51.8	53.6	103
Nisporenskiy	77.6	79.8	103
Novoanenskiy	68.8	77.0	112
Oknitskiy	67.4	68.2	101
Orgeyevskiy	101.8	99.0	97
Rezinskiy	58.2	57.3	98
Rybnitskiy	38.0	34.5	91
Ryshkanskiy	84.4	83.5	99
Slobodzeyskiy	110.5	115.9	105
Sorokskiy	63.2	59.0	93
Strashenskiy	96.4	101.7	105
Suvorovskiy	74.5	76.4	103
Tarakliyskiy	41.6	44.7	107
Teleneshitskiy	74.0	73.1	99
Ungenskiy	85.0	79.5	94
Faleshtskiy	95.4	93.7	98
Floreshtskiy	78.3	78.1	100
Chadyr-Lungskiy	63.8	67.1	105
Chimishliyskiy	58.0	58.7	101
Sholdaneshitskiy	48.1	46.4	96
Yalovenskiy	76.5	84.3	110

The population residing in cities of republic jurisdiction makes up 32 percent of the republic's total population, increasing by 31.6 percent as compared with 1979. During the intercensus period, owing to the migratory outflow from rural to urban areas, the population of 13 rayons decreased. Basically, these were rayons territorially located near large centers with a developed industry.

The census data broken down by cities and rayons on the distribution of the population by sex, age, nationality, language, level of education, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other characteristics are being worked out by the Moldavian SSR State Committee for Statistics and will be published in statistical collections.

Tajik SSR

18300662 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA
in Russian 7 May 89 p 3

[Report by the Tajik SSR State Committee for Statistics:
"On Preliminary Results of the 1989 All-Union Population Census"]

[Text] The Tajik SSR State Committee for Statistics worked out the preliminary results of the all-Union

population census taken in January 1989 concerning the population in the Tajik SSR and oblasts with a distribution into urban and rural and by sex.

1. According to the data of the all-Union census, the actual population of the Tajik SSR totaled 5,112,000.

The change in the Tajik SSR population according to censuses during the postwar years is characterized by the following (thous. people):

1959 (on 15 January)—1981 1970 (on 15 January)—2900 1979 (on 17 January)—3801 1989 (on 12 January)—5112

During the 10 years following the 1979 census the republic's population increased by 1,311,000, or by 34 percent.

Years	Total Population, thous. people	Including		In Percent of Total Population	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1959	1981	646	1335	33	67
1970	2900	1077	1823	37	63
1979	3801	1325	2476	35	65
1989	5112	1667	3445	33	67

As compared with 1979, the urban population increased by 342,000, basically owing to natural growth. During that period the rural population increased by 969,000, also owing to natural growth.

Years	Thous. People		Number of Women per 1,000 Men		
	Men	Women	Total Population	Urban	Rural
1959	965	1016	1053	1098	1032
1970	1426	1474	1033	1040	1029
1979	1878	1923	1024	1031	1020
1989	2539	2573	1013	1035	1003

In 1959 the number of women exceeded the number of men by 51,000. During subsequent years a leveling occurred and by the 1989 census the indicated excess was reduced to 34,000. The excess of the number of

2. The dynamics of the population in oblasts and the city of Dushanbe is characterized as follows:

	Population, thous. people		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Tajik SSR	3801	5112	134
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast	127	161	127
Dushanbe ^a	501	604	121
Leninabad Oblast	1195	1559	130
Khatlon Oblast	1221	1703	139
Rayons of republic jurisdiction	757	1085	143

Natural growth is the basic factor in the increase in the population in most of the republic's oblasts.

3. The change in the distribution of the Tajik SSR population into urban and rural can be seen from the following data:

4. The number of men and women changed as follows:

women over the number of men begins from the age of 22 and is due to the higher level of mortality in the male population and in older age, in addition, to the consequences of its big losses during the war years.

The census data on the actual population in oblasts, rayons, and cities, where the number of residents is 50,000 and more, are cited below:

	Population on 12 Jan 89 (thous. people)			1989 in Percent of 1979 (total population)
	Total	Urban	Rural	
Tajik SSR	5112	1667	3445	134
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast	161	20	141	127
City of Khorog	20	20	-	114
Vanchskiy Rayon	21	-	21	130
Ishkashimskiy Rayon	20	-	20	133
Kalai-Khumbskiy Rayon	17	-	17	130
Murgabskiy Rayon	13	-	13	129
Rushanskiy Rayon	19	-	19	119
Shugnanskiy Rayon	51	-	51	130
City of Dushanbe*	604	596	8	121
Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon	108	108	-	105
Oktyabrskiy Rayon*	107	99	8	96
Tsentralnyy Rayon	143	143	-	115
Frunzenskiy Rayon	246	246	-	152
Leninabad Oblast	1559	527	1032	130
City of Leninabad	160	160	-	123
City of Kayrakkum*	42	42	-	108
City of Chkalovsk*	57	57	-	122
Ayninskiy Rayon	53	2	51	122
Ashtskiy Rayon	83	9	74	141
Ganchinskiy Rayon	83	7	76	137
Zafarobodskiy Rayon	41	24	17	152
Isfarinskiy Rayon	157	49	108	129
Kanibadamskiy Rayon	128	38	90	125
Matchinskiy Rayon	81	17	64	137
Nauskiy Rayon	79	14	65	135
Pendzhikentskiy Rayon	146	28	118	137
Proletarskiy Rayon	81	15	66	132
Ura-Tyubinskiy Rayon	159	46	113	135
Khodzhentskiy Rayon	209	19	190	130
Khatlon Oblast	1703	363	1340	139
City of Kurgan-Tyube*	72	72	-	139
City of Kulyab	75	75	-	136
City of Nurek*	33	21	12	117
Vakhshskiy Rayon	103	15	88	139
Voseyskiy Rayon	111	15	96	138
Dangarinskiy Rayon	73	17	56	145
Dzhilikulskiy Rayon	65	5	60	139
Ilichevskiy Rayon	52	-	52	148
Kabodiyenskiy Rayon	93	-	93	138
Kolkhozabadskiy Rayon	107	17	80	132
Kommunisticheskii Rayon	143	12	131	134
Kuybyshevskiy Rayon	85	10	75	138
Kulyabskiy Rayon	55	-	55	140
Kumsangirskiy Rayon	73	9	64	136
Leningradskiy Rayon	54	10	44	147
Moskovskiy Rayon	98	17	81	143
Parkharskiy Rayon	84	18	66	140
Pyandzhskiy Rayon	69	9	60	139

	Total	Population on 12 Jan 89 (thous. people)		1989 in Percent of 1979 (total population)
		Urban	Rural	
Sovetskiy Rayon	39	7	32	138
Khovalingskiy Rayon	34	-	34	162
Shaartuzskiy Rayon	81	12	69	150
Yavanskiy Rayon	104	22	82	148
Rayons of republic jurisdiction	1085	161	924	143
City of Rogun*	18	16	2	286
Garmskiy Rayon	78	10	68	160
Gissarskiy Rayon	220	25	195	138
Dzhirgatal'skiy Rayon	41	-	41	151
Komsomolabad'skiy Rayon	50	-	50	154
Leninskiy Rayon	266	23	243	141
Ordzhonikidzeabad'skiy Rayon	192	46	146	137
Tursunzadev'skiy Rayon	161	41	120	138
Fayzabad'skiy Rayon	59	-	59	154

*Including settlements subordinate to the city soviet.

Ukrainian SSR

18300663 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
7 May 89 p 2

Table 1.

Date of Census	Population, in millions
15 January 1959	41.9
15 January 1970	47.1
17 January 1979	49.8
12 January 1989	51.7

[Text] According to data of the census conducted in January of this year, the population of the Ukrainian SSR was 51,704,000 as of 12 January 1989.

The population of the Ukrainian SSR increased by 1.9 million or 3.9 percent in the 10 years that have passed since the 1979 census, 4.6 million (9.7 percent) since 1970, and 9.8 million (23.5 percent) since 1959.

Changes in the republic's total population according to censuses conducted during the postwar period are shown in Table 1.

Dynamics of the population of oblasts are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Oblast	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Ukrainian SSR	49,755,000	51,704,000	104
Vinnitsa	2,046,000	1,932,000	94
Volyn	1,016,000	1,062,000	105
Voroshilovgrad	2,787,000	2,864,000	103
Dnepropetrovsk	3,639,000	3,883,000	107
Donetsk	5,161,000	5,328,000	103
Zhitomir	1,597,000	1,545,000	97
Transcarpathian	1,154,000	1,252,000	108
Zaporozhye	1,946,000	2,081,000	107
Ivano-Frankovsk	1,332,000	1,424,000	107
Kiev (less city of Kiev)	1,904,000	1,940,000	101
City of Kiev*	2,164,000	2,602,000	121

Table 2.

Oblast	Population		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Kirovograd	1,251,000	1,240,000	99
Crimean	2,183,000	2,456,000	113
Lvov	2,584,000	2,748,000	106
Nikolayev	1,242,000	1,331,000	107
Odessa	2,544,000	2,642,000	104
Poltava	1,741,000	1,753,000	101
Rovno	1,121,000	1,170,000	104
Sumy	1,463,000	1,433,000	98
Ternopol	1,163,000	1,169,000	101
Kharkov	3,056,000	3,196,000	105
Kherson	1,164,000	1,240,000	107
Khmelnitskiy	1,558,000	1,527,000	98
Cherkassy	1,547,000	1,532,000	99
Chernovtsy	890,000	938,000	105
Chernigov	1,502,000	1,416,000	94

*Including populated areas subordinated to city soviet.

Natural growth was the main factor in the population increase in most oblasts. Population decreased in seven oblasts mainly due to the migratory outflow.

Changes in the urban and rural population of the republic are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.

Year	Total Population, in millions	Urban	Rural	Percent Urban	Percent Rural
1959	41.9	19.2	22.7	46	54
1970	47.1	25.7	21.4	55	45
1979	49.8	30.5	19.3	61	39
1989	51.7	34.6	17.1	67	33

Compared to 1979, urban population increased by 4.1 million, including by 2.0 million due to natural growth and by 2.1 million due to rural residents moving to the cities and transformation of rural areas into urban areas.

The rural population decreased by 2.1 million due to the reasons given above.

The census showed there are 24.0 million males and 27.7 million females in the republic. Changes in the male and female population during the postwar years are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.

Year	In millions		Number of Females per 1000 Males		
	Males	Females	All Population	Urban	Rural
1959	18.6	23.3	1254	1210	1293
1970	21.3	25.8	1212	1162	1275
1979	22.8	27.0	1188	1155	1242
1989	24.0	27.7	1158	1137	1201

In 1959, the number of females exceeded the number of males by 4.7 million, which was the result of large losses of the male population during the war. In subsequent years,

the gap between the number of males and females gradually reduced and was 3.7 million according to the 1989 census. Today, their ratio is basically even up to age 46.

Census data on urban and rural population for the republic's oblasts are shown in Table 5.

Table 5.

Oblast	Population as of 12 Jan 89, in thousands			In Percent of Total Population			
	Total	Urban	Rural	Urban 1989	Rural 1989	Urban 1979	Rural 1979
Ukrainian SSR	51,704	34,591	17,113	67	33	61	39
Vinnitsa	1,932	857	1,075	44	56	35	65
Volyn	1,062	519	543	49	51	40	60
Voroshilovgrad	2,864	2,474	390	86	14	85	15
Dnepropetrovsk	3,883	3,233	650	83	17	80	20
Donetsk	5,328	4,810	518	90	10	89	11
Zhitomir	1,545	818	727	53	47	44	56
Transcarpathian	1,252	515	737	41	59	38	62
Zaporozhye	2,081	1,577	504	76	24	71	29
Ivano-Frankovsk	1,424	598	826	42	58	36	64
Kiev (less city of Kiev)	1,940	1,042	898	54	46	45	55
City of Kiev*	2,602	2,602	-	100	-	100	-
Kirovograd	1,240	743	497	60	40	52	48
Crimean	2,456	1,714	742	70	30	67	33
Lvov	2,748	1,630	1,118	59	41	53	47
Nikolayev	1,331	875	456	66	34	60	40
Odessa	2,642	1,745	897	66	34	62	38
Poltava	1,753	991	762	57	43	50	50
Rovno	1,170	530	640	45	55	36	64
Sumy	1,433	886	547	62	38	53	47
Ternopol	1,169	477	692	41	59	31	69
Kharkov	3,196	2,512	684	79	21	75	25
Kherson	1,240	759	481	61	39	58	42
Khmelnitskiy	1,527	723	804	47	53	36	64
Cherkassy	1,532	810	722	53	47	44	56
Chernovtsy	938	395	543	42	58	38	62
Chernigov	1,416	756	660	53	47	44	56

*Including populated areas subordinated to city soviet.

The number of males and females in oblasts is characterized by the data in Table 6.

Table 6.

Oblast	In thousands		Number of Females per 1000 Males
	Males	Females	
Ukrainian SSR	23,958	27,746	1158
Vinnitsa	868	1,064	1225
Volyn	502	560	1117
Voroshilovgrad	1,329	1,535	1154
Dnepropetrovsk	1,800	2,083	1157
Donetsk	2,476	2,852	1152
Zhitomir	713	832	1167
Transcarpathian	605	647	1070
Zaporozhye	963	1,118	1161
Ivano-Frankovsk	672	752	1119
Kiev (less city of Kiev)	889	752	1119
City of Kiev*	1,230	1,372	1116

Kirovograd	569	671	1179
Crimean	1,147	1,309	1140
Lvov	1,307	1,441	1103
Nikolayev	620	711	1146
Odessa	1,235	1,407	1140
Poltava	790	963	1218
Rovno	555	615	1108
Sumy	650	783	1206
Ternopol	540	629	1166
Kharkov	1,467	1,729	1178
Kherson	581	659	1134
Khmelnitskiy	697	830	1190
Cherkassy	687	845	1231
Chernovtsy	436	502	1150
Chernigov	630	786	1248

*Including populated areas subordinated to city soviet.

The number of cities in the republic increased by 28 in the last 10 years, and as of the beginning of 1989 there were 434 cities: 40 with a population of 100,000-500,000; 10 with a population of over 500,000, including 5 cities with a population of over 1 million.

Compared with 1979, the population in medium cities (50,000-100,000) increased by 15 percent; population of large cities (100,000-500,000) increased by 15 percent; population of major cities (500,000-1,000,000) increased by 12 percent; and population of cities with a population of over 1 million increased by 13 percent.

Changes in the population of cities with 50,000 or more residents are shown in Table 7.

Table 7.

City	Population, in thousands		1989 in percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Aleksandriya	82	103	125
Antratsit	61	72	118
Artemovsk	87	91	104
Akhtyrka	45	51	112
Belaya Tserkov	151	197	130
Belgorod Dnestrovskiy	47	56	119
Berdichev	80	92	114
Berdiansk	122	132	108
Borispil	40	51	127
Brovary	59	82	141
Bryanka	63	65	103
Vinnitsa	314	374	119
Voroshilovgrad	463	497	107
Gorlovka	336	337	100.3
Dzhankov	49	53	109
Dimitrov	59	64	109
Dneprodzerzhinsk	250	282	113
Dnepropetrovsk	1,066	1,179	111
Dzerzhinsk	45	50	113
Donetsk	1,021	1,110	109
Drogobych	66	78	118
Druzhkovka	64	73	113
Yevpatoriya	93	108	116
Yenakievo	114	121	106
Zhukov	244	292	120
Zheltve Vod	52	62	120
Zaporozh'ye	781	884	113
Ivano-Frankovsk	150	214	143
Izmail	83	93	111
Izumi	61	64	106
Ilichevsk	43	54	126
Kalush	60	68	112
Kamienets-Podolskiy	84	102	121
Kerch	157	174	111
Kiev	2,133	2,587	121
Kirovograd	237	269	114
Kospi	49	67	137
Kolomey	52	63	122
Kominternsk	120	126	105
Komsonensk	38	52	136
Konotop	82	96	116
Korolivka	112	108	96
Korosten	68	72	111
Korostivsk	108	198	111
Krakovsk	100	113	107
Krivoy Rog	650	713	110

Krasnodon	48	53	110
Kremenchug	210	236	113
Krivoy Rog	650	713	110
Lisichansk	119	127	106
Lozovaya	53	73	137
Lubny	54	59	110
Lutsk	141	198	140
L'viv	667	790	118
Makeyevka	436	430	99
Marganets	50	54	108
Mariupol	503	517	103
Mehtopol	161	174	108
Mukachevo	72	85	118
Nezhin	70	80	116
Nikolayev	440	503	114
Nikopol	146	158	108
Novaya Kakhovka	44	51	129
Novovolynsk	46	55	120
Novograd-Volynskiy	49	55	114
Novomoskovsk	69	76	109
Odessa	1,046	1,115	107
Pavlodar	107	131	122
Pervomaysk (Voroshilovgrad Oblast)	45	51	115
Pervomaysk (Nikolayev Oblast)	72	82	113
Poltava	279	315	113
Priluki	65	72	110
Rovenki	61	68	111
Rovno	179	228	127
Romny	53	57	108
Rubezhnoye	66	74	113
Sverdlovsk	74	83	112
Svetlovodsk	47	55	117
Sevastopol	301	356	119
Severodonetsk	113	131	116
Simferopol	302	344	114
Slavyansk	140	135	96
Smela	62	80	128
Snezhnove	66	69	105
Stakhanov	108	112	104
Stryi	55	67	121
Sumy	228	291	128
Ternopol	144	205	143
Torez	87	86	99
Uzhgorod	91	117	129
Uman	79	91	115
Fastov	51	54	105
Feodosiya	76	84	110
Kharkov	1,444	1,711	112
Khartsyzsk	58	68	118
Kherson	319	385	111
Khmelnitskiy	172	241	138
Chervonograd	55	63	131
Cherkassy	228	296	127
Chernigov	238	299	124
Chernovtsy	219	287	117
Shakhtersk	70	74	108
Shostka	87	91	113
Shepetovka	47	53	117
Yalta	80	89	111

The preliminary data were obtained based on calculations made by census workers.

Detailed census data in a territorial context with a breakdown of the population by sex, age, nationality, language, education level, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked up under the established program and will be published.

Uzbek SSR

18300662 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 May 89 p 3

[Report by Uzbek SSR State Committee for Statistics: "On Preliminary Results of the 1989 All-Union Population Census in the Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR State Committee for Statistics worked out the preliminary results of the all-Union population census conducted in January 1989 concerning the population in the Uzbek SSR, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, oblasts, and the city of Tashkent with a distribution into urban and rural and by sex.

1. According to the data of the all-Union census, the actual population in the Uzbek SSR on 12 January 1989 totaled 19,906 million.

The changes in the Uzbek SSR population according to censuses during the postwar years are characterized by the following (million people):

1959 (on 15 January)—8.1 1970 (on 15 January)—11.8
1979 (on 17 January)—15.4 1989 (on 12 January)—19.9

Years	Total Population, thous. people	Including		In Percent of Total Population	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1959	8119	2729	5390	34	66
1970	11799	4322	7477	37	63
1979	15391	6348	9043	41	59
1989	19906	8106	11800	41	59

As compared with 1979, the urban population increased by 1,758,000 including owing to natural growth, by 1,504,000 and owing to the migratory inflow and transformation of rural into urban centers, by 254,000. The rural population increased by 2,757,000.

Years	Thous. People		Number of Women per 1,000 M.	
	Men	Women	Total Population	Urban
1959	6897	7222	6083	64
1970	8744	9055	6062	64
1979	10558	10833	6062	64
1989	12819	13087	6062	64

In 1989 the number of women exceeded the number of men by 325,000. During subsequent years by the 1989

During the 10 years following the 1979 census the republic's population increased by 4.5 million, or 29.2 percent.

2. The dynamics of the population in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, oblasts, and the city of Tashkent is characterized as follows:

	Population, thous. people		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Uzbek SSR	15391	19906	129
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	901	1214	135
Andizhan Oblast	1349	1728	128
Bukhara Oblast	887	1141	129
Kashka-Darya Oblast	1121	1594	142
Namangan Oblast	1100	1478	134
Samarkand Oblast	2160	2778	129
Surkhan-Darya Oblast	895	1255	140
Syr-Darya Oblast	960	1316	137
Tashkent Oblast	1792	2187	122
Fergana Oblast	1694	2083	123
Khorezm Oblast	747	1010	135
City of Tashkent	1785	2079	116

Natural growth is the basic factor in the increase in the population.

3. The change in the distribution of the Uzbek SSR population into urban and rural can be seen from the following data:

4. The number of men and women changed as follows:

censuses the number of women exceeded the number of men by 325,000. During subsequent years by the 1989

number of men begins from the age of 30 and is due to the higher level of mortality in the male population and in older ages, in addition, to the consequences of its big losses during the war years.

5. The census data on the actual population in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, oblasts, and the city of Tashkent are presented below.

	Population on 12 Jan 89 (thous. people)			1989 in Percent of 1979 (total population)	In Percent of Total Population			
	Total	Including		Urban 1989	Rural	1979		
		Urban	Rural			Urban	Rural	
Uzbek SSR	19906	8106	11800	129	41	59	41	59
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	1214	584	630	135	48	52	42	58
Andizhan Oblast	1728	559	1169	128	32	68	29	71
Bukhara Oblast	1141	397	744	129	35	65	33	67
Kashka-Darya Oblast	1594	415	1179	142	26	74	25	75
Namangan Oblast	1475	550	925	134	37	63	34	66
Samarkand Oblast	2778	926	1852	129	33	67	42	58
Surkhan-Darya Oblast	1255	245	1010	140	19	81	19	81
Syr-Darya Oblast	1316	407	909	137	31	69	29	71
Tashkent Oblast	2157	958	1199	120	44	56	43	57
Fergana Oblast	2153	703	1450	127	33	67	33	67
Khorezm Oblast	1016	283	733	136	28	72	20	80
City of Tashkent ¹ Tc2079	2079	-	116	100	-	100	-	-

1. Including settlements subordinate to the city soviet

6. At the beginning of 1989 there were 124 cities, of which 16 had a population of more than 100,000. During the period following the 1979 population census two cities in the republic—Dzhizak and Navoi—crossed the 100,000 line. The population residing in big cities (more than 100,000 residents) increased by 25 percent as compared with 1979.

The change in the population of cities, where the number of residents is 100,000 and more, as well as in oblast centers:

	Population (thous. people)		1989 in Percent of 1979
	1979	1989	
Aimalyk	101	114	113
Angren	106	131	124
Andizhan	230	293	127
Bukhara	185	224	121
Dzhizak	70	102	147

Karshi	108	156	144
Kokand	153	182	119
Margilan	110Tc125	114	
Navoi	84	107	127
Namangan	227	308	136
Nukus	109	169	155
Samarkand	346	366	106
Tashkent	1780	2073	116
Termez	57	83	146
Urgench	100	128	128
Fergana	176	200	114
Chirchik	132	156	119

Detailed census data broken down by areas on the distribution of the population by sex, age, nationality, language, level of education, marital status, family size, housing conditions, and other indicators are being worked out by the USSR State Committee for Statistics and will be published in the series of collections "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda" [Results of the 1989 All-Union Population Census].

Journalists Explain Delays in Reporting 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300660a Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII
in Russian 4 May 89 pp 1-4

[Questionnaire and answers by correspondents Georgiy Lebanidze, Ia Mukhraneli, and Nuzgar Mikeladze: "Duty and Duties"]

[Excerpts] "Couldn't you really have done anything?" This may seem to be the most inoffensive of all questions that the correspondents of Central publications working in our republic might have to answer in the days following the events of 9 April. Complaints against the Central press, which has continued to report on the situation in Tbilisi in an extremely tendentious manner, were more than justified. And as it turns out, these correspondents have had to take upon themselves "sometimes deservedly so, more often, forced upon them" a share of the blame for the publications which they represent.

This questionnaire, which coincides with Press Day, is by no means an act of rehabilitation, although most of the correspondents honestly tried to carry out their duty and stand up for their position to the end. They need no justification, because the chief judge, their own conscience, could hardly hand down a verdict of guilty. This "correspondents' questionnaire" has a different purpose: to attempt to understand the reasons for the sudden "silencing" of glasnost on the part of professionals. Three questions:

1. Consider the three stages of your work: orientation of the material (editorial assignment)—direct preparation of the article—publication in the organ of the press. At what stage did this chain break down? [passage omitted]

Georgiy Lebanidze (PRAVDA)

1. In answering this question let me say that it would be more correct to say "transmission of the material, publication" because we basically do not work on assignment but in accordance with our own approximate quarterly plan, which is approved by the editorial board.

And now, the substance of the question

Let me note first that, to my deep regret, some of the readers of our newspaper have expressed dissatisfaction over its reportage of the tragic events of 9 April. Let me say frankly that the breakdown was not the fault of the correspondent. Like all my countrymen, I sincerely, with all my heart, share this pain, the great disaster and woe that has befallen us, and I crave certain retribution. I demand that everyone without exception who was in any way guilty or involved in this "bloody slaughter" (I do not hesitate to call it that!) be punished with all the severity of the law. No mercy to anyone!

Inaccuracies took place due to the circumstances which took shape at first around the events in the republic's information services, when in one case it—the information—was extremely skimpy and incomplete, and sometimes classified "secret" and, on the other hand, muddled and deliberately distorting the actual state of affairs, incorrect, and disorienting. All of this could hardly fail to affect our work, the work of the local press, television, radio, and in particular TASS.

When I dispatched my first report to the editors on what had happened, it was "edited" and brought into line with the official TASS report. I did not sign it, and later on the editors only made use of their "own information." It went on like that until apparatus official A. Chernenko came to see me in Tbilisi. Unfortunately, however, our materials were frequently adjusted to fit the TASS reports, which were not distinguished by either accuracy or objectivity.

Let me note, incidentally, that dispatches to TASS were transmitted by a special correspondent who came down from Moscow, and who manifested an amazing (to put it mildly) boldness in his own assessments and judgments. It reached a point where the materials he submitted to TASS via GRUZINFORM shocked agency head E. Kandelaki so badly that he had a heart attack and went to the hospital. And I was certainly no less disturbed to take literally from an issue of PRAVDA TASS's cynical report that the people were victims of the "crush" of the crowd, while troop units supposedly "strictly carried out instructions not to use their weapons and to take measures to protect women and adolescents especially."

The difficulties we faced in reporting the events are attested, for example, by this incident: when we—Chernenko and I—failed to get our report into the newspaper concerning the use of chemical agents, because we lacked "documentary proof," we resorted to a "little trick"—namely, we used a video tape from Georgian Television that for some reason was not broadcast. In it, a representative of the internal troops admitted the use of chemical agents—tear gas. Chiding him for his "belated acknowledgement" we went further and claimed that "some of the victims on 9 April went in for medical aid showing signs of poisoning...." Thus, our PRAVDA was the first of the Central media to announce for all to hear that gas had been used. [passage omitted]

Ia Mukhraneli (SOVETSKAYA KULTURA)

1. I prepared four reports on the tragedy of 9 April. Two were printed, considerably abridged. Passages that were omitted included episodes from City Hospital No. 1, conversations with doctors and victims, and a report from the newspaper building of the publishing house, in connection with the military people's nighttime ban on the press run of MOLODEZH GRUZII and AKHAL-GAZRDA KOMUNISTI on 13 April. The editors of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA were supposed to publish my concluding material, including expert

the Public Medical Commission, an analysis of the events, and statements by eminent scientists, workers in the arts, public figures, and students, on 27 April. But that material was never published. So this breakdown took place only in the editorial offices, where, evidently, they were unable to overcome the stereotypes of past years, as was done by Ye. Yakovlev in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. [passage omitted]

Nugzar Mikeladze (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA)

1. Journalists can be subjected to powerful pressure at practically every stage of the preparation of materials. The actual orientation may already be given; "consultants" from official leadership circles are always ready to shake a warning finger at the journalist and set forth their own point of view as being "the only correct one," as has been done by numerous representatives of the ideological leadership. But the time that is hardest to monitor is the last hour before the newspaper comes out, when the material, which has already gone through various proofs, comes to the censor. Incidentally, we were officially notified that in the event of a state of emergency, military censorship would be imposed. [passage omitted]

Georgian Journalists Question Central Coverage of 9 April Events

18300660b Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
13 May 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Georgian Journalists Union"]

[Text] An extraordinary meeting of the presidium of the board of the Georgian Journalists Union examined questions relating to the reporting of the tragic events on 9 April in Tbilisi by the Central press and television.

Participants discussed a number of materials that were prepared by journalists of TASS, the Vremya information program, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, MEDITSINSKAYA GAZETA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and other publications. They also heard an announcement that correspondents of a number of Central newspapers had decided to resign their posts.

The presidium of the board of the Georgian Journalists Union decided to send a message to the leadership of the board of the USSR Journalists Union requesting that the presidium of the board hold a special examination of all the materials published by the Central mass media concerning the tragic events of 9 April and make a principled appraisal of the authors of unobjective, disinforming materials which have caused enormous harm to the conscience of peoples. In addition, they asked that the board determine why the correspondents of a number of Central publications were forced to quit their jobs.

The presidium of the board passed a resolution to bring the issue up again before the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers with regard to creating a press organ of the Georgian Journalists Union.

Former Officer Loses Faith in Army After 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300661a Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
9 May 89 p 4

[Interview with writer Boris Vasilyev by Besik Urigashvili: "Boris Vasilyev Says, 'I'm a Russian, I'm a Military Man...'"]

[Excerpts] There was a meeting in Moscow on 23 April with Boris Vasilyev, the well known writer and playwright, the author of such popular works as "The Dawns Here are Quiet..." "I Did Not Enroll in the Lists," "Don't Shoot at the White Swans," "Tomorrow It Was War," the novel "Once Upon a Time," and a number of plays and screenplays.

At that time he had been to Tbilisi among a group of USSR deputies from the Cinematographers Union. The deputies' questioning of the group was published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Soon after, he was interviewed in VECHERNIY TBILISI, and then he appeared on Central Television's program Vzgl'yad, where he expressed his views on the Tbilisi tragedy. Nevertheless, much of what we discussed in Moscow was left out of the newspaper articles and the Vzgl'yad program. For this reason, the editors have decided to publish this interview in order to emphasize those issues which, in our opinion, are of interest to the reader.

[Urigashvili] Boris Lvovich, I believe you used to be a cadre officer. But to me, judging from your works, you are primarily a major humanist and a genuine Russian intellectual. How are these two factors getting along inside you now after what you have seen and heard in Tbilisi?

[Vasilyev] The fact is that I am the son of a cadre officer. I spent my whole childhood in military compounds. My father always taught me that the army is the defender of the people. Naturally, I have seen the conditions under which military cadres live, the difficulties and deprivations they experience. I was an infantryman and an airborne trooper during the war. I graduated from the Armored Corps Academy and served as an engineer and a cadre officer. And I really did know and love the kind of army that defends its people.

But since what has happened in Tbilisi, I have experienced a huge psychological letdown. Here for the first time we came up against the military's punitive acts having nothing in common with the law, directed against the people of our own country. They were not there to disperse the people. They were there to punish the

people. For what? For nothing. At that moment the people weren't doing anything against the law. It is wrong to punish people for their views, for expressing what they think.

[Urighashvili] I served my two years almost eight years ago, and I could tell even then that the army was seriously sick. Of course, its sickness is a reflection of the state of society. But again, in connection with the events in Tbilisi, the following question naturally arises. As a result of those actions, faith in the army as the defender of the people was partially undermined. This is understandable, because the army carried out a function that is totally inappropriate to it. And now how are we to explain to those who were on the square that day, those who possess certain information, that the time may come when they will have to perform their military duty?

[Vasilyev] In connection with this I will quote the words of an elderly Georgian whom I talked to in the hospital: I won't send my boy to the army, I'd rather see him in jail.

You're right, of course, the army is experiencing a crisis. And in my opinion there are two reasons. The first is that the army really does reflect all the ills of society. The second—and this is purely my own opinion—is that we have learned the wrong lessons from the shameful war in Afghanistan.

The army gained two kinds of experience in Afghanistan. The first—and this has been proved by Tbilisi's Afghan vets—is the positive experience of mutual help, standing by one another, military brotherhood, tested under the harsh conditions of war. This kind of experience needs to be propagandized and supported. And thanks to Tbilisi's Afghan vets for having brought this back with them.

However, an enormous number of soldiers and officers brought back a different kind of experience from Afghanistan: the kind of experience gained by fighting guerrillas rather than regular army. Combat experience acquired through conflict with regular units. But in the case of fighting against guerrillas, the army's functions come to be punitive. This is inevitable, because there is individual combat and routing of people who are not professional soldiers. This kind of experience ought not to be studied, propagandized, and passed down to succeeding generations. As an example of this I should like to mention the fact that the American army disbanded all the units that fought in Vietnam. The Americans have done exactly the opposite of our opinion. We have not acted as wisely.

[Urighashvili] It has become clear how this negative experience is being used. It is so explosive, the assimilation of this experience that it can burst its spread.

[Vasilyev] The people's inquiry is represented by the fact that the government found it necessary to form a commission.

[Vasilyev] It is essential to create a special deputy commission to tour the special units [spetspodrazdeleniya] and determine the principles governing the conduct of operations, their tactics, how the soldiers are instructed, what they are and are not authorized to do, who monitors it, and, finally, how things stand with regard to unpleasant but safe equipment for dispersing demonstrations. As is well known, such equipment exists in all the civilized countries. If we can't make it ourselves, let's buy it. I definitely intend to raise this issue at the Congress of People's Deputies. And I will attempt to do so along with my friends and fellow-thinkers on the overall platform.

There needs to be a permanent deputy commission which monitors the army and the special units. Moreover, it is essential that video and movie cameras be utilized during such actions if they recur (and they undoubtedly will). Why is it forbidden to take pictures, to use cameras and video cameras? What are they, afraid of glasnost? Are they acting illegally? If they are acting illegally, they are liable for strict punishment. But if they are acting within the law, then they themselves ought to be interested in such films. It is not absolutely essential that these films be broadcast on television. It would be sufficient to screen them for deputy and community commissions which need to be created in any such situation in order to carry out an independent investigation.

I emphasize that such actions, assuming we can't avoid them, must be strictly regulated by the law and in keeping with all the international legal acts signed by our country—whether it be the Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Acts, the Vienna Accords, or whatever. Taking account of the experience of the civilized countries. This is what I personally carry away with me from the Tbilisi tragedy. [passage omitted]

Civil, Military Legal Experts Investigate 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300661b Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII
13 May 89 p. 2

[Article by N. Leonidze under rubric "Facts and a Jurist's Commentary": "Concerning an Unprecedented Situation"]

[Text] The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission to investigate the facts of what happened on 9 April in Tbilisi continues its work. Two questions. What happened that night in front of Government House, and how did it happen? This question is still at the center of the public's attention. The cause-and-effect relationship of events that took place in Georgia appears to be of interest to all. However, jurists have found it necessary to state that it is without precise facts it is impossible to

How are we to qualify the actions of the special troops? How are we to view the cause of the bloodshed in front of Government House—as a violation of orders, the personal initiative of the military personnel, or in fact strict compliance with a directive, which was carried out precisely?

Otar Gamkrelidze, head of the criminal law sector of the Scientific-Research Center of State and Law, Georgian Academy of Sciences, expresses the opinion of the juridical community: According to preliminary data, we are dealing with a planned action. Accordingly, the legal ruling is handed down on the basis of the following propositions.

If it is shown that the carrying out of the military action was preceded by an order, then it must be kept in mind that regulations prescribe and stipulate that all orders are to be carried out precisely and immediately. There is one exception, however, when the order should not be carried out—or, to put it another way, the person to whom the commander has given the order has the moral and the juridical right to refuse to carry it out. This refers to a situation in which the order is of a clearly criminal character because the consequences ensuing from carrying it out could lead to people's deaths, which is what happened.

If a crime has been committed, then there are criminals who must be responsible. What does that mean in this case?

Someone has to answer for carrying out a criminal order. Responsibility rests with both the person who gave the order, if he prescribed the use of entrenching tools and toxic chemical agents, and the person who either carried out the order directly or abetted it.

The person who gives the criminal order is viewed as the instigator to murder. Because the order itself is qualified as a kind of instigation, while the actions of the person who carries it out is characterized as murder.

The investigative commission has information, supplied by persons who were on the avenue at that time, stating that they heard the order, "Unsheath!" That is, this is something eyewitnesses have reported. Hence, this is one more confirmation that entrenching tools were used, quite apart from information given by doctors and experts who have testified about the scars and cuts caused by the shovels.

In addition, the military people also threatened the lives of militia officers who were stationed in front of Government House to maintain order. In the event that this threat to their lives is proved, the persons who are determined to be guilty will be held accountable in accordance with Article 209¹ of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code: **"Encroachment on the life of an officer of the militia or volunteer militia in carrying out their official**

duties with regard to maintaining public order." This article calls for imprisonment for a term between 5 and 15 years or, in the case of aggravating circumstances, death.

[Leonidze] What do jurists think about the circumstances leading to the killing of 28-year-old Giya Karseladze on 10 April?

[Gamkrelidze] Karseladze was killed soon after curfew. He was going home in his friend's car. Moreover, none of the people in the car knew that curfew had been instituted in Tbilisi. The driver sitting next to Giya did not obey the patrol's order to stop, and that was a mistake. But an even greater mistake was the announcement of the curfew scant minutes before 23:00 hours, when it went into effect.

The conclusion is obvious: the actions against Giya Karseladze can be qualified as deliberate murder. While the specific persons who committed the illegal actions on 9 April are as yet unknown, the soldier who killed Karseladze is known but has yet to be arrested.

In an interview published in MOLODEZH GRUZII on 13 April, Lt Gen Yu. Kuznetsov, the deputy military commandant of Tbilisi, commented on the rights and duties of the military personnel who were responsible for the situation in the city during the curfew. He said that **"According to instructions, the use of firearms is categorically forbidden except in extreme situations when persons involved in maintaining public order are being attacked—that is, for purposes of self-defense, or in cases where there is a threat to the safety of other citizens"....** The deputy commandant also said that "There were casualties [izderzhki] that first night." Unfortunately, the curfew, which was announced belatedly for unknown reasons, caught the city's inhabitants and their guests by surprise. In commenting about this absurdity, Lt Gen Yu. Kuznetsov provided valuable information: **"Many people were on the streets at the time the start of curfew was announced—it was almost 11:00. For this reason, the guard stations were ordered not to detain passers-by but only to check the papers of suspicious persons."**

[Leonidze] Nevertheless, a shot rang out, and it was by no means self-defense, am I right?

[Gamkrelidze] This case, along with all the others, is being investigated. It is being conducted by the military procuracy, and I hope that the investigators will deal with this difficult assignment with a sense of professional duty and total responsibility.

While this interview was being prepared for press, information came in about a routine meeting of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet commission. During it, Justice Maj Gen Vladimir Vasilyev, Deputy Chief Military Procurator of the Transcaucasian Military District, reported the following: A special brigade is in charge of the criminal

case instituted against military personnel. The charge relates to the military personnel's abuse of their official position, exceeding their authority, and using chemical agents.

Investigation is also underway concerning what factors contributed to the increase in the number of participants in the unsanctioned rally, why it was not stopped in time, and why the specific chemical agents which the military personnel used were not immediately named. V. Vasilyev said that the actions of those who concealed the name of the chemical substances for so long were cowardly.

Justice Maj Gen Vasilyev also reported that the man who killed Giya Karseladze had been identified. It was Capt Lokhin. The request to have him escorted in Tbilisi has been submitted, and the appropriate measures have been taken.

He went on to note that there were two troop units on the square on 9 April. They included special troops sent in from Voronezh and Perm, permanent troop units which undergo training according to a special program.

Participants in the same meeting heard reports from Roman Gventsadze, chief of the city administration of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; journalist Irakli Gotsiridze, who was given permission to conduct his own journalistic investigation into the events of 9 April; and Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Otar Cherkeziya, concerning the facts that took place in Tbilisi on the night of 9 April.

Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Otar Cherkeziya stated that he will not try to justify himself. And although he still does not know who gave the directive to bring troops into Tbilisi, he is convinced that the republic's leadership had not acted properly.

Officer Defends Army's Actions in 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300674a Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 19, 12 May 89 pp 16-18

[Article by Major A. Abramkin, Transcaucasian Military District: "Let a Military Man Speak: We Must Tell the Truth"]

[Text] An investigation is underway into the circumstances of the tragic events in Tbilisi. Various assessments and versions of what happened are being aired in the newspapers, journals, and on television. A government commission is working on it.

Our weekly newspaper has been getting letters from readers, including collective letters, which express alarm over what happened in the capital city of our fraternal republic. Calls for restraint are being heard. Many rumors are circulating, conjectures, inaccurate information. There are those who are ready to look for "the hand

of Moscow" in the tragedy. However, as was stated at the press conference for foreign and Soviet journalists by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Medvedev, "The decision to use troops was taken locally by Georgian republic authorities. As for what happened in Tbilisi on the night of 8 and 9 April, that is, the use of military force to clear the square in front of Government House, Moscow found out about that after it was done."

Today we publish a letter from political officer A.A. Abramkin of the Transcaucasian Military District.

In turning the floor over to him, the editors are proceeding on the indisputable proposition that all testimony is important in the search for the truth.

The four years of my service in the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District have come in the period since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and have coincided with the processes of renewal and perestroika unfolding there. It is not just that the characteristics of the social-political and economic development of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the national-territorial factor, have influenced the nature, intensity, and direction of processes of perestroika and the actions of the forces opposing them. These characteristics, in my view, have practically conditioned the development of events and channeled these processes into the mainstream of national-ethnic problems.

After all, the Transcaucasus has been in turmoil for a year and a half. Recurrences of the disease, effective means for the treatment of which have yet to be worked out, continue to emerge with new force. The pulse of the social-political life of the Transcaucasus is beating increasingly faster. The use of the forces of public order to liquidate hotbeds of tension has ceased to be a forced, extraordinary measure, a "surgical intervention" to relieve emotional tension in interethnic relations, and has become an everyday phenomenon. State of emergency, curfew, huge rallies, demonstrations, riots, and disorders rooted in nationalism have become a kind of attribute of the local reality. They include the forces for the maintenance of public order, which are defined, in the common parlance (and elsewhere too) by the word "army." The emergence of this epithet, and attitudes toward it on the part of the people of the republics of Transcaucasia and the local organs of authority, constitute the reason for my letter.

"The military command took the only correct decision — not to allow the overheated crowd into the Armenian districts (of Kirovabad). Army patrols were stationed at all the bridges across the River Gvandzhachay. The soldiers stood stoically, but they understood that it could not last long. The crowd surged forward, provocateurs yelled about our brutally murdered brothers. And only then was the decision made to push the crowd back from the bridge. Ranks of soldiers moved forward. The crowd gave way and retreated. A little later, the crowd began to

from an alley, a truck hurtled out...The murderer at the wheel did not hesitate; he did not step on the brake at the last moment. He ran over several people at full speed. The vehicle ran into the curb, but the driver managed to straighten it out. But all it took was his momentary confusion to allow Lt Viktor Popov to jump on the running board. With his entrenching tool he knocked away the knife that was aimed at his chest. The blade slashed his arm...The lieutenant held on, and the murderers, it was not clear, would not be getting away. Right then, however, there was a hail of stones...How could the soldiers allow perfectly innocent people to be killed? Why did headquarters, knowing about the situation in the city, not give the order to move out to the bridges with weapons?" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY No 297, 25 December 1988.)

"In addition to clubs, military units used entrenching tools and toxic chemical agents...This action, unprecedented in its brutality, has aroused the rage and profound indignation of our whole community" (from the message of the USSR Academy of Sciences to the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, titled "Perestroyka in Danger," ZARYA VOSTOKA, No 97, 23 April 1989).

And so, the central figure in the events is the army, military people, although neither term is actually correct, or at least not always correct. I will discuss this a little further on. But we cannot ignore the fact that the number of wounded, injured, and suffering military personnel responsible for maintaining (imposing) public order already stands at several hundred.

On 27 February 1988, during the first hours after troops were brought into Sumgait (where they arrived from their permanent stations in Baku 2 to 3 hours after receiving the appropriate orders, having broken through the raging crowds at the approaches to the city), the military people's situation was extremely grave. All they had to defend themselves with against sharpened pokers, rebar rods, chains, knives, and clubs were their fists and their closed ranks, which they put into the service of protecting people's lives.

In late November and early December 1988, in Baku and Yerevan, Kirovabad and Nakhichevan, in Stepanakert and other cities, the military men again took upon themselves the outbursts of nationalistic passions; they were obliged to defend gorkoms, rayispolkoms, and procuracies, help release hostages, and protect women and children who were frantic from grief and horror. The onset of cold weather also affected the weaponry of those persons who placed their nationality allegiance above all else. Rifle fire against military patrols and whole units, the use of home-made hand grenades, and the widespread use of bottles containing inflammable mixtures—all of these factors seriously heated up the atmosphere. A lack of armored equipment were burned in Kirovabad, and it was very convenient in the city

including one infantry combat vehicle during the defense of the Azerbaijan Communist Party gorkom. The driver, who escaped the fire, was savagely beaten by the crowd.

And again, the soldiers' only protection was their helmets and armored vests, and their only means of self-defense was small entrenching tools.

Last October in Stepanakert, during an operation to stop attempts to foment mass disorders occasioned by the detention of Manucharov, the leader of the Krunk nationalist movement, the town's central square was cleared of a crowd of 1500 persons by means of the displacement [vytesneniye] method. Several soldiers went to the hospital with dagger wounds in their arms—their left arms, the ones which held their shields. Their lives were saved by their armored vests, which left their arms uncovered. This was one of the first experiences of the "displacement of an unarmed, peaceful demonstration," which can be defined in everyday language as the exclusive use of shields to push people back—shields which serve as the weaponry of the internal troops and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops. Soon after, on 5 December 1988, this method was used more successfully in Baku in clearing a crowd of 5000 persons out of V.I. Lenin Square. Again, internal and MVD troops were involved in this action, for which they had not only special weaponry but also special training.

The Central and republic newspapers cited examples similar to the above from the experience of the use of public order forces in Armenia. At the same time, other, more effective methods were used there, including the participation of Soviet Army troops. This necessity was dictated by the fact that so-called "national self-defense" detachments were attacking refugee columns and by the necessity of emergency measures to secure the safe passage of columns of equipment headed for the natural disaster zone and to prevent mob scenes on roads and streets at a time when the whole country was helping the victims of the disaster as best it could.

However, merely recounting the positions of the two sides involved in the interethnic conflict—the crowd and the army—would portray a picture that was incomplete, damaging, and far from reality. After all, this conflict was participated in by local organs for the maintenance of public order (unfortunately, what was said above concerning actions to maintain public order does not apply to them), local law enforcement organs, and finally, local organs of government and local mass media.

Valeriy Vladimirovich Vasilenko, the representative of the USSR Procuracy who was temporarily working as acting procurator of NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], agreed with me that repeating in the press the killing of two Azerbaijanis in a conflict between the inhabitants of Agdam and Askeras, without any national clarifications, was inappropriate in this tense situation. There are men who try to do the right thing

this report that served as the match setting off the powder keg that exploded in Sumgait (A. Vasilevskiy's essay "Cloud in the Mountains," AVRORA, No 10, 1988).

"Given the urgency of the situation, the mass media and propaganda organs bear high responsibility...A number of broadcasts by republic television and radio were the fruit of political thoughtlessness and shortsighted carelessness...There were deviations from the well-considered and sober position; a number of articles served to inflame passions and aggravate the situation...The newspaper AZERBAYDZHAN PIONERI allowed the publication of a report calling on school children to take part in unsanctioned rallies. Statements by certain figures in culture on television and radio were opportunistic and ideologically damaging, and some of the television and radio broadcasts essentially supported the ultimatums that were voiced at unsanctioned rallies. Gross errors were committed by sectorial and factory newspapers" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, No 296, 23 December 1988).

A few words about the actions (inaction) of local law enforcement organs and public order maintenance organs. A. Vasilevskiy's essay "Cloud in the Mountains," to which I have already referred, cites evidence given by eyewitnesses to the events in Sumgait concerning this matter:

"After those three days, my hands shook for a week. We slept two or three hours a night. We worked in the crowd in civilian clothes and without 'barrels' (that is, without weapons); they did not issue them, fearing that the weapons might fall into the hands of the bandits. We circulated among the crowds. We carried belts or sticks so they wouldn't get wise to us. We picked up the worst bandits by means of a ruse. We'd call one of them aside, say 'we found a suitable apartment,' lead him to a quiet place and push him into the vehicle. But we didn't catch the biggest fish. I think the main ringleaders and instigators got away."

That's the kind of "fine-meshed net" that was cast over the city. But when the military personnel went into the city, they were puzzled: "Where are all these thousands of rioters coming from, and where is the militia?" It turned out that the militia were also in the crowd. They were catching fish in muddy waters.

This last statement is fully applicable to practically all the "hot spots" of the Transcaucasus.

And now, Tbilisi. BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THAT TRAGIC NIGHT. "The catastrophe was brought on by the indifference of a portion of the public, and the instigation of certain persons who were motivated by immorality, corruption, careerism, personal ambitions, and personal grievances. For five days, unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations were held in Tbilisi in front of Government House; as a result, life in the capital city

and the entire republic was practically paralyzed. Recently the organizers of the rallies and demonstrations were increasingly and openly calling for disorder and strikes, which posed a threat to public safety; there were open calls for the government to resign, slogans that were blatantly anti-Soviet, anti-state, anti-communist, and anti-socialist, which insulted our state and social structure. There was an attempt at the rally to create a so-called 'national committee' functioning as a provisional government. The organizers of the rallies and demonstrations, the extremist leaders of the informal associations, openly told people not to obey the authorities or the law enforcement organs; they called for bloodshed, for overthrowing the existing system. There was the real threat that the extremists would seize the most vital facilities of the republic's economy...Labor collectives were regularly threatened by blackmail...The city transportation system was paralyzed. The Georgian Television building was the target of constant attacks by the extremists for several days. Studies in the VUZes practically came to a standstill and, to a certain extent, in the public schools as well. The dramatic tension of the situation was heightened by the fact that dozens of young people, egged on by the extremists, declared a hunger strike in front of Government House" (from the report of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, published in the republic press on 10 April).

"Let's mentally rewind the tape of this tragic chronicle. The first demonstrations appeared on the streets. They were taken as a sign of a new era, born of democracy, so no one was very worried. Slogans started to appear on the facades of VUZ buildings. Some of them were definitely of anti-Soviet character. 'It's the cost of glasnost' we assured ourselves, thinking that they would disappear the next day. But they didn't. We had become so slack internally that we let the moment slip when events, gathering speed, began to bring us closer and closer to certain tragedy. And here are scenes from that chronicle, which we must run in slow-motion in order to see them better and fix them in memory. The column of demonstrators is followed by children carrying book bags and briefcases. Imitating their elders, they shout the slogans without, of course, understanding what they mean. The kids are happy and excited, feeling that they are taking part in events of which they have only the vaguest understanding. They are unaware of the danger that lurks in wait for them" (N. Zhordaniya, director of Secondary School No 128, VECHERNIY TBILISI, No 85, 12 April 1989).

"I assume, incidentally, that at least the 'leaders' had a good idea of the true state of affairs, they understood that, to our great shame, the republic is unable to clothe and feed its people, to say nothing of the major concern of exporting our goods to other countries, their competitiveness in the world market. They knew it. But they 'diplomatically' kept silent and pushed people toward the brink—young people who, that is, are not

of their inexperience and, alas, inadequate information, were unable to evaluate the whole complexity of the situation. They knew about the unacceptable anti-Soviet slogans under which the rally participants were demonstrating. They knew, but...They were unable to get a handle on things and put forth convincing arguments to show that the platform being advocated was bankrupt both in political and in economic terms" (G. Kurtanidze, *castor in the Tsentrilit Plant, Hero of Socialist Labor, VEC'HERNIY TBILISI*, No 86, 13 April 1989).

"The situation on the square was totally in the hands of the leaders of the informals or, as they call themselves, the 'radicals.' They even had their own orderlies wearing green arm bands. At my request one of the orderlies brought Irakli Batiashvili, one of the informal leaders, to see me; he was accompanied by a couple of strapping young men. We got off by ourselves at a medical station that had been set up in the Artists' House and had a quiet talk. Batiashvili told me the details of the political platforms of the 'radicals' in Georgia. As I listened to him I understood an unforgivable blunder all of us workers on the ideological front had committed by failing to engage these leaders in dialogue in good time. None of us, of course, could have foreseen what a ghastly tragedy this blunder, to put it mildly, would result in. Our talk was interrupted by D. Patiashvili's speech, which was relayed to the square by radio. We went out to listen. His words sounded so half-hearted that they failed to evoke a response in the demonstrators, who were excited by the speeches of the 'radical' leaders. No sooner had Patiashvili stopped speaking when the voice of Tsereteli rang out. I had never seen him, I did not approve of his position and his slogans, and I was shocked at his unpardonable anti-Sovietism, but I do have to admire his oratorical skills, his ability to hold an audience, and that is of great importance in making contact with it. The main point, however, is that the leaders of the 'radicals' were constantly among the demonstrators, in whose eyes they, being unafraid of the law enforcement organs, delivered 'terribly' bold speeches and, naturally, looked like heroes. Yet while a substantial percentage of Tbilisi's young people were out in the streets, the republic's leaders—distinguished and respected people—went on television to try to persuade them to disperse. Whom did they think they were persuading—grandmas and grandpas? Why didn't any of them go out on the square, stand at the microphone, and hold a dialogue—direct, well substantiated, persuasive, and wise—with the young people? Why were the rally organizers so well prepared for this dialogue with young people, while we workers on the ideological front, we party and Soviet leaders of the republic, and many representatives of the intelligentsia and the working class—were taken by surprise by the impending events, which resulted in the tragic events of 9 April?" (*VEC'HERNIY TBILISI*, No 96, 25 April 1989).

The same article and the same author: "I was on the square at 7:00 in the evening. I watched as a high school boy undoubtedly imagining himself to be a hero, hung

slogans on the statue in front of Government House. His comrades held him up from the rear. And the adults nearby looked on placidly as these events took place. Law enforcement officers joked with the girls; 24 hours later, these law enforcement officers would have to risk their lives to save these girls."

And now, Tbilisi, Rustaveli Prospekt, 0400 hours.

"At 4:00 in the morning, without any warning, four armored personnel carriers in a line advanced up the street at a speed of about 10 kilometers per hour. At that time, the pavement was cleared by the demonstrators themselves. The crowd let the vehicles through and then closed up again. Right behind the personnel carriers came soldiers wearing armored vests and carrying shields and clubs. When they confronted the line of people they stopped. I was about 5 meters away from the standoff and heard the yelling. Some woman threw a shoe at the formation. It may be that someone in the crowd couldn't restrain himself, although at the rally there had been calls for nonresistance. At this stage of the drama, I didn't see any stones or sticks. Then, as if on command, the clubs flew up. Other groups of soldiers came out of a side street. Those who did not have clubs used their entrenching tools. The soldiers began to push back the demonstrators, who resisted actively. Stones came into play, also sticks broken off of the barrier and clubs taken from the soldiers. Persons who didn't have time to run but remained behind the cordon and hid in the bushes hoping to escape were wounded. Tear gas grenades flew into the fleeing crowd. One grenade fell right next to me. A sharp pain in my eyes, and my tears, made it impossible to take pictures. In the ensuing panic the crowd ran over persons who could not stand up due to blows to the head and also persons who could not keep up and fell down. I failed to dodge a blow from a club, took it on the back, and started to run...In an hour the street was cleared of demonstrators; there on the pavement were stones, a broken video camera, various things, and several buses and trucks which the demonstrators had used to close the main streets and the avenue to protect themselves against a possible tank attack" (Yu. Rost, "Tragic Night in Tbilisi," *MOLODEZH GRUZII*, 13 April 1989).

"Our unit began to move from Lenin Square in the direction of Government House. We proceeded peacefully up to its traverse [travert]. The crowd gave way into two parts. Then we were confronted by women and children. They were sitting down. When we started to pick them up to proceed further, we were hit by metal objects and stones. I distinctly heard the pop of four explosive packets that were hurled from the crowd into our formation. Several of my comrades fell down. They were wounded. I belong to an internal troops unit. I will be discharged in May of this year. I have had to take part in maintaining order more than once. But we have never had so many wounded as we had that night. Nevertheless, we kept ourselves under control. We made increasing use of defensive techniques. When we came to the big

building with the columns [the Tbilisi Hotel—author's note], a hard blow to the head knocked me off my feet" (Jr Sgt Igor Polyakov, ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District] newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 89, 18 April 1989).

"I can't tell you very much. The fact is, I barely had time to get information and run a few steps when I got hit. What happened after that I don't remember. In the hospital they told me that I was unconscious for two days" (Pvt S.N. Pryakhin, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 87, 16 April 1989).

"I'm not exaggerating. I was a witness, an eyewitness and participant in everything I'm telling you. I myself saved some frightened little girls from getting hit [at 4:00 in the morning—author's note] and took some youths with broken heads to my own home. Their blood was all over my face and clothing, because they held on to me as I was carrying them, wounded, away; probably that's why the rumor got started that they had killed Vakhushti Kotetishvili. No, people, I'm alive, but what does a life like this mean to me?" (KOMUNISTI, 11 April 1989).

"The fact is that stones and boards were flying at us from out of the crowd. A bottle hit my comrade's shield and shattered. It smelled of alcohol. Guys jumped out of the crowd, jumped up and kicked our shields. But seeing that we were practically invulnerable behind our shields, they began to throw stones at our legs. I got hit hard on the leg. At some instant, I spotted a tall guy with a crowbar in his hands. All this time the crowd was advancing toward us. I got hit with a board and fell down. And then it started...." (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 89, 18 April 1989; recounted by Pvt V. Korolev).

A statement by A.N. Tsintsadze, a department head in the Physicians' Refresher Institute: "Among the persons who came to us in the early dawn that day, many had served in the army; two of them were 'Afghans,' and two others were unarmed-combat experts. Tough guys, not easy to knock down. They said that when the soldiers saw that they were resisting they sprayed them with some kind of substance" (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 29 April).

"They weren't dispersing the demonstrators, they were beating them up, they blocked the exits from the square. They pursued persons who managed to get away and continued to beat them up. How come entrenching tools came into play? How come they used tear gas and other unknown chemical agents? Why is all this still being denied, despite the evidence, and they don't even want to tell the Tbilisi medical people the composition of the chemicals that were used in order to make it easier to treat the victims more effectively? Has anyone thought about how all this changes people's attitudes toward the army, toward Soviet soldiers? They didn't even get around to announcing the curfew in time—they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect, so that they caught hundreds of people, and one Tbilisian was killed when he didn't stop his car when ordered to do so by a

patrol" (From an inquiry of USSR People's Deputies from the USSR Cinematographers' Union, VECHERNIY TBILISI, 20 April).

Esteemed People's Deputies, chosen by the people! In describing your visit to Tbilisi you report a broad spectrum of contacts in search of the truth about the events of 9 April. There are representatives of the creative intelligentsia who witnessed the events, and deputies to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Georgian medical personnel and journalists, and the families of the dead victims, and representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD. Only they didn't get around to meeting with us military people, attitudes towards whom you are so concerned about. I myself take the liberty of answering certain questions you have raised.

First, regarding the purpose of the operation as I see it. The first echelon—the main group of MVD and internal troops which was supposed to clear the square in front of Government House and all of Rustaveli Prospekt—was supposed to be followed by fire trucks and ambulances. Internal and MVD troops in reserve as well as airborne commando units bringing up the rear were supposed to close off the side streets to Rustaveli Prospekt as the units moved forward in order not to allow a regrouping of the people. Thus, the airborne units, whose field equipment includes small entrenching tools, according to the plan of the operation DID NOT HAVE direct contact with the demonstrators. As far as the internal and MVD troops are concerned, their equipment does not include small entrenching tools, and in fact the purpose of this implement is quite different from what you ascribe to it in your inquiry.

As far as the use of toxic agents against the demonstrators is concerned, you are probably already aware that the District troops are not supplied with them. As far as the MVD is concerned, they obviously don't have toxic agents either. To attribute to them the use of "cheremukha [bird-cherry]" tear gas, obviously, is also wrong, because the USSR Ministry of Health would hardly permit it to be included in the table of agents authorized for use. But certain side effects of certain types of "cheremukha" (and, as far as I know, there are several) may still be unknown or inadequately studied, which could be the cause of the poisonings. For this reason, the question can be resolved in collaboration with the USSR and Georgian SSR MVDs and the health care organs. But you, following the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet's medical community commission, continue to hold the USSR Ministry of Defense and ZakVO (the army), among others, guilty of it. Moreover, the airborne units, which were in reserve, that is, not in direct contact with the participants of the rally on the square, could not have been assigned the task of using any gas or aerosols.

On the other hand, this insistence on having the community commission demand that the USSR Ministry of Defense reveal the secret of the toxic agents merely attests to the level of its competence and its attitude toward the army.

Returning again to the purpose of the operation, I refer to the statement by journalist Yu. Rost, whose objectivity the community has no reason to doubt. He states that the side streets leading away from Rustaveli Prospekt were deliberately blocked with heavy buses and trucks by the organizers of the rally. I can vouch that the trucks were loaded with crushed stone, which can be used either as ballast or as projectiles. Notice: they were loaded with crushed stone, not sand.

The same kinds of vehicles and buses blocked the entrances to Rustaveli Prospekt both from the direction of Lenin Square and from the direction of Republic Square. These "measures" made it impossible to use fire trucks. The personnel carriers coming from Lenin Square had to cross high barriers, which fire trucks filled with water could not have done. So the public should not view this fact as an attempt on the part of the military people to "aggravate the antagonism."

This is attested by certain other facts, which were skirted by the USSR people's deputies. I take the liberty of asking them a few questions. Why did the republic's GAI [state motor vehicle inspectorate] fail to carry out its assignment of preparing for and supporting the operation, and why did it allow the grouping of vehicles and buses at the entrances to Rustaveli Prospekt and in the side streets? In response to questions by the officials of the operation, the leaders of the GAI could only spread their hands in embarrassment, as if to say, "We're sorry. How come more than 2500 representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD failed to show up at the assembly point before the operation began?" It was their responsibility to inform the demonstrators about the forthcoming operation and persuade them to stop the rally in order to avoid clashes and casualties. Finally, how come the Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs himself did not head up this operation, preferring the role of observer? Since he was present on Lenin Square, how come no one has asked him the question, "What agents were used by the forces of public order, and when, how, and in what combination did they do so?"

I do not intend to assess the level of military training of the person who was assigned the overall direction of the operation (it was probably forced on him), his service record and his present post speak for themselves. But the academies where Col Gen I. N. Rodionov trained do not teach the art of dispersing rallies and demonstrations. The techniques, principles, and tactics of such actions fall within the province of the MVD; there is no way they form part of the training and functions of the Soviet Army. So why, in the events of that night (and not just then, either) is all of this lumped together, as if purposeful, and depicted as "the military people," "the army,"

and so on? Why? Why is it that in the rallies that preceded that night no more than 1000 persons gathered on the square before dawn (which predetermined the time of the operation), whereas

on that tragic night a crowd of 10,000 had gathered? Could it be that the composition and number of troops brought in to take part in the operation were calculated to deal with between 1500 and 2000 people? If so, then here's a question for the people's deputies—"point-blank," so to speak: Was the purpose of the square-clearing operation opposed by some other "scenario"?

And now let us summarize all these "whys." The command of the operation was assigned without regard to the person's readiness and ability to supervise such actions; there were, after all, more suitable candidates—for example, Internal Troops Maj Gen Yu. Yefimov, head of the USSR MVD's Internal Troops (incidentally, I find it difficult to attribute the arrival of units subordinate to him just to the decision of the republic's leadership); and the Georgian minister of internal affairs (the reason for the absence of his subordinates on the square is unknown). The forces of public order that were brought into the operation were weakened by the absence of the local militia, fire trucks, and armored personnel carriers. The absence of local MVD forces and fire fighters on the square provided the soil for the germination of rumors and conjectures about the "anti-democratic, anti-perestroika orientation of the military," who have allegedly taken upon themselves the function of defending the "conservatives" and forces executing their will using such un-perestroika means. The forces of the opposing side were increased many times over. The cordon of buses and trucks loaded with crushed stone, coming from who knows where, created a relatively large but still enclosed space, which required the use of the harsher measures remaining in the arsenal of the Internal Troops and turned the whole operation into a ferocious clash, hampered the order of the "troops," forced the second echelons and reserves to take direct part in the confrontation, brought them into direct contact, and placed the essentially unarmed airborne units in a position where they had to defend themselves.

The fact that this necessity arose is attested by video tapes and articles by local journalists. In particular, the scene where "a guy who is insane with grief is pounding on a passing armored personnel carrier with a flag pole. Believe me, or, rather, check it out: any flag pole would have shattered into pieces on first hitting the armor. But several blows were shown on the tape. My version of this story is that he hit it with a crowbar. I can't bring myself to explain its presence on the square by the desire of the hunger-strikers to use it to open tin cans. But I can believe that it was used to inflict an open cranio-cerebral injury on Pvt S. Prvakhin. Just as I can believe the use of "stones and sticks" which, according to Yu. Rost, "were broken off of" the missing barrier. Just as I believe the use of these "peaceful, parliamentary" means by "the strapping young men" who accompanied the leaders of "radicals."

And now it's your turn to grant that these means, which were brought to the peaceful rally from who knows where, might be used to attack the airborne troops. If you

were in a similar situation and all you had was a small shovel, you probably wouldn't like it. In presenting to you my vision of the facts, I will not impose my conclusions on you, but I do ask writer B. Vasilyev to consider my view and not avoid it when assessing the events of 9 April.

But that's still not my whole story. There is still the AFTER.

"They didn't even get around to announcing curfew in the normal way, in good time; they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect and caught hundreds of people. One Tbilisian was killed...." (from the same message of the USSR people's deputies, in which it was suggested that someone take thought about "how all of this is changing people's attitudes toward the army, Soviet soldiers").

"The situation in Tbilisi, as in the republic as a whole, remains extremely complex. Curfew has been instituted in Georgia's capital in peace time, during a period of renewal and democratization. There are dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers in the streets. This is creating an explosive situation" (from the account of E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with representatives of the public and the scientific and creative intelligentsia of the republic, ZARYA VOSTOKA, No 85, 11 April 1989).

"Oh, those military! You see, they received the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium U'kase at 22:15 hours on 9 April and announced it thirty minutes later. And just where did they come from? Why did they come, and who called them, anyway? (See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 April). After all, the U'kase was not in the republic newspapers on 10 April (!); there was only Col Gen I.N. Rodionov's message, with reference to that U'kase—but there was no U'kase in the newspapers on 9 April! They just came in, uncalled and unbidden, and created an explosive situation. In this, the best representatives of the public and the scientific and creative intelligentsia of the USSR and the Georgian SSR are unanimous.

A week after the "military coup," the public finally got itself together, collected its thoughts, and "overthrew" the military. The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Buro petitioned to have the curfew lifted, and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a U'kase and had it published. But the image of the "military as bandits and anti-perestroika forces" was already in place. And although E. A. Shevardnadze stated that the "military" had resisted carrying out functions not proper to them, this image was being successfully and nastily implanted by the mass media and by both local and visiting members of the community. "They poisoned people, beat them with shovels, and chased hardened and hard people down Rustaveli Prospekt; they started an infowar as a secret scheme of provocation, they shot and caught hundreds of people"—this is the tone and "backbiting" of all the publications and reports. The

people have given a hostile reception to the modest reports of the Central mass media concerning the actual state of affairs, saying they're slander and unobjective.

One indirect but still very strong and "long-playing" reproach directed at these "military people" is the lack of any information whatever about their feelings and tribulations, about their life and position in the period before and after the events: their existence is completely ignored by local and visiting leaders and the public. Everyone who comes down meets with all "types" in the community and the intelligentsia—members of the clergy, people called upon to maintain public order (but who have for some reason forgotten about it), medical people, and so on and so forth. But as for going to the military and extending a hand, asking about their daily life, their woes and difficulties—no one, no way. So that "the community" has come to the conclusion that the military are "blood-thirsty social outcasts, pathological killers" hateful even to look at, and has conducted itself accordingly. In 3 weeks there have been 50 cases (and that's obviously not all) of psychological and physical assaults on officers and the members of their families. The weaponry, again, is quite diverse—from nunchaki [unidentified] and "yoko-giri" to the head, to foul cursing. Nor is the position of the "keepers of order" subject to any doubt: they are now riding high, "friends of the people."

Meanwhile, finally, the ideological organs have gained a great deal. There are briefings, and press conferences, on-the-spot analyses, meetings, and exhibits. It's only the military who do not get a chance to tell their side. While the curfew was in effect, members of the airborne troops tried for three days to get on Georgian State Television and Radio. Finally they did; they were given 20 minutes of unscheduled air time, at 3:00 on a work day. Thanks a lot. The military district newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA devoted two editions to interviews with participants in the events and distributed copies among the population. Thus, one of the ladies on the public commission to investigate the events of 9 April, the Georgian poetess Iza Ordzhonikidze, threatened to bring suit for "slandering and hindering the work of the public commission," although she herself gave an interview and made announcements without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation. All it took was for Central Television to let it slip that the military's situation in the city was far from good, and in 15 minutes local television broadcast a denial and accused the Center of slander and nonobjectivity. All it took was for SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA to write about the necessity of a balanced approach to assessing the events, and MOLODEZH GRUZII immediately accused Karkham of provocation and nonobjectivity, alleging that the slogan "Russian Invaders Get Out of Georgia" was changed by the author of the article and given in SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA as "Russians, Get Out of Georgia." (The subtext is political rather than ethnic, MOLODEZH GRUZII notes), moreover, the slogan was not written around, as Karkham said, "around the flag," but

of Government House. So those are two "quite different differences." And someone from the community, during a television press conference, constructed an accusation out of the fact that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had misspelled the last name of a 16-year-old girl who died on the square.

So I understand the noble rage and emotional coloration of the messages sent to the CPSU Central Committee and the Congress of People's Deputies by the scientific and creative intelligentsia. Unfortunately, their representatives in Tbilisi have acted on the principle of the Roman Caesars: "I came, I saw, I accused." Their program left out one very important point, namely "I found out." Their idea, it seems, was to let someone else "do the dirty work." The republic leadership's accusation of ignoring the military people, unfortunately, was not backed up by example.

Yet these "stepsons of society" have been dealing with "states of emergency" for one and a half years now, instituting curfews, leaving their homes in order to carry out political decisions made by who knows who and who knows how, going where they are sent by their elders and commanders, who actively protested these decisions. The community has not the slightest idea about all this, yet it continues to publish things about the "old soldiers' privileges [dedovshchina]" and listens to rumors that the earthquake in Leninakan was caused by an atomic bomb—set off by the military, of course—on Novaya Zemlya.

Please forgive me if my letter seems excessively emotional. Having served in the Transcaucasus for several years, I like to believe that I have deep empathy and respect for the peoples who live here, and I respect their national traditions. So that my emotions stem from many months and weeks in a "state of emergency," the grief of Sumgait, Stepanakert, Kirovabad and Tbilisi, the horrors of Leninakan and Spitak, the tense voice of the battalion commander on the telephone reporting, "The crowd has forced us off the square. We have sustained losses. We are forced to abandon the first stage. We request reinforcements, we cannot retrieve our wounded." Where do you think that happened? No, not in Afghanistan. It was in the Soviet city of Kirovabad. My emotions are the result of the eyes of the comrades-in-arms of the airborne troops who with their own bodies guarded the bridge and the people beyond the bridge. My words reflect my personal grief over the events in all these "hot spots" where I have had to serve. These words reflect my personal grief over the fact that it is now too late to ferret out who made the decision to put troops into Afghanistan. These words reflect my personal grief over the fact that if these attitudes towards the army continue, then we military people, who covered with ourselves the bonfires of nationalism in the Transcaucasus and who know where Leninakan and Spitak are (and not just from the newspapers)—all we can do is emulate

the example of the submarine "Komsomolets," hoist the signal "I'm dying but I do not give up," and slowly sink into the depths of public scorn under the salvo of the aroused community.

As for the events in Tbilisi, they remind me of the following episode from the patriarchal past. Outskirts of a village. A kolkhoz granary. Summertime. Sunshine at noon. The kolkhoz watchman, leaning on his double-barreled shotgun, asleep at his post. Nearby, some kids are fooling around with matches. A little smoke. The smell startles the old man awake. Not yet fully alert, before he knows what's going on (that often happens with watchmen), he grabs for the gun, a shot rings out, and... So the people of the village come running, hit the old man, and begin to kick the gun. Not a pretty sight, I tell you. Either for the victim or for the gun, which is also a victim. How about the old man? After what happened, the old man vows to stand guard with a big scoop shovel. Is that it?

Georgian Journalist Attacks Officer's Defense

IS300674b Tbilisi MIOI ODI ZH GRU ZII in Russian
23 May 89 p. 3

[Article by Roman Miminoshvili, writer, editor in chief of LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA: "Request Permission To Speak, Comrade Major!"]

[Text] More than one month later—on 12 May—the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA "elucidated" the tragic events of 9 April in Tbilisi, with a lengthy article by ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District] political officer Maj A.A. Abramkin, suggesting that "in the search for truth, all (?) testimony is vital." After I studied the article I got the impression that a typographical error had been made in the title: instead of "tell [skazat]" (as in, "We Must Tell the Truth") it ought to read "gloss over [smazat]"; that would be more correct. The author of the article has turned his back on the eyewitnesses to the tragedy, the people's deputies of the USSR, and the Georgian community; without blinking an eye he assures the readers of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA (who he thinks are gullible) that the army was defending itself against the people and now has to defend itself against the people's deputies. But may one ask which army he's talking about? Isn't it the **people's** army?

But let's trace the course of the operation as the Comrade Major sees it. In his words, "the first echelon... was supposed to be followed by fire trucks and ambulances," while troops kept in reserve were supposed to close off the side streets in order to prevent a new massing of people. Are we to presume that the firefighters were assembled to rout the demonstration and the first echelon of troops, using powerful streams of water? Otherwise, why were they supposed to follow the troops?

Perhaps I don't understand something about military maneuvers, and that's why the wisdom of this seems absurd to me. In fact, however, if the fire trucks were

going to be used, it was not for peaceful purposes because as the political officer himself goes on to assert the exits were closed off by the demonstrators themselves, using trucks. The question arises: In that case, what were the reserve units supposed to "close off"? Another question: How did the tanks come onto the avenue prior to the operation, tanks which were met incidentally, with the singing and applause of the demonstrators, if all of the exits were closed off? After all, this procession by the tanks and armored personnel carriers, with headlights turned on, is recorded on video film and has been documented. It is not easy to write the truth, but it is just as hard to write lies too, even skillful false witnesses are not insured against contradictions. We can see, incidentally, that A. A. Abramkin is not all that skillful. Here's one contradiction: "How come over 2500 representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], who had been assigned the task of informing the demonstrators of the forthcoming operation, did not show up at the assembly point?" Let's keep in mind: 2500 had been assigned to "inform" the demonstrators, but through someone's ill will they didn't show up. And how do you like the author's next question: "Finally, how come the Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs himself didn't head up this operation?" Which one, the "information" operation? And immediately, literally four lines later, the author blurts out why this happened: "I do not intend to assess the military training of the person who was assigned the overall direction of the operation (it was probably forced on him); his service record and his present post speak for themselves. But the academies where Col Gen I. N. Rodionov trained don't teach the art of dispersing rallies and demonstrations." In that case, who did command the bloody parade? Who was assigned the job, or had it forced upon him? Who was dismissed? Let the reader judge and tell the results.

I should like to direct the reader's attention to another circumstance: concerning the introduction of USSR MVD internal troops into the republic under the command of Maj Gen Yu. Yefimov, the author notes parenthetically, "incidentally, I find it difficult to attribute to the arrival of units subordinate to him just to the decision of the republic's leadership." Let us believe the author, that he finds it difficult to answer. But do the editors of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, whose editorial note categorically denies that "the hand of Moscow" was involved, have the answer?

The author of the article states that entrenching tools are part of the "field equipment" of airborne troops but not of MVD units, and that the "purpose of this 'tool'" is quite different. Could it be that the soldiers were going to dig pits on Rustaveli Prospekt, and our girls would hold their heads under them?

How does the author view the toxic agents—OV [toxic agents], as the esteemed A. A. A. is pleased to call them? "The District troops are not supplied with them. As far as the MVD is concerned, they obviously don't have

toxic agents either." It is obvious where he is pointing the finger: at the "schemes of the agents of international imperialism!" But until such a command is given, the Major confines himself to the remark that several types of "cheremukha [bird-cherry]" have been authorized for use by the USSR Ministry of Health, but he immediately cautions, "the effects may still be unknown or inadequately studied, which could be the cause of the poisonings." I just bet! The Ministry of Health authorizes their use—without knowing the effects!

But the author, accusing the deputies of incompetence, does not stop there. "This insistence on having the community commission demand that the USSR Ministry of Defense reveal the secret of the toxic agents merely attests to the level of its competence and its attitude toward the army." One wonders whether the author is capable of blushing, when the facts he has been so apt pious to conceal come bobbing to the surface. After all,

...don't the military authorities actually reveal the secret—though to be sure, after a delay of 24 days? As for the people's deputies of the USSR, evidently the author has his own attitude toward them; he takes the liberty of using such expressions as, "facts which the people's deputies of the USSR skirted," "a question to the people's deputies, 'point-blank,' so to speak"... Good thing it's only a question.

The author is also displeased by these words from the deputies' message: "They didn't even get around to announcing curfew in the normal way, in good time, they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect, caught hundreds of people, and one Tbilisian was killed." Again, "Oh, those military people!"—this inventive author goes on sarcastically, and then gets into some vague statements about the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, which was allegedly received by the military authorities at 22:15, acting as if he did not understand that this does not justify killing. Even under curfew—as we know, no one has the right to resort to firearms unless the proposed victim constitutes a threat to the life of the law enforcement officer or other citizens. Incidentally, is the author convinced that Comrade I. N. Rodionov, when he announced the curfew, already had in his hands the constitutionally enabling juridical documents, the Ukases of the presidiums of the USSR and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviets? I don't believe it! And he ought to keep in mind the appropriate article of the USSR Constitution which was revised recently, near the end of November 1988.

A. Abramkin goes on to say that in the space of 3 weeks there have been 50 cases of psychological and physical assaults against officers and members of their families by inhabitants of Tbilisi. As is well known, one of the officers lodged a complaint about some unknown men who had attacked him. It was later determined that he had been the victim of an assault by his own driver. So you see, it was easier for him to accuse Georgians of nationalism than to admit the shameful fact that his own subordinate had beat him up. Is he one of the 50? Or the 51st?

The author, it seems, is sympathetic—deeply so—toward the peoples of the Transcaucasus and their national traditions. He is also ready to understand the noble rage and emotional coloration of the messages sent by the scientific and creative intelligentsia. As far as we are concerned, sympathy like that deserves nothing but sincere gratitude—if this sympathy were really sincere. In fact, the author has "understood" something else: the position taken by MOLODEZH GRUZII with regard to Karkhanin's article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has aroused the Georgian public. "MOLODEZH GRUZII accused Karkhanin of prejudice and nonobjectivity, alleging that the slogan 'Russian Invaders, Get Out of Georgia' was remade by the author of the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and changed to 'Russians, Get Out of Georgia.'" Then he explains sarcastically, "Here, you see, is a quite different, political subtext. MOLODEZH GRUZII remarks." It is difficult to believe that this fact should put the political officer in a sarcastic mood... True, these are completely different slogans. And it is not by chance that the author in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA substituted the one for the other: his aim was to set the Russian people against the Georgian people, and our sarcastic author is in solidarity with him! A. Abramkin goes on to say that one of the persons who went on television constructed his accusation only on the basis of the fact that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had misspelled the last name of a 16-year-old girl that died. Permit me to inform you, Comrade Major, that that's not true. This was mentioned by the way, but you have to agree that it's not very nice to misspell the name of someone who has died tragically; it contains an element of disdain.

It is appropriate at this point to recall how, with reference to the Georgian press, Karkhanin gave information about the Georgian leaders of the informal associations. This information was not given in the republic press. Where did the author find these sources? In which organizations?

Moreover, Comrade Major, you go on to say that the representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia "acted on the principle of the Roman Caesars: 'I came, I saw, I accused.'" The principle is somewhat different, to be sure, and I understand that you were intentionally distorting Julius Caesar's familiar phrase, *Veni, vidi, vici*; but you did it in order to show that the Georgian intelligentsia would rather accuse than find out. So let's restore the actual wording of Julius Caesar's saying and think about whom the words "I came, I saw, I conquered" fit best—you, or the intelligentsia that has been aroused by the Georgian press?

Proposals for Changing ArSSR Administrative, Territorial Structure

18300689 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
20 May 89 p. 2

[Article by L. Valesyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences' Geographical Society and corresponding member of Novosti Press: "Territorial Divisions and Regional Policy"]

[Text] More and more perestroika is bringing about a profound evolution of our society as every aspect of our lives undergoes renewal before our very eyes. Radical

steps are being taken to transform the USSR into a lawful state and to work out effective means of regulating matters related to structuring state territories in accordance with the principles of democracy, humanism, and national equality. One step in this process is drafting for public discussion general principles involved in restructuring the management of social and economic affairs in the union republics on the basis of self-government, self-financing, and an extension of sovereign rights.

This reform of economic management is laying the foundations for the genuine sovereignty of the soviets of people's deputies as the principal means of popular self-government and the true proprietor of their own territories. Hence the fundamental importance of a scientifically determined structure of territorial units of administration, their levels, composition, and boundaries.

The structuring of administrative territories in our republics is under discussion not only by scholars and managers, but by a broad range of the public. The issue has also been covered in the central press. Zorix Balayan in the article "Sacred Place," which appeared in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (No. 8, 22 February 1989), makes the following statement:

"The devastation of the land and with it the human spirit began in our republic not simply near the end of the 1920's and at the start of the 1930's, as is often said. There is an exact date. It was 9 September 1930. On this day, all at once, 25 administrative rayons were created within the territory comprising the historically determined regions of the Armenian SSR. ... In 1937 the republic pie was cut up into 7 more pieces. That dreadful year 7 additional rayons were added to the original 25." [For a translation of this article, see pages 60-63 of the JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-LPA-89-031, dated 19 May 1989.]

Although one might argue about the exact date of "the devastation of the land and with it the human spirit" in our republic, we must agree with the writer that "we made a mistake in creating administrative bits and pieces." Apart from journalistic hyperbole, it may be considered a demonstrable fact that these divisions do not correspond to the realities of today, nor do they help us to reach the goals of perestroika.

With regard to the sources of reform during the period 1920-1930, it must be said that the principles of dividing the republic into districts along economic lines were established and worked out in the early 1920's and approved by V. I. Lenin. Each territorial administrative unit—rayon, oblast, kray or province—was looked upon as an integral economic entity, functioning as part of a larger territory. During the process of reform, however, especially in the second phase of it, because of the departure from the territorial principle of management and the increasing predominance of the industrial approach, and with it the increased use of the arbitrary

administrative methods of management, the principle of creating administrative units along economic lines began to lose its original significance.

Specific schemes for dividing up the republics into administrative areas increasingly began to adapt themselves to the task, as they used to say in those days, of "applying power locally." Soon this task began to be infused with a new content, reflecting a gradual tendency to concentrate all power in the hands of the central apparatus by restricting the rights of citizens and enterprises together with the organs of Soviet power in urban and rural areas. The departments became all-powerful within the territorial administrative units. As Zorix Balayan in his article aptly stated: "In an instant orders, requisitions, guidelines might be issued. All people were under the eyes of the local authorities—all held accountable. Everything was seen and heard."

Acknowledging the inability of the existing system for administering territories within the republic to meet the requirements of social development does not preclude the possibility of making new mistakes. New and constructive decisions entail in-depth scientific analysis of the problems together with a thorough study of the various factors in order to form a new model for the state system of territorial administration.

In a multinational federal union, as in the USSR, the objects of territorial administration are not only the administrative territorial divisions—krays, oblasts, and rayons—but also the national political formations; that is, the union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and national okrugs. Of course, the principles of their formation and of the delineation of their frontiers are substantially different. Whereas for the first group the main criterion is socio-economic expediency and the combination of productive forces, for the second group—that is, the national political entities—the principle of ethnic origin and nationality is the important factor. The problems that have piled up in this regard may be resolved **in their entirety by improving Soviet federalism**. That is a special subject of discussion. With respect to improving the state system of territorial administration, this clearly means making it compatible with the existing territorial structure of the national economy and with the principles of economic and political reform carried out in the country within the framework of perestroika.

Experts in the geographical sciences have carried out prospective republic redistricting according to various factors, in combination or altogether. More than ten different systems or regional division have been devised, not to mention variations of them, with regard to general conditions of water, soil, climate, botany, agriculture, land formation, and general topography, among others. These classification systems reflect the major differences in natural conditions for the territorial organization of society, which are not always taken into consideration as they should be by planning and management bodies.

No less difficult and piecemeal a process is the distribution of cities and villages in the republic. The overall statistics are well known. A population of more than 3.8 million people is located in about a thousand settled areas, of which 58 have the status of cities. Almost 70 percent of the population is concentrated in 60 populated areas, which amounts to only 6 percent of the total number of settled areas. About half of the people included in this group live in three cities—Yerevan, Leninakan, and Kirovakan, and about 35 percent of them in Yerevan itself. More than 55 percent of the population of the republic lives on the 10 percent of its territory that is below 1000 meters in height above sea level.

Manufacturing, the leading sector of the republic economy, reflects this large population density. It consists of 20 independent enterprises and associations, together with their branches, and 2,500 auxiliary enterprises located in more than 200 populated areas. About 90 percent of these enterprises, however, are concentrated in six industrial areas: Yerevan, Leninakan, Kirovakan, Alaverdi, the Razdan-Sevan industrial area, and the Kafan-Kadzharan area. These centers are functioning economic as well as territorial aggregates, which have developed in conformity with specific natural laws, but which do not have administratively set boundaries or administrative organs of their own. As a result their existence is not taken into consideration in planning or pre-planning activities or even in official statistical accounting.

The general picture of the territorial organization of the national economy is seen to be even more complex when we examine its infrastructure. It is common knowledge, of course, that the railroads, gas pipelines, electric power lines, irrigation canals, and main roads operate independently of administrative boundaries and are not under the jurisdiction of regional bodies.

There is scientific evidence of the fact that these heterogeneous areas of the national economy can under certain conditions merge in such a way as to form a fairly well-synchronized economic organism known as the Integrated Socio-Economic Region. It has been demonstrated after many years of research by economic geographers, and it is now officially recognized, that six regions have developed in the republic which represent the functional units of the Armenian SSR industrial complex in terms of territory. They are the Ararat'skiy, the Shirak'skiy, the Lori-Pambak'skiy, Sevan'skiy, Syunik'skiy, and Arstev'skiy regions.

These regions, however, do not constitute the entire existing structure of the republic's national economy. It is a multi-step structure. Each of these socio-economic regions is bounded by at least four steps: the socio-economic subregion (consisting of a group of administrative regions or rayons); the rayon; the micro-rayon (a part of a rayon); and the basic locality or habitation unit [naselennyy punkt], whether of a rural soviet, settlement

soviet, or city soviet. In this hierarchical staircase that makes up the structure of the national economy in terms of territory, only the second step (that is, the rayons and, equated with them, urban centers under republic authority) and the fifth step (basic localities) have administrative bodies; whereas, the others, including the socio-economic regions themselves, which are the most powerful and highly developed components of the national economy, are deprived of them. Moreover, in the practice of territorial planning, only a formal use is made of these components.

These inconsistencies and contradictions, together with the problems of organizing society that they have engendered, have developed historically. It is perestroika that has illuminated them. The restructuring process has also highlighted a clearly marked and growing rift between the structure of territorial administration and the structure of the republic economy as it objectively exists.

What follows is of fundamental importance. Cybernetic theory postulates that no more than 25 elements should be governed from a single center. The number of territorial units administered by our republic Council of Ministers is 59. The units consist of 37 rural rayons and 22 cities under the authority of the republic. The number of second-step units—that is, of urban rayons and units under the authority of (rural) rayons—is 525. This means that for each of the 59 administrative centers there are an average of 9 administered units. This, however, is the actual situation: 20 of the 59 centers have no administered units under their authority, and the number of administered units under the authority of the 39 centers ranges from 2 to 20. Thus there is an enormous difference in the effectiveness with which the republic territories are administered.

Three possible options for solving this problem are delineated as follows:

First Option: The two-step system of territorial administration in the republic is preserved, but the number of first-step units is reduced from 59 to 13. Instead of the present number of 37 rural rayons, the 6 socio-economic regions now in existence are incorporated as administrative units and equated with 7 urban areas under the authority of the republic. In this case the optimum number of territorial units under republic authority is preserved. The system of administrative division approximates to a maximum extent the actually existing structure of the national economy, which in turn creates additional opportunities for the planned regulation of territorial social organization, the further integrated development of the regions, and the elimination of regional imbalances. Nevertheless, if the number of lower-echelon territorial power cells remains intact, then the problem of creating an optimum number of second-step elements administered by first-step units is not fully resolved.

Second Option: A three-step system of territorial administration (which cannot be considered efficient) is established with the introduction of a new step, consisting of administrative okrugs (the designation yet to be determined), corresponding to the 6 socio-economic regions; the cities of Yerevan and Leninakan and, eventually perhaps, Kirovakan to be equated with them. Thus the present number of rayons is substantially preserved and the cities acquire the status of being under okrug authority.

Third Option: A combined administrative and territorial system is established. For some of the territories, a two-step system is adopted, depending on the level of social and economic development and the productive potential of the regions; for the rest, a three-step system is in effect. (Examples of such an approach may be found in countries abroad as well as in a number of USSR republics.)

What can be expected of the proposed improvement of the structure of administering republic territories? Especially in the event that the first option is accepted, much will depend on the presently existing territorial structure of the national economy. It is this that creates the actual conditions for improving state direction of the national economy and social life; for streamlining the functionally interrelated elements, both governing and being governed; and for fortifying the scientific basis of territorial planning and regional development. The consolidated units of territorial administration will have a more potent socio-economic potential. Under conditions of extending the rights of local authorities and introducing regional economic self-sufficiency, this potential may be used to expand the social sphere, and to resolve problems of exploiting natural resources more efficiently while preserving the environment.

The formation of territorial administrative units on the basis of the existing socio-economic regions will have the effect of stimulating the development of cities of regional significance, which will become the regional centers of the consolidated rayons (or okrugs). Having been given a greater potential for urban area formation together with additional administrative functions, they will develop as a "counterweight" to the republic capital, and as a result they will, in effect, aid in the solution of such a vitally important national problem as the abnormal hypertrophy of Yerevan. Finally, as computations indicate, only by improving the territorial administrative structure of the republic can a further cutback of the administrative apparatus be achieved in the range of 30-35 percent.

The problem of improving the territorial administrative structure of the republics by dividing them into economically viable regions continues to be a subject of much research. A sound scientific basis for it has already been established. For many years, under the USSR Geographical Society Presidium, the Council for the Territorial Organization of Society has been in existence, regularly holding scientific conferences and seminars and publishing collections of scientific works. As early as 1986, at a

scientific conference in Yerevan regularly held under the sponsorship of the council, the republic Ministry of Higher Education and the Armenian Geographical Society of the Academy of Sciences discussed problems of improving the territorial administrative structure in the light of decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. The state of affairs in Armenia was likewise subjected to thorough scientific analysis. The proceedings of the conference were presented to party and government organs. Subsequently, this call to action was repeated in the form of a special report. No doubt it is believed in some quarters that the extraordinary situation that has developed in the republic calls for a different set of priorities, and that improvement in the territorial administrative structure can be put off for a while. One might think that the coverage given in the central press provides more than sufficient proof of the unconstructive nature of these attitudes. If we want to apply modern scientific standards in directing economic, social, political, and moral processes of change without losing our long-range perspective, then we should turn immediately to the task of resolving this problem.

It should not be forgotten that eliminating the consequences of the catastrophic earthquake means restoring not only the individual sites of enterprises and institutions, but reconstructing the particular territorial units and regions in terms of their industrial capacity, and renovating while improving their industrial structure in terms of space.

ArSSR: Officials Meet to Coordinate Investigation of Recent Mass Poisonings

18300654a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
9 May 89 p 2

[Armenpress report: "Relying on the Public"]

[Text] It would seem that two incongruent categories have come together—the secrecy of investigative work, and...glasnost.

Taking part in the work of the expanded collegium of the republic procuracy were officials from the law-enforcement organs; scientists and chemists from leading academy of sciences, academic and branch institutions; biologists and medical workers; representatives of social organizations, the mass information media and unofficial associations; and officials from industrial enterprises. The interest of all participants in this unprecedented collegium was the same—these people were brought here by the serious concerns which were aroused at numerous industrial enterprises of Minlegprom [Light Industry Ministry] and Goskomuslug [State Committee for Services] by the cases of mass poisoning of people and by the desire to render all possible assistance to the investigation.

Responsible officials from the republic procuracy delivered reports, which stated specifically that all the poisoning cases in industry are individual links in a chain, the

beginning of which was an incident at the Masis branch of the Garun Garment Manufacturing Association. However, while self-critically acknowledging that the investigation has taken a rather long time—for four months they tried unsuccessfully to find possible toxic components in the manufacture of Akrilan 32/2 yarn—today it has been reliably established, that toxic substances having nothing to do with the production process were found in a yarn sample from the production line where the victims work. By assignment of the Armenian SSR Procuracy, at the present time authoritative specialists are conducting more than 70 different expert analyses, the aim of which is determining the chemical substance which caused the mass poisoning of the workers. It is very important to determine the nature of the chemical substance. Until this is accomplished, it will not be possible to pursue the means of its introduction.

It was reported that as a precautionary measure, the enterprise has completely rejected the services of the supplier in whose yarn the poisonous substance was found. A proposal was made to conduct expert analysis for possible identification of the chemical substances utilized in Tbilisi on the night of 9 April. The collegium participants gave assurances that such identification would be made in the next few days.

The female workers who were victims of the poisoning at the Masis branch of the Garun Garment Manufacturing Association expressed a great deal of concern. They have complained that their health has not yet been restored, and they cannot work an entire shift productively. They have expressed the desire that the republic procuracy come to their social and moral defense.

The collegium acknowledged that the question was properly put: the labor productivity of the workers has fallen in connection with their loss of health, and naturally their wages have declined. Those who retired on disability pension have also suffered materially. In the opinion of republic Procurator V. Nazaryan, the loss of the ability to work in connection with the poisoning must be considered a production loss, with all the ensuing consequences. It was decided to set up an authoritative commission made up of officials from the health-care and legal professions, and resolve these questions.

"How can one explain the fact that science and expert chemists have to this day been unable to determine the chemical substance which caused the mass poisoning of the people on the production line?" they asked republic State Sanitary Inspector U. Pogosyan, Armenian SSR deputy health minister.

"Obviously it would be best for those specializing in toxicology to answer this question. On my own part I can say that to this day we have been unable to detect this substance in its pure form, but only traces of its separate components, by which it is difficult to establish what the

substance was. You see, science and manufacturing knows of nearly two million toxic substances which contain these components."

A question to Armenian SSR Procurator V. Nazaryan: "What do you expect from this collegium?"

"A great deal," he replied. "We have tried to elicit a serious lesson from the criticism addressed to us by the Armenian SSR CP Central Committee; we are considering its recommendation to rely more fully on the public in our work, and to affirm the spirit of glasnost. I am firmly convinced that our appeal to the scientists will be heard. I would like to call attention to the fact that we are inviting them not only in the capacity of experts, but are also appealing for their voluntary cooperation: to whomever wishes to, whomever is able to, and finally to whomever is interested in helping us. And this, along with the operational and investigative work, provides a certain guarantee of successful conduct of the investigation."

"It only remains for me to add, in concluding my impressions of the work of the expanded collegium of the republic procuracy, the following: the attention of the participants is invited to the materials from the expert analysis, as well as the recommendations which may help coordinate the work of the health-care organs and that of the interested ministries and agencies, social organizations and the general public."

A large expert commission was chosen from among those attending the session of the collegium of scientists and chemists, for conducting comprehensive investigations of all instances of poisoning, and disclosing the true causes of this crime.

Taking part in the work of the collegium were First Deputy Chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers L. Saakyan—chairman of the government commission—and G. Asatryan, chief of the ideological department, Armenian CP Central Committee.

Armenian Council of Ministers Approves Leninakan Reconstruction Plan

18300654h Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
7 May 89 p 1

[Armenpress report: "In the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers: Let There Be a New Leninakan"]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Council of Ministers has approved the general plan for the city of Leninakan worked out by the Yerevanproekt Institute for the period up to 1995. It had been approved previously by the ispolkom of the Leninakan city Soviet of People's Deputies and by Armenian SSR Gosstroy. The general plan specifies priority construction projects for the years 1989-1990.

Prior to the earthquake, 233,000 people had been living in Leninakan—a major economic, cultural and historical center in the republic, and its available housing totalled 2.6 million square meters. As a result of the natural disaster, about 1.5 million square meters of housing space was destroyed or is subject to demolition—as well as 80 percent of the schools and children's pre-school institutions, polyclinics and hospitals, other establishments of a socio-domestic and municipal nature, transportation facilities, public utilities and communication. Of 40 industrial enterprises, 17 were totally destroyed.

Also included in the priority measures to be taken in 1989-1990 for restoring the decimated city as a single urban entity are the territories contiguous to Leninakan. The new construction zone is being expanded at the expense of the lands of the Akhuryanskiy Rayon, and the rayon will receive other land in exchange.

Land to the northwest of the existing city will be opened up to civilian housing construction. They are favorable in terms of urban development, geological engineering and microseismic conditions, and correspond with the conclusions of the Earth Sciences Section of the Chemical and Geological Sciences Department of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, and by expert groups approved by the republic government and by a commission on extended seismic zoning for construction in the rayons and cities of the Armenian SSR. Dwellings with a total space of 2,015,000 square meters will be situated in the northwest part of the city, as well as a complex of establishments for socio-cultural purposes, and projects and structures of the engineering-transportation infrastructure.

New housing construction will consist of three-to-four story houses of the sectional type. At the same time, they have taken into consideration the fact that the region is subject to seismicity estimated at nine points for second-category earth, as well as the natural-climatic conditions and the city's peculiar urban development plans.

Repair and strengthening have begun for a total of 100,000 square meters of restorable housing, as well as schools, children's pre-school institutions and other public buildings, and civil-engineering projects.

Construction projects in the central city includes a memorial to the earthquake victims, and institutions for cultural, sport and children's aesthetic education; trade, public catering and everyday services establishments; and health-care and public utilities facilities.

Within the boundaries of the existing city, it is planned to carry out new individual construction with private subsidiary plots, with a total area of 150,000 square meters, to compensate for the individual houses destroyed by the earthquake.

Construction industry bases are being established in order to carry out priority housing and civic construction projects in the city.

The planning and building processes have been put in order, and the architectural appearance will be improved for existing industrial regions of the city—Leninakan South, Leninakan North, Textile, and Southern, as well as for the new Marmashen industrial region, which is to be situated on territory with favorable geological-engineering conditions. USSR Ministry of Machine Building enterprises will be situated here, as well as enterprises of the Armenian SSR ministries of Local Industry and Light Industry, and a number of municipal facilities.

The establishment of bypass highways with transportation bypasses at various levels, as well as a system of main streets with traffic control will provide convenient transportation ties between the residential and industrial regions.

Development of public urban transportation has been planned; trolley lines will be increased to 38 kilometers, and bus lines to 62 kilometers.

There are plans to construct a trolley depot, bus and taxi parks, garages for private automobile owners, public parking places, automobile service stations, and a new main bus terminal.

The general plan for city also envisages completion of a top-priority complex of measures for civil-engineering preparation of the territories, including lowering the level of ground water, improving drainage ditches, regulating surface flows, and clean-up and sanitization of territories in the zones of destruction; and, laying water pipelines in continuous and semi-continuous collectors.

Construction and restoration will be also carried out on the city's electrical, gas-supply and telephone systems.

Measures stipulated for 1991-1995 envisage a significant volume of work, including: restoration and repair of 250,000 square meters of residential housing; construction of 500,000 square meters of housing from state resources; construction of 250,000 meters of individual housing with private subsidiary plots; restoration and development of the city's social infrastructure; and, maximum restoration of the historically-evolved urban environment and preservation of the architectural traditions and the uniform make-up of old and new urban development in a harmonious manner, with parks, gardens and squares.

Plans have been made to reconstruct the historic built-up areas while preserving the architectural appearance; to restore residential and public buildings of cultural and historical value; to increase the amount of trees and shrubs up to 15 square meters per capita, and to create a state park of culture and recreation as well along the gorge of the River Akhuryan; and to create a physical culture and sanatorium zone and a system of parks, squares and boulevards, making use of the territories not suitable in geological-engineering respects for housing,

civic and other types of construction. It is also planned to organize a zone for brief holidays in the River Akhuryan valley and the areas of Vardbakh and Marmashen.

The work being carried out must be accomplished in conjunction with measures for protecting the soil, the air and the water reservoirs from pollution by industrial and municipal enterprises, storage dumps and transport.

By decree of the republic Council of Ministers, when drawing up their five-year and annual plans for the economic and social development of Leninakan: Armenian SSR Gosplan, the ispolkom of the Leninakan city Soviet of People's Deputies, ministries and agencies, are instructed to stipulate the allocation of the necessary capital investments for construction of housing, cultural-domestic and municipal facilities, roads and other objectives in the infrastructure, in accordance with the city's general plan.

Special attention must be devoted to drawing up the draft for detailed planning and for historical architectural work at the Kumayri State Park; and also for completing the research and design for individual housing construction projects with private subsidiary plots for the populace of Leninakan, in a complex with establishment of a socio-cultural nature.

The Armenian SSR Council of Ministers has invested the republic state construction committee, the ispolkom of the Leninakan city Soviet of People's Deputies; the Armenian SSR ministries of housing, municipal services, and health, as well as the Armenian SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection, with responsibility for monitoring the realization of the general plan approved by the government for the city of Leninakan.

ArSSR: Leninakan Workers Concerned Over Factory Closure Rumors

*18300688a Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
16 May 89 p 2*

[Article by KOMSOMOLETS correspondent Yu. Arutyunyan: "The Plant Will Live"]

[Text] Recently, a rumor about the elimination of the Leninakan Compressor Plant stubbornly spread throughout the city, sowing disquiet not only among workers of the enterprise but among other workers collectives, too. The farther—the bigger: This rumor, like a snow ball rolled down a mountain, grew with new details. And soon it was rumored that, not one plant but, all of the city's organizations and industrial enterprises were subject to elimination after which reconstruction of Leninakan itself would allegedly not make sense.

It must be admitted that the more "believable" rumors become, the less truth there is in them, but in real life, facts say something else entirely: About the reconstruction of a plant and not about its elimination. Immediately after the earthquake, B.M. Belousov, a ministry representative,

arrived in Leninakan to ascertain the scale of destruction at subdepartmental enterprises and to render necessary assistance to their workers collectives. Then, in December, Leninakan residents talked about him with a sincere liking and not only because he was the first of the nation's ministers to arrive in the disaster zone. The main thing was that he promised to rebuild the plant in two years and in accordance with his orders, a Ministry construction organization was the first in Leninakan to begin clearing rubble from the enterprise's grounds and the first to complete it. And besides that, the city's residents also immediately became filled with faith in B.M. Belousov because he knows how to talk to people and understand their problems and concerns.

The minister was true to his word: On the basis of his 27 December, 1988 memorandum, a resolution was adopted on rebuilding the compressor plant which was destroyed by the earthquake.

It seemed that everything was clear. Well, but rumors were born of the forced idleness, despair, and uncertainty which took up residence in many of the city's workers collectives at the time.

However... There it is in front of me,—the text of an actual document which became the chief basis of the rumors—the text of USSR Council of Ministers Order No 446, dated 14 March, 1989, "In connection with the impossibility (?), due to seismic causes, of reconstructing the Leninakan Compressor Plant, destroyed as a result of an earthquake, a resolution of this ministry, approved by the ArSSR Council of Ministers, USSR Gosplan, USSR Gosstroy, and Kirov Oblispolkom, is adopted on the creation [of a facility] in 1990 at Selmash Plant in Kirov with an annual production capacity of one million home refrigerator compressors instead of rebuilding the Leninakan Compressor Plant.

And thus, is the plant being eliminated anyway? It seems that this document provides a simple answer. But...following this decision, events occurred at the plant which forced the ministry to review its position. Yes, today it is already impossible to simply take and disband an enterprise's collective in an administrative manner without its agreement. And not just anywhere but in a disaster zone which has become a zone of compassion and a sore point.

Yes, regarding the future, there is a plant and, of course, something to think about. The enterprise's grounds, as the experts have determined, is actually a seismically dangerous zone. But today a new form of city building thought exists and is rapidly developing: Architects are currently attempting to erect industrial enterprises outside the city's boundaries. It was precisely this principle which guided them in Armenia during construction of a number of Leninakan's new enterprises—a magnetic circuit plant, a prefabricated home construction combine, a wrought iron pressed equipment production association, and bicycle and glass plants. Thus, in the

1970's and 80's, a new Promyshlennyy Severnyy [Northern Industrial] microrayon was formed beyond the city limits. Incidentally, the last three enterprises were formerly located closer to the city's center.

This is what was also talked about at a meeting of the compressor makers workers collective which decided that they would themselves discuss the issue of the possible elimination of the plant. I listened to the workers speeches and I was filled with pride for them: despite the complicated social situation which arose in Leninakan after the earthquake, the people have preserved a feeling of collectivism within themselves and are fully resolved to rebuild their plant.

This is what Emil Chavushyan, head of the mechanical shop, had to say:

"After the tragedy in Armenia, the minister repeatedly came to Leninakan: At that time, he was interested in our living conditions and with understanding our fate. And right now with a stroke of the pen, he is suddenly deciding our fate without us! It is necessary that he come here for one more meeting with us: We are really only against the total elimination of our enterprise and the dissolution of our collective. We agree to manufacture goods—any goods, at any other location where there will be a plant."

The gathering composed the text of a telegram to the ministry with a request that he fly to Leninakan for a meeting with the compressor makers collective. This decision angered the ministry's representatives, A. Tsarev, head of the labor and wages administration, and A. Kozlov, deputy director of personnel administration, who were present at this meeting: What, summon the minister himself?! Their dissatisfaction was hard to understand and to share, especially—from the position of perestroika...

By that time, an alarming telegram from the plant's collective and from the city party committee in Leninakan and addressed to N.I. Ryzhkov, B.M. Belousov, and to the CPSU Central Committee produced an effect: The minister recently arrived in Leninakan once again.

He arrived to meet with the plant's collective and to express constructive proposals: The compressor makers will work at a new consumer goods production plant which will be built at a new location during the next two and a half years. And he proposed that, during that time, members of the collective be placed in jobs at the Ministry's SU [Special Administration], at the Elektroytprigor Plant, or in another subdepartmental enterprise.

Thus the plant will live anyway. But the rumor that other enterprises will also be eliminated? They are without basis.

ArSSR Gossnab Official on Quake Reconstruction Commission Concerns

*18300688b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
30 May 89 p 3*

[Armenpress report: "Ensure Material and Technical Deliveries"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov chaired a 12 May meeting of a commission of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Council of Ministers Presidium in Moscow which broadly and comprehensively discussed the issue of reconstruction work progress in areas of the Armenian SSR which suffered from the earthquake and the progress of carrying out resolutions on eliminating its consequences which were adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Basic measures for improving the progress of reconstruction and construction work were elaborated.

In a conversation with an Armenpress correspondent, ArSSR Gossnab Chairman S.N. Stepanyan discussed the following.

The commission pointed out that Armenia's party, soviet and economic agencies are devoting daily attention to reconstruction work in the natural disaster zone. Envoys from Moscow, Leningrad, and the fraternal republics are working hand in hand with the workers of Armenia.

The issues of providing homeless people with housing and preparation of schools and educational institutions for normal pursuits during the new school year were broadly discussed. It was emphasized that due to late completion of engineering and geological surveys, unsatisfactory organization of construction work, and ill-timed delivery of technical documentation, construction time periods are being delayed for housing, preschool institutions, and social-cultural facilities.

The need was recognized to allocate an additional 25,000 mobile homes for relocating people living in the disaster area from tents and yurts during the 1989-1990 winter period. Two thousand panelboard houses will be delivered for timely preparation for the new school year. It must be said that these houses are being shipped at the expense of the nation's oil workers, geologists, and gas workers.

Under the guidance of Commission Member L.A. Voronin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of USSR Gossnab, the organizational plan for eliminating deficiencies revealed at the CPSU Central Committee commission session was reviewed and approved.

The USSR Ministry of the Lumber Industry was tasked with immediately carrying out the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on delivery of window and door units in accordance with the construction and reconstruction work schedule, beginning in May 1989.

The CPSU Central Committee commission gave high marks to the Armenian workers' collective patriotic initiative which decided to manufacture 22,000 wooden huts. At the present time, we are searching for the capability of ensuring assembly of these homes through physical assets. ArSSR Gossnab organizations are making their contributions along with the workers of Armenia in the matter of reconstructing destroyed cities and villages, enterprises, agricultural industry facilities, and home construction.

Twelve thousand huts, more than 2,000 wooden homes, and 1,200 parts of homes have been delivered for resolving the issues of providing housing to the workers of Kirovakan, Leninakan, Spitak, Stepanavan, and the villages of Northern Armenia. Gosagroprom has received 3,600 mobile homes and 101,000 square meters of parts kits. Deliveries of 80,900 tents, including 27,300 heated tents, have been completed to the disaster area.

The issues of providing fuel, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants to the republic have been completely resolved.

Insurance reserves of material resources at double the norm are being created at Gossnab wholesale trade enterprises. This allows us to ship them to construction organizations and support the rhythm of work during delays in deliveries.

A major depot complex is being established in the area of Arevik station for consistent material and technical supply to the disaster zone which will allow processing of up to one million tons of cargo per year. This is greater than the capacities of all of the republic's Gossnab bases. It will begin operating this year.

We must point out that during the past several months we have surpassed the annual volume of deliveries to the republic of materials, mechanisms, and transport assets. Three hundred fifty million rubles worth of various types of equipment have already arrived.

Starovoytova on Reducing Tensions in Interethnic Relations

*18300655 Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
13 May 89 p 3*

[Interview with Galina Vasilyevna Starovoytova, scientist, conducted by G. Rubinyan: "Approaching the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Improvement of Interethnic Relations": "Galina Starovoytova: 'We Need Dialogue'"]

[Text] There is hardly any need to introduce to our readers the person we are interviewing today: Galina Vasilyevna Starovoytova, scientist and public figure.

This past year, a very difficult one for our republic in many respects, brought great popularity among Armenians to this Moscow ethnopsychologist, and that in itself is a notable fact and one worthy of special attention. Her nomination as a candidate for USSR people's deputy from Soviet National Okrug No 393, city of Yerevan is further proof of that recognition...

[Rubinyan] Galina Vasilyevna, please share with us the secret of your popularity here in our republic! Seriously, how did it happen that you have become so actively involved with the fate of the Armenian people?

[Starovoytova] It is actually difficult for me to say when my love for Armenia began. It was probably a very long time ago, as I read the works of Armenian poets (I especially love Narekatsi) and Andrey Bitov's "Uroki Armenii" [Lessons of Armenia]. Then I visited Armenia—for the first time—in 1978. Six years later I became acquainted with Nagorno-Karabakh, where I worked as the head of a joint international expedition studying the phenomenon of extreme longevity in the Caucasus. We had to live in very remote settlements, and in that way came to know the daily life and problems of that region very well; incidentally, we also made many friends there. The beginning of the "Karabakh" events found me lying flat on my back in bed in Moscow, to which I had moved from Leningrad in order to work at the new USSR Academy of Sciences Center for the Study of Interethnic Relations. Through an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances I broke my leg and my arm four days after I arrived in Moscow. Since I was unable to fly to Yerevan I wrote a letter of sympathy addressed to S. Kaputikyan and Z. Balayan and, essentially, to everyone who could understand me in Armenia. It was obvious that we were witnessing an historic event, not just a random people's demonstration, but rather a people's movement born out of the whole course of that people's turbulent history. My letter was immediately copied and distributed, and I was not able while in Moscow to reply to the flood of letters and telephone calls I received from Armenia. By the way, I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to thank everyone who wrote to me from Armenia in response to my message.

For me it is a tremendous honor to be nominated as a candidate for deputy. I did not think that my love for Armenia and my interest in politics would intersect in this way. But it did happen: the collective of the Yerevan Amino Acids Technology Research Institute nominated me, twice actually, as the nomination was not registered the first time. Now I face some very strong competitors, individuals who are very well known and respected in the republic: Vardges Petrosyan, Aramais Saakyan, Yuriy Vardanyan and Kamo Vardanyan. I think that the people who did not come out to vote for the proposed candidates the first time will be able to make a worthy choice on the second ballot. I repeat that for me it is a very great honor to be nominated for deputy at all, particularly from Armenia, because that republic is going

through a very difficult and crucial period in its modern history. Today the people of Armenia need an unbiased approach perhaps more than ever before...

[Rubinyan] Today there is probably no more timely issue than that of interethnic relations. Many people were taken aback by the coincidence of the beginning of restructuring with a heightening of tensions over the nationalities question, but that coincidence was a natural development rather than a chance occurrence... Nonetheless, can the mere fact that people have obtained a certain degree of freedom of self-expression account for the unexpected explosion of ethnic self-awareness among our country's peoples? Can just, democratic legislation eliminate interethnic conflicts?

[Starovoytova] I would like to begin by saying that this heightening of tensions in interethnic relations was not unexpected; I witnessed the Abkhazian demonstration in 1978, and even then one could have predicted the further development of this process. Our problem is that the USSR inherited a difficult legacy from the Russian Empire and was founded on insufficiently democratic principles of national-state organization, yet for 70 years has proclaimed that the nationalities question has been resolved in our country, that no such problem exists here. But how could it not exist, when we have four different types of national-state formations: union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs? And each form has different rights. Thus what we have are peoples who are classified as first-, second-, third- and fourth-class, and that is completely incompatible with the principle of equality among peoples. Especially since as a result of historical vicissitudes the fate of some peoples has been dependent on other peoples within whose national-state formations they live. That is the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the ethnocultural and religious differences in the population are great, and that is the situation in Abkhazia, where the problem persists. There is the problem of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR as part of Uzbekistan and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan.

Some friction and some difficulties are inevitable and natural in relations between peoples. It is not necessary to appeal to people to "love one another" and it is not necessary to proclaim "friendship." Friendship cannot be created by proclamation. We must appeal for compromise; throughout the civilized world relations between people, if they are established on a democratic basis, require compromises and broad equal rights, in short the democratic and legal foundations of a state system. If we achieve the victory of democracy we will also resolve the nationalities question—to the degree to which it can be resolved, of course.

One major problem is that all the anti-restructuring forces, as they are called, have rallied very well and succeeded in regrouping during these four years of restructuring; unfortunately restructuring is proceeding much more slowly than we would like and reactionary

forces have had enough time to grow stronger and tighten up their ranks. Furthermore, it is precisely these forces which are internationalist, perhaps the most internationalist segment of our entire society (the latter is due to the fact that they do not care about the interests of their own people nor those of any other people). I think Rashidov, Kunayev, Brezhnev and the rest could understand one another without an interpreter. It was precisely those leaders who eagerly condemned their peoples to assimilation and called it voluntary, natural assimilation. Just as eagerly, for example, as the Belorussian leaders went about closing Belorussian-language schools in their republic after Khrushchev stood on the steps of Minsk University and said: "The sooner we all speak Russian, the sooner we will build communism." Now today we are witnessing a wave of ethnic self-awareness in Belorussia, and its success is based on that threat: the threat of losing national traditions and values. The same thing is happening in many other republics, in Armenia in particular. The reason is probably that when the state has to a certain extent discredited itself through the difficult decades of our history the nation becomes the natural foundation of civil society. When enthusiasm for the values being proclaimed wanes people turn to their traditional historical realities, ones like the family and the nation; therefore it is quite natural that today social rebirth is assuming the nationalistic form which we are now witnessing.

I think that we are seeing the rebirth or origin of a civil society in which public opinion has real power as a regulator of social forms of behavior, a society with well-developed informal movements, with pluralism of associations and organizations along with pluralism of opinion.

Since reactionary forces have done such a good job of closing ranks according to the principle of internationalism, it would be good if democratically-minded individuals could also close their ranks and sweep away all ethnic barriers, which should not be at issue here. In any event, while I have been here in Armenia, with my friends and those who share my ideas, meeting with the voters, I have not experienced any obstacles due to the fact that I am Russian.

[Rubinyan] But the struggle for democratic transformations requires some reliance on a functioning legal mechanism, for without that there are no grounds for declaring that restructuring has become irreversible. Nowadays many people are writing and talking about the need for legal guarantees which will ensure invariable compliance with the articles of the Constitution...

[Starovoytova] Here I am often asked questions like that, specifically in regard to the Sumgait trial and other aspects of national rights. What can I say, the struggle for a democratic state ruled by law still lies ahead. For instance, what can we do to prevent the Sumgait trial from becoming bogged down? The same things we have

been doing: fighting for a corps of bold, decisive members of parliament who are capable of raising this issue. What other options do we have?

But I would also like to note the fact that now that the Vienna agreements have been signed and the decision has been made by the CPSU Central Committee to recognize the priority of international law over Soviet law and to bring our domestic legal acts into line with international ones we also need to recognize the convention on genocide signed by the USSR in 1951 and the UN formulation of 1948 and on that basis conduct trials and evaluate the events occurring in our country.

The same applies to the matter of Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution, an issue of concern to many people, the article which guarantees peoples the right to self-determination. I do not think that the legal basis for secession from the USSR will be discussed at the upcoming Congress of People's Deputies, since this matter will be dealt with by a party plenum devoted to the nationalities question. But in anticipation of the plenum appropriate approaches are being drafted and alternative platforms developed which refer to legal guarantees to back up Article 72. Unfortunately an overwhelming majority of those writing documents for the plenum still feel that it would be better not to mention this article and simply forget about peoples' right to self-determination. Unfortunately our state is not founded on the principles of federalism, but rather those of autonomization; at the time the authorities, and expert consultants as well (this science was not at all in favor at the time and was more of an office-bound, slogan-oriented nature), were not willing to provide a serious foundation for Article 72.

Today this has become a very serious issue. The findings of sociological studies indicate that 80 percent of Lithuanians are already demanding a referendum in their republic, even though the Constitution does not state by what means peoples' right to self-determination is to be realized. Though we do still do not have any legal guarantees, Article 72 has not been repealed. Therefore I think it is wrong to speak of separatist tendencies only in negative terms. I would suggest that we talk about them in a neutral way; the right to self-determination is a constitutional right of peoples.

Generally speaking it is no secret that to a certain extent there has arisen a divergence between the actual levels of policy and citizens' awareness of their rights (the latter being far in the lead). And today dialogue between the authorities and the people is very important. Perhaps we are too inclined to maximalism, demanding that our leaders be farther to the left and closer to our radical aspirations, that they express only the interests of the democratic intelligentsia. Let us not forget the overall situation, both within our country and abroad. If certain republics have taken the lead that does not mean that we remain mired in some completely different era. But it is very important that our leaders have highly competent

expert advice; economic advice, which could perhaps have prevented the failure of the anti-alcohol campaign; advice on ethnic matters, legal advice...

[Rubinyan] Galina Vasilyevna, you are an active participant in the Moscow Forum Club [Klub "Moskovskaya Tribuna"], which has gathered the finest of our capital's scientific intelligentsia under its aegis. Could you tell us about its work in more detail?

[Starovoytova] The Moscow Forum Club is a non-departmental, unofficial—though it has already gained some respect—and informal professional club for the Moscow intelligentsia. It was founded last fall at the initiative of such renowned architects of restructuring as L. Kaprinskiy, Yu. Afanasyev (rector of the Historical Archives Institute), L. Batkin, Yu. Burtin, Academician R. Sagdeyev, Academician A. Sakharov, sociologist Yu. Levada, A. Belyayev (editor-in-chief of the bulletin "BEK XX I MIR") and others. I have named almost all of the club's bureau, of which I am also a member. The club currently has around 160 members, but as many as 500 people attend its meetings (even though they are not open to the public). We are not striving to transform our club into Hyde Park; many people simply want to come and get a look at famous people, Sakharov, for instance, or hear hard-to-get information, but we would like our sessions to be working sessions. The club has a dual task. Firstly, the expression and molding of public opinion among that segment of the democratic intelligentsia which belongs to the club. Secondly, the development of alternative scientific projects. Today science itself is very far removed from the level we would like to see; the Academy of Sciences is a highly bureaucratic and conservative organization, as was reflected in the election held by the Academy of Sciences. In that election neither Sakharov nor Sagdeyev, major scientists who are the conscious of our nation, were selected at the first stage. Subsequently outrage and a lack of confidence were expressed in regard to the Academy of Sciences Presidium, and in Moscow a meeting of scientists was held to demand the Presidium's resignation. The Presidium has been restructured and has now, as you are aware, elected both Sakharov and Sagdeyev, along with others.

Within the Moscow Forum Club several different groups have taken shape, primarily in the humanities. That is only natural; lacking our own synchrotron, for instance, we are unable to conduct alternative physics research. But we have set ourselves the goal of independent consultation and independent research in the humanities, because unfortunately censorship pressure remains very great in official science in these areas, and we continue to lack certain branches of scientific knowledge in the humanities. I deal with interethnic relations problems, and there is also an economists' group and a strong jurists' group. Other groups are also going to be established.

In addition the Moscow Forum Club reacts in a very timely manner to all important events in public life. For example, our 22 April session was supposed to be

devoted to the election returns—a preliminary analysis of the way the election was conducted had been done—with a regional analysis and one for the country as a whole, analyzing the social composition of the group of deputies elected and proposing other ways of organizing the work of the Congress of People's Deputies, as well as a mechanism for elections to the Supreme Soviet, because under current election law these matters remain vague and will require further study, which is already in progress. But we were unable to devote our entire session just to the election returns because of the tragic events in Tbilisi. Our session was attended by a large group of our Georgian colleagues, among whom was Eldar Shengelaya, a professor at Tbilisi University who brought along a video of that terrible and tragic night. Yuri Rost also addressed the session. The Moscow Forum Club resolved to lodge a written protest and organize a rally in protest against the actions taken by the special troops; in my preelection program there is a point concerning the struggle for the disbanding of those units and repeal of the Ukase on Regulations Governing Rallies and Demonstrations, as well as the establishment of monitoring by deputies of the operations of the Ministry of Defense, the MVD and the KGB—these should all be subordinate to our people, both in regard to the nature of their work and in terms of their financing. The Moscow Forum Club held a rally opposite the Georgian Center on the Old Arbat; the rally was attended by a large number of people. Afterwards the Moscow Forum Club passed a resolution concerning the need for an independent investigation. There will undoubtedly be a parliamentary request from deputies to the Congress of People's Deputies demanding a national investigation instead of a commission at the republic level. The Forum Club has decided to get involved in this process; even though this is not a scientific issue we cannot simply stand idly by. Recently Academician Sakharov visited Tbilisi with a group from the Moscow Forum Club.

[Rubinyan] How do you perceive and evaluate the work of a people's deputy within the framework of your firm conviction that he or she represents a tool of and a means of expressing the will of the people? What is in your preelection program?

[Starovoytova] Yes, that is my conviction, but I feel that my constituents are going to know what kind of platform they are voting for and will not force me to make changes in my convictions.

As for my preelection program, it includes a number of general legal and democratic demands. Incidentally, it also contains a point in regard to the status of a deputy and his or her obligation to carry out the will of the people. Specifically, I appeal to people's deputies, and if I am elected am prepared to set a personal example, to renounce privileges such as special distribution of scarce goods and services, giving them instead to orphaned children and the handicapped. I feel that it is essential that we repeal antidemocratic ukases regarding MVD special operations units, regulations governing rallies

and demonstrations, changes in and amendments to the USSR Law "On Penalties for State Crimes" and several other USSR legislative acts. I am convinced of the need to amend our country's Constitution and the republic constitutions for the purpose of strengthening republic sovereignty. I deem it essential that we support the group of deputies who favor radical reforms aimed at creating a state ruled by law and a market economy.

In the ethnic realm it is essential that we work to perfect Soviet federalism and equal development of languages, cultures and traditions regardless of the size of a given people, and also resolutely oppose all manifestations of Russian great power chauvinism (as a Russian and a specialist in interethnic relations I feel that it is my duty to do so), because during all the decades of the Stalinist era it was impressed upon the Russian people that they were first among equals, the "elder brother."

As applied to Armenia, it is essential that we establish a fully-empowered ecological service and improve the current seismological service and grant them the power to veto projects which are not properly founded on scientific research. There is also another urgent problem facing Armenia: the ethnodemographic degeneration of a nation which has borne the double burden of genocide and natural disasters. The forced assimilation of Armenians living outside of Armenia is yet another problem.

My program also includes establishment of a system of public and state assistance to young families, especially those with many children. It is essential that we think about establishing an international charity fund to be called "The Children of Armenia, the Hope of the Nation." Armenian schools should be brought up to a level on a par with the best world standards.

I regard it as essential that we work to achieve a fair solution to the Karabakh problem on the basis of peoples' right to self-determination, as well as the soonest possible reestablishment of the functioning of democratic, constitutional institutions in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast: soviet organs, labor collective councils and informal organizations. I think that the special system of administration established in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which is of a purely temporary nature, has already outlived its usefulness, even though it has served as an important precedent for changes in the status quo.

It is very important that we work in every instance to achieve objectivity as we assess the Karabakh movement, which is a people's movement, and the work of its committee.

Uzbek Academy of Sciences Roundtable on Nationality Questions

18300640 Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA
in Russian 11 May 89 pp 1-2

[Roundtable conducted by Semen Novoprudskiy: "The Nationality Question: The Hegemony of Law"]

[Text] Staffers of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law gathered around the "roundtable"

in the editorial offices of KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA: Professor Dr of Juridical Sciences Boris Mikhaylovich Lazarev, sector head; Candidate of Juridical Sciences Irek Sharipovich Muksinov, head of the problems group of national-state relations; Candidate of Juridical Sciences Mayya Vladlenovna Puchkova, senior scientific associate; and Candidate of Juridical Sciences Akmal Kholmatovich Saidov, a sector head in the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law. (While the material was being prepared for press, it transpired that Kh. Saidov had been appointed head of the ideological department of the republic's Komsomol Central Committee.) The conversation was about the state-legal aspects of interethnic relations, legal protection for ethnic groups and nationalities, and laws governing relations between the USSR and the union republics, the autonomous formations, the Center and the outlying areas.

The first question dealt with by participants in the meeting was, Where do the legal problems of interethnic relations come from?

[B.M. Lazarev] For us jurists these involve primarily problems of federation, autonomy, language, national minorities, and all-union and republic citizenship. In my opinion we also need to talk about national and interethnic relations. Some ethnic groups are territorially separated. Consider the Buryats, for example, who have two autonomous formations and, in addition, live outside their borders. Here we confront an example of purely ethnic relations. It's the same story with the Germans of the Volga region, who have been scattered in various parts of the country since they were evicted and their autonomy liquidated.

The rising national self-awareness which we are now observing is a positive phenomenon. People everywhere have their own culture, their own intelligentsia. But just step over the line, and what is national becomes nationalism. Arrogance about one's own culture, and scorn for the cultures of other ethnic groups, come into play. Forecasts of the relatively rapid disappearance of ethnic groups have not come true. It is clear that they will exist for a very long time, an unforeseeable historical period. And as long as there are ethnic groups, there will be national phenomena. An ethnic group is a storehouse of culture, and exchange occurs between peoples even on the level of everyday customs. We sometimes fail to distinguish between customs—there are reactionary ones and there are completely normal ones. Hence, rising self-awareness is the **first factor** characterizing the present state of ethnic relations.

The second factor is the legacy of past times. Peoples did not always live in harmony. And this is handed down from generation to generation in culture and national psychology, leading to strife with other people even when there are no conflicts between them. There is also the recent past. Certain peoples were subjected to unjust persecution during the years of the Cult. Injuries are

alive and run deep. In addition, very frequently it is not easy to restore justice. On certain lands that were "liberated" from the native inhabitants, other people have settled, and on some lands, health resorts have been built, for example the Crimean coast. For this reason, there are objective difficulties in rectifying historical injustice.

When dealing with socioeconomic problems we have often forgotten that they can and do have an ethnic angle. This has resulted from excessive centralization of economic processes, of the economic mechanism. We have underestimated horizontal relations—direct relations between republics.

Urgent problems have been exploited by nationalistically inclined people. Whenever we fail to deal with problems, such people attempt to resolve them for us and seize the initiative.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] There are not many people left who do not understand the necessity of genuine, radical perestroika in interethnic relations. The distortions which afflicted our whole political system in the past also affected the national-state structure. I would define five categories of the causes of such distortions: first, direct deviation from Leninist principles of nationality policies and the federative structure; second, the administrative-command system of governance that developed in the federation; third, excessive centralization of social and cultural construction; fourth, an ossified bureaucratic hierarchy that is unresponsive to the needs of ethnic groups; fifth, finally, weak juridical guarantees of the rights of the union republics, the autonomies, and the non-native nationalities, forced transition from the federative state to the unitary state.

Having examined the causes, we ought to point out the means of resolving the problems. First of all, we must secure more fully the voluntary nature of the Union.

The discussion turned to another theme, which can be defined approximately as: On the path to a multi-national federative state of law.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] Federalism can no longer be perceived as a transitional form on the path toward unitarism [unitarism]. It is important to overcome the attitude of party, soviet, and economic bodies toward federalism as a temporary phenomenon. In the CPSU Central Committee decree devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR there was an important passage to the effect that a Union of republics is necessary over the entire period of the transition from socialist statehood to communist social self-government. As long as there are ethnic groups there is no reasonable alternative to federation. We must become a federative state of law. This means that we need to extend the boundaries of relations among union

republics, autonomous formations, and "separated" ethnic groups, we need to set up additional political-judicial guarantees of the sovereign rights of the various national-state formations.

[B.M. Lazarev] Indeed we must strengthen the unity of the Union and fight against excessive centralization, against excessive "bending" of federalism toward unitarism.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] A heated debate is currently underway concerning the issue of the Treaty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. People in the Baltic republics are coming out in favor of renegotiating this treaty. Also in need of review is the Declaration of the Union—in order to answer the question of why in fact we are joining together. It is necessary to interest the republics in the Union. Let us take another look at all the pluses and minuses of our state structure. Then we can precisely delineate the jurisdiction of the Union and the republics and get rid of the administrative-command system. We can no longer avoid dealing with this issue.

[B.M. Lazarev] When the republics concluded the treaty they came to the overall agreement that the Union, as represented by its general organs, would itself define its jurisdiction. The all-union organs consist of people representing the republics. But a distancing between the all-union organs and the republics has occurred here. New republics may join the Union, but on the basis of its laws. For this reason, concluding a new Treaty of the Union would constitute a violation of the principle of the first treaty. Why can't we gain the same package of rights by means of changes in the Constitution?

Estonia has long since registered the land of the republic as its own property. And the Ukraine says that the land belongs to the republic and to the Union. Naturally, the republic leaves the Union with a land share [zemelnyy pay]. As you can see, even this problem is difficult to settle. What we need, then, is not to renegotiate the treaty but to change the declaration. It would be worthwhile to stipulate in the Fundamental Law that the Union is to decide only those questions which are assigned to its jurisdiction by laws. Other questions should be the prerogative of the republics. At present, however, in order to enlarge its own powers inordinately the Center makes use of Point 12, Article 73 of the Constitution which reads: "In addition to the above, the Union shall decide other questions of all-union importance." This point needs to be repealed.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] In the 1924 Constitution, as is well known, actions by the USSR people's commissariats (there were only 10 of them then) could be halted by a republic's top authorities if these actions were contrary to the republic's laws. The republic's commissariats practically never duplicated the Central ones. The republics had broad independence in regard to using their

share of the all-union budget, and they decided questions of citizenship. In this connection, the question arises as to the sovereign rights of the union republics and how to protect them.

[A. Kh. Saidov] In fact, not a single legislative act provides juridical guarantees protecting the sovereign rights of the union republics today. It would probably be a good idea to have the Fundamental Law include a section "On the Sovereign Rights of the Union Republics," as the 1924 Constitution did.

[B.M. Lazarev] In order to put up effective resistance against the dictatorship of the all-union ministries and departments, the Councils of Ministers of the republics must be given the opportunity to protest any actions of these ministries and departments which are in conflict with the republic's laws. Perhaps the republic Supreme Soviets should be given the right to appeal decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet. The jurisdiction of the USSR should only include indivisible systems such as the defense industry, the railroads, power and energy, ship building, and the aircraft industry. Issues concerning ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy as well as the automotive industry can be subject to debate. In short, economists and jurists will have to determine which sectors are not subject to separation and turn all other sectors—in particular, trade and agriculture—over to the jurisdiction of the republics. It is enough for the Union to have just the basic indicators in regard to these sectors in order to keep track of the equilibrium in the country's economic situation.

The same picture can be observed in regard to laws. In addition to legislation enacted by the Union and autonomous republics there are general, indivisible laws. It makes sense, for example, to have a single law in effect over the entire country concerning military obligations, a single law regulating the basic principles of property relations.

[A. Kh. Saidov] If we intend to form a socialist state based on law, then relations between the USSR and the union republics must be structured on principles of law. Today, unfortunately, we lack a precise legal mechanism for resolving conflicts between all-union and republic legislation.

[B.M. Lazarev] In delimiting jurisdictions, it seems to me, we must make more extensive use of the presumption of the republic's jurisdiction. Namely, the Union should be invested with those rights which are precisely stipulated in the USSR Constitution; all else falls under the jurisdiction of the republics. A similar method is applied in the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR concerning administrative infractions: it gives a list of rules the violation of which calls for responsibility to be established by the Union; for the violation of any other rules, the republic itself is empowered to call for administrative responsibility.

[A. Kh. Saidov] In delimiting the jurisdiction of the USSR and the Union republics, I would formulate the following principle: "The republic shall have the right to do everything that does not fall under the jurisdiction of the USSR." Moreover, it is necessary to draw up an exhaustive list of the rights and powers of the Union and its organs, on the one hand, and those of the republic and its organs, on the other, as well as a range of issues to be examined and resolved jointly by both sides. Issues which are not assigned to one of the three above categories are to be turned over to the jurisdiction of the union republics. This will make it possible to achieve greater decentralization and harmonization of the relations between the Union and the union republics.

What is a state language? This question was also a topic of discussion.

[A. Kh. Saidov] Never before in the history of the Soviet state has the problem of national languages in the republics been such a burning one, discussed so broadly and argumentatively as today. Uzbekistan is no exception in this regard. It is entirely natural under present conditions to strive to meet developing public opinion halfway, to revive the strength and expressiveness of the Uzbek language and make it into a state language, into a means of everyday communication among people of various nationalities living in the republic.

But what is a state language? It is the main language of a state, used in legislation and official business, the administration of justice, schooling and so on. It is the language in which state authority talks with its citizens.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] The issue of the status of languages has come to be especially acute today. It is not a new problem. The language of the indigenous nationality was first proclaimed the state language in Georgia in 1921. The same thing was done in Armenia in 1937. Finally, twenty years later, it was done in Azerbaijan. In other words, a state language had already been proclaimed in three republics prior to the adoption of the present Constitution.

[A. Kh. Saidov] Originally the article about the state language in the Constitution of Georgia was placed in the symbols section—alongside the state seal and the flag. In the present Constitution it is included in the section which discusses the state structure. From the juridical point of view, in other words, the idea of a state language in Georgia is now reflected in a milder form.

Articles about the state language in the constitutions of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan consist of three parts: ensuring the use of the state language, equal rights and free use of other languages, and no privileges or restrictions on the use of languages.

Now the Baltic republics have passed special laws on language. Similar bills have been published in Moldavia and Tajikistan. We are also preparing a draft Law on

Languages. Acknowledging that the language of the nationality which gives its name to the republic is the state language, in my opinion, is an indicator of republic sovereignty.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] Undoubtedly, laws on languages will be adopted in all the union republics. People speaking a different language think that the law will force them to learn a foreign language. In fact, one must be prepared for this. It is essential to recognize that the struggle for the broad use of one's own language is a legitimate one. It is essential to give broad scope in your own republic to the Uzbek language and not hinder it—keeping in mind that, through the will of fate, the Russian language plays two roles: the language of the Russian people and the language of interethnic communication.

[B.M. Lazarev] It is not right to order people to study a foreign language at any cost. I believe that the cultivated man ought to know at least three languages—his own, Russian, and a foreign one. I am not in favor of coercion, however; I favor the creation of conditions for the study of languages. It is essential that all languages be given equal rights of development, without infringing on human rights. In the United States there are Chinese districts, Japanese districts, where the people speak in their own language. On the job, naturally, they cannot get by without English. One wonders whether it is always necessary to resolve such problems by legal prescriptions.

National minorities, their rights and juridical status—this is one of the most interesting and least studied problems in the legal system of our state. Naturally, the participants in the roundtable had to deal with it.

[M.V. Puchkova] Before resolving something by means of legal guarantees for national minorities, it is necessary to work out a differentiated approach. In our country, the national minorities are divided into several groups. In particular, there are the nonindigenous nationalities of the republics. This group includes 50 million persons. The total of all national minorities numbers over 55 million. A second group includes national minorities who do not have territorial formations in the USSR. For a third group, the USSR is their historical homeland, yet they do not have autonomous formations (these include the Veps, the Gagauzes, and many nationalities in the Far North). A fourth group is made up of representatives of ethnic groups and nationalities which were independent prior to the 1926 census but were later registered as representatives of other peoples (for example, the Livonians who "became" Latvians). It is necessary to take account of the characteristics of each group, traits which relate to their national-cultural development.

But there are general problems as well. Neither the USSR Constitution nor the laws of the union republics include special articles about the rights and guarantees of the national minorities. No one was concerned with this problem in the 1940s and 1950s. At present, jurists are

debating as to whether it is sufficient to include special articles concerning the rights of the national minorities in the existing laws concerning the rights of citizens, or is it necessary to adopt a separate normative act. I believe it is necessary to have a separate, integrated act which lays down the fundamental principles of the rights of the national minorities. Laws of this type should first be adopted on the all-union level, after which, on its basis, the national and territorial formations can pass their own laws.

[A. Kh. Sardov] "The problem of protecting the rights of the national minorities," V.I. Lenin wrote, "can be resolved only by publishing a statewide Law in a consistently democratic state which does not deviate from the principle of equal rights." In foreign countries there are special legislative acts concerning the legal status of national minorities. Consider, for example, the Constitutional law concerning the status of nationalities in Czechoslovakia and the Austrian Law on National Minorities. In formulating such laws in this country we need to take account of all foreign legal experience in this field.

[M.V. Puchkova] It is extremely important to delineate the functions of the Union and the republics in the sphere of legislation concerning the national minorities. On the Union level it is only possible to deal with issues requiring joint settlement: the principles of the legal status of citizens, the main conditions of the formation of autonomous entities. Present laws in force concerning autonomous oblasts and okrugs are as alike as peas in a pod. They lack the human factor; they do not take account of the various regions' specific characteristics. In essence they are laws concerning the powers of the organs of administration within the territories of these formations.

A law ought to give concrete form to the constitutional norms and rights of citizens: the right to education, the development of culture, information, protection of the habitat, and the development of national crafts. Otherwise, things can get absurd. Hereditary hunters are forbidden to hunt under the pretext that they are not members of the All-Union Hunters' Society. In order to get permission for a motor boat, representatives of the peoples of the Far North have to apply to Moscow.

Existing benefits for national minorities sometimes do not fulfill their purpose. Thus, the benefit providing for keeping children in boarding facilities has resulted in their being separated from their national culture, traditions, and crafts, which may constitute the only means of existence of such nationalities.

Broad discussion is underway on the issue of new national-territorial formations. National and community soviets, national rayons did exist in the 1920s.

[A. Kh. Saidov] National rayons and village soviets were quite widespread as forms of national-administrative units. In the late 1920s and early 1930s there were more than 5000 of them in various parts of the USSR; in Uzbekistan there was the Tajik Okrug in Khodzhen and over 600 village soviets.

[M.V. Puchkova] Who should be given the right today to create such units? Primarily, perhaps, those peoples who do not have an autonomous formation within the country. Although we cannot categorically end it there.

Considerable dispute revolves around the legal status of the national-cultural centers. Should they be given the status of a social organization, a state institution, or combine both forms? I am for the third option. At first, such centers could be created in affiliation with the executive committees of the local soviets. Then the executive committee would be obliged to be responsible for their material-technical needs. We have yet to work out a law concerning the voluntary social organizations. It is probably necessary to grant such organizations, national-cultural centers, the right to have a credentialed representative in the local organs of authority. There is also need for clarity in regard to granting such centers the right to develop international connections and take part in international cultural exchanges through the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship With Foreign Countries.

Toward the end, the interlocutors expressed their ideas on one other rather burning issue—citizenship.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] I am convinced we cannot avoid discussing the Law on Citizenship. This question also needs to be explored thoroughly.

[A. Kh. Saidov] The question of citizenship needs to be decided on the constitutional level. Under present legislation, the union republics only have the right to grant citizenship; the question of withdrawing citizenship falls under the jurisdiction of the USSR. In my opinion, these rights should later be turned over to the union republics so that they can decide questions of citizenship.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] Neither the USSR Constitution nor the Law on Citizenship puts up any obstacles to the adoption of republic laws on citizenship. Article 2 of the USSR Law on Citizenship grants that possibility to the republics.

[A. Kh. Saidov] That is true, but there are certain unclear matters concerning which questions of citizenship may be regulated by the laws of the union republics. These questions are not named in the Law on Citizenship.

[I. Sh. Muksinov] I emphasize once more, nevertheless, that it is not against the Constitution for a union republic to pass its own Law on Citizenship. Not just because the presence of citizenship is a most important feature of a

sovereign state either. The point is that allowing a republic law to define who is a citizen of that republic is not in conflict with all-union legislation on citizenship.

[B.M. Lazarev] But now there have been attempts to get rid of difficulties in nationality policies by administrative means. In particular, to restrict migration. I have seen drafts of laws on citizenship which refuse it to people who have lived within a given territory for less than ten years or people who do not know the language of the local nationality. We ought not to replace one administrative system with another.

[A. Kh. Saidov] Truly, there are problems here; there is a certain apprehension. By passing such laws, in my opinion, the republics might establish certain qualifications [tsenzy] for their citizens, relating, for example, to knowledge of the national language, permanent residence, and such like. But this would inevitably result in restricting certain of the rights of noncitizens of the republic. It would then come into conflict with the USSR Constitution, which proclaims equal rights for all citizens of the country.

Therefore, even thing depends on the actual content of the laws on citizenship that are passed by the republics, not the mere adoption of them. It is essential that such a law establish equal citizenship for all inhabitants of the republic.

The interlocutors' time was limited. But even in a vastly longer discussion it would have been impossible to cover the range of problems involved in the nationality question. One thing is clear: without hegemony of the law, the supremacy of law, without improvement of the juridical protection of the rights of citizens and ethnic groups, this question can never be resolved.

From the editors:

We think that the problems dealt with by the participants in this roundtable will be interesting to our readers. We invite you to share your own thoughts on the nationality question in the pages of this newspaper.

Status of Uighur Minority in Uzbekistan Outlined
18300637 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
6 May 89 p 3

[Article by Kh. Khudayberdiyev, Honored Culture Worker, Uzbek SSR: "The Soviet Uighurs: Equals Among Equals"]

[Text] I am a citizen of Uzbekistan. What I have become and what I have achieved in my life I owe primarily to my multi-national republic, where my kinsmen—the Uighurs—live and work among many dozens of ethnic groups and nationalities.

What I want to tell you about today is my people: ancient and unique, long-suffering and valiant, its difficult fate and problems today.

The majority of the Uighur people (7 million) live in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. This land, which bore the name of Eastern Turkestan from ancient times, is the homeland of the Uighurs. The people of this nationality had their own culture and written literature. Later, their history came to be closely interlinked with that of the Uzbek and Kazakh peoples. The Uighurs who now live in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenia are basically descendants of immigrants from China. Bad times drove them from regions of the former Turkestan. The next to last mass migration of Uighurs (50,000) took place in the early 1880s.

Until the October Revolution, the Uighurs were virtually a people without a name. My people owe the return of our ancient name to Soviet rule. This took place in early June 1921 in Tashkent: at a kurultay [Turkic peoples' assembly] it was decided to reinstate the unified ancient name of the people. Then another important event took place—the founding of the first Soviet Uighur newspaper, KAMBAGALLAR AVAZI ("Voice of the Poor"). It signaled the birth of Uighur Soviet culture and literature.

The 1930s were a period in which the culture and literature of the Soviet Uighurs flourished. But it was all too short, unfortunately. The works of Soviet Uighur writers and poets were being published in their native language in Tashkent at that time. They included the first Uighur novel, by Mumin Khamrayev, stories, poems, the first collections of the founders of Soviet Uighur literature such as Umar Mukhammadi, Nur Israilov, Gulistan, Izim Iskanderov, and others. Uzbekistan's Uchpedgiz Publishing House published textbooks in the Uighur language for primary and secondary Uighur schools. These textbooks even made it to Xinjiang. Andizhan became a second center of Uighur culture. A Uighur music and drama theater and a teachers' technicum were opened there in the 1930s.

Alma-Ata was another center of Uighur national culture. The national music and drama theater that was organized there in the 1930s and has survived to this day, became a center of Uighur theater arts and national dramaturgy. Uighur-language books and newspapers were published in Alma-Ata.

Young people were attracted to learning. Whole groups of them went to Tashkent, Leningrad, Moscow, and Alma-Ata to study. Numerous Uighur communists and non-party members worked in the party and governmental organs, social organizations, and cultural institutions of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and other cities.

Suddenly, as if hit by a frightful, devastating storm, everything that had been created during the brief period of Soviet rule in the sphere of Uighur national culture,

the people's intellectual life, was destroyed, annihilated. Whence came this disaster upon my kinsmen, the whole country and its peoples? Today, everyone knows the answer to that question.

In 1937, I, a twenty-year-old college student, was summoned to the Central Committee of the Uzbek Komsomol.

"Members of the Uighur intelligentsia have turned out to be enemies of the people," came the stunning words. "We have determined that you worked on the Uighur newspaper in Alma-Ata. We have decided to send you, as a trusted Komsomol member, to the Uzbek Uchpedgiz. You will be working on the publication of textbooks for Uighur schools."

"But I don't have the education to cope with that kind of work; I just enrolled in the Tashkent Pedagogical Institute. And I have no experience," I objected.

"Never mind, you will learn...."

That's how I became an editor of language and literature textbooks and, not long after, the head of the department of Uighur textbooks.

Much water has gone by since that time. But the warm atmosphere in that friendly collective which was headed by Dzhumaniyaz Sharipov (who later became a well known Uzbek writer and scientist) still evokes in my heart a feeling of sincere gratitude. Our Uzbek comrades in Uchpedgiz were always helping us and shared their experience. I cherish the names of my older comrades A.I. Urazayev, A. Valiyev, T.Z. Zakhidov, L. Muradov, Aybek, Ibragimov, Degtyar, Kh. Suleymanova, my immediate mentor A. Khudaykulov, and many others. Their advice and help played a major role in preparations for textbook publication.

My work in Uchpedgiz did not last long. Soon, Uighur writers, linguists, journalists, and party and soviet workers were being arrested. The storm of repressions did not bypass office workers, ordinary Uighur citizens, including many of my friends who were students in the VUZes, the Rabfaks [workers' faculties], and the technicums of Tashkent. All kinds of labels were plastered on them: "agents of China," "nationalists," and "pan-Turkists"—in short, "enemies of the people." Newspapers in the Uighur language that had been published in Tashkent and Alma-Ata were abolished. Publishing houses which printed literary and social-political literature were closed down. The doors of Uighur schools were closed. In connection with this, the Uighur Department of Uchpedgiz, which I was in charge of at the time, was also "buried." That took place in 1939.

"Of course we cannot allow even the smallest people to disappear, to lose its language; we cannot allow nihilism in regard to the culture, traditions, and history of either

the large or the small nations," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with science and cultural leaders on 6 January 1989.

Indeed, my people were headed against their will toward disappearance as a nation.

During the first years of Soviet rule, 600,000 Uighurs lived within the boundaries of Turkestan Oblast alone. By the mid- 1960s, according to statistical data, only a little over 100,000 Uighurs were living in the USSR. After several thousand Uighurs migrated to the USSR from China, they numbered 210,000 (1979). What happened to the remaining 390,000 Uighurs living in the USSR during the first years of Soviet rule? By the logic of things, shouldn't the Uighurs have had a natural population increase, like other peoples? Hence, the Uighur population should have been several times larger. What was the matter? There were several causes.

As a result of gross violations of Lenin's ideas on collectivization, a substantial portion of the Uighurs, because of famine and fearing for their lives, fled to neighboring Xinjiang. Secondly, as was mentioned above, many sons of the Uighur people were crushed between the millstones of the repressions of the 1930s. But the main reason, probably, was that the mass of Uighurs, fearing for their fate and the future of their children, began to change their nationality affiliation. Thus, many became Uzbeks.

More than 300,000 Uighurs lived within the borders of today's Uzbekistan in the early 1920s. According to the 1959 census, only a little over 19,000 persons listed themselves as Uighurs in the republic. The 1979 census brought this figure only up to 25,000. And, incidentally, that included many thousands of immigrants from Xinjiang who came in the 1960s.

As we see, the Uighurs in the USSR, especially in our republic, wound up among the small nations which the Stalin era sentenced to gradual disappearance as a nation. And even among those who dared to remain, as the people put it, "Uighurs by law" (in their passport), the Uighur language is barely alive. The bulk of the Uighur people have begun to forget, or have completely forgotten, the language of their ancestors.

It must be said, with deep regret, that both Tashkent and Andizhan, which were once centers of Uighur Soviet culture, have almost completely lost this noble internationalist role they once played.

Such is the bitter truth about my small nation. This by no means implies, however, that our country's and our republic's overall progress has not affected the Uighur people. Uighurs have lived in the fraternal family of Soviet nations, sharing joys and sorrows with everyone.

Today's changes in the life of the Soviet people also give the Uighurs reason to hope that their national aspirations, which were grossly violated in past times, will be satisfied.

The process of perestroika has begun to yield its first fruits. Recently, at the initiative of the Andizhan comrades, Pakhataabad Rayon Radio began to broadcast in the Uighur language. So far, it's only ten minutes twice a month, and the amateur announcers still have a little trouble with Uighur, but it's a start. Formerly, the Uighur language was never heard on the radio in Andizhan Oblast, despite the fact that many Uighurs lived there. And here's another bit of pleasant news: the Pakhtaabad Rayon newspaper devoted one whole issue to the life and problems of the Uighurs.

I should also like to comment on the interest shown by the republic press and organs of culture in the problems of Uighur national culture. The newspapers have begun to focus more attention on the life of the Uighurs. At the initiative of the republic's Ministry of Culture and the Theater Workers' Union, a theater concert collective has been organized in Tashkent and, together with the existing Uighur ensemble, may form the basis for a Uighur music and drama theater. This would rectify one more injustice stemming from the long-ago liquidation of the republic music and drama theater in Andizhan.

Recently in PRAVDA VOSTOKA there was an article by A. Babakhanov, director of the Tashkent Department of Raduga Publishing House. He suggested that this department be converted into an independent publishing house, Shark, and spoke of the possibility of publishing literature in several languages of the peoples of the republic, including Uighur. We would welcome such a decision.

The ice has now been broken, it would seem. The republic has made a good start in the process of perestroika and the sphere of nationality policies. We are happy for our brothers—the Crimean Tatars, the Koreans and the Jews—who have opened their own cultural centers with the help of the republic's party and governmental organs. The time has come to restore to Tashkent its former importance as a center of ancient and modern Uighur culture. There will be no special problem with national cadres, because many hundreds of thousands of Uighurs have received a higher education in Uzbekistan.

An initiative group has been formed in Tashkent to revive the national culture of the Uighur nation. In this connection, we hope that facilities will be allocated in Tashkent to accommodate a Uighur republic cultural center, which the initiative group will organize.

It is necessary to revive the small nationalities, restore their national pride and faith in justice, and secure their happy future.

Turkmen Academy of Sciences on Developing Bilingualism Program
18300668 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 4 May 89 p 3

[Interview with B. Charyyrov, director of the Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli and corresponding member of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences, by Ye. Prikhodko, Turkmeninform correspondent: "The Connecting Force of the Word. In the Republic the Integrated Program "Yazyk" [Language] Is Being Developed"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The goal of the program is the development of the foundations of Turkmen-Russian and Russian-Turkmen bilingualism and the creation of favorable conditions for the further development and perfection of the languages of all nations and nationalities that inhabit Turkmenistan. And there are more than 100 in the republic. The questions of the correspondent of the Turkmen Information Agency are answered by B. Charyyrov, director of the Institute of Language and Literature imeni Makhtumkuli of the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan and corresponding member of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences.

[Correspondent] Byashim Charyyrovich! The program "Yazyk" is the child of perestroika, a fundamentally new approach to the solution of the nationality question. However, it would be useful to begin our discussion with how the years of stagnation were reflected in the state of language and language culture in such a multi-national republic as ours.

[Charyyrov] Enormous damage was inflicted by the theory of the merging of nations and the disappearance of languages that still existed not so long ago. The idea, whose absurdity is obvious, was hypocritically presented in the light of communist ideals. In many respects, it separated from the roots, it leveled the distinctiveness of every people. The short-sighted, and at times even simply disdainful attitude to the development of the national languages is one of the reasons for the origin of the hot-beds of the inter-nationality tension in the country. Fortunately, in Turkmenistan, in my view, such alarming tendencies do not exist. And nevertheless it is impossible to embellish the situation in the sphere of language culture and the development of the entire historically-developed diversity of languages.

According to the statistics, only 25 percent of the Turkmen (they constitute 64.8 percent of the population of the republic) know the Russian language. This is one of the lowest indicators in the country. It is well known how this is reflected in the training of cadres and the service of young people in the ranks of the Soviet Army. Of the persons of other nationalities (including Russians, who constitute 12.6 percent of the population), only 2 percent know the Turkmen language. And, what is especially deplorable, 15,000 Turkmen do not know their native language. The roots of this phenomenon lie in the

socio-political atmosphere of those years, in the soil of which both nationality nihilism and non-respect for the language of another people began to spring up.

It is completely logical to turn, first of all, to the system of public education. And here we see unequitable conditions instruction. For example, by a special decree the teachers of the Russian language in the national schools had their salaries raised, and for convenience the studies are conducted in small groups of students. The teaching of the Turkmen language in Russian schools was not affected by these innovations. Moreover, the lessons are at times conducted by people holding more than one office—teachers of labor, biology, mathematics. . . . There is also no examination in the Turkmen language in the school. As a consequence, the attitude to this subject is not serious. Unfortunately, up to now no scientific research work on questions of the methodology of teaching the Turkmen language as a non-native language has been conducted or is being conducted in the republic.

Things are unfavorable with the study of languages in the institutions of higher and secondary specialized institutions. Recently my colleague, Professor Dzh. Allakov, analyzed the state of affairs here in a detailed article. For example, in the pedagogical institute of the arts the Turkmen language is not studied at all. Is this conceivable in the training of the intelligentsia of the republic? And is it really normal that a graduate of a medical institute, because of the language barrier, cannot communicate with a patient?

The narrowing of the sphere of functionality—at times unjustified—during the years of stagnation lowered the authority of the Turkmen language. Labels and ridiculous accusations were hung on the scholars who voted for raising its prestige. Incidentally, one of these scholars is O. Nazarov, a candidate of philology. At present he is one of the active developers of the program "Yazyk", the head of the department of bilingualism and multilingualism of our institute.

During the years of stagnation, no or insufficient attention was paid to the languages of the Uzbeks and Kazakhs, the Kurds and Baluchi, the Germans and Koreans. . . . This, of course, is inadmissible, and the program "Yazyk" takes this into account. Today it is impossible not to understand: The harmonious and equitable development of national languages along with the Russian language is a necessity for our country that is confirmed by the whole experience of intercourse.

[Correspondent] How is the project of the integrated program "Yazyk" being prepared, what are its fundamental ideas?

[Charyyrov] The work on the program has combined the efforts of a whole series of scientific institutions and organizations of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants & the Book Trade, the State

Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the military commissariat of the republic, the republic Znaniye Society, whose activity in one way or another is connected with propaganda and the study and teaching of languages. After discussion by the Presidium of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences, specialists and officials of the organs of public education expressed their ideas and suggestions. Recently the question of the preparation of the program was examined in the Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro. The work is continuing with regard to the observations made. We hope that the project will be submitted to nationwide discussion.

The project will be based on sociological-linguistic data on the types of bilingualism and multilingualism in the republic, the investigation of the most urgent problems of the functional and intra-structural interaction of languages, the study and generalization of the experience of practical workers and the best teachers.

The program will contain a list of measures for each one of the multitude of aspects of the problem. I will dwell on some directions. These are, first of all, the development of the theoretical basis for the study of the Russian and Turkmen languages. It includes the cycle of investigations of the questions of grammar, orthography, word formation, stylistics, the writing of geographical names, etc. A large part is devoted to the creation of educational programs, textbooks, and various types of educational supplies, educational-methodological literature, didactic materials, and reference works. More than 30 dictionaries alone will be published before the year 2000.

Of special significance is the extensive plan for the training and improvement of the qualifications of the pedagogical cadres and the organization of language teaching to the population. It is being planned that this work will begin with kindergartens and will be continued in mixed schools, schools with intensified study of some language, boarding schools with the intensified study of the Russian language, and multinational labor associations of pupils and students. The creation of a republic center for the coordination of translation activity is being planned. Television and radio courses for the study of different languages will be organized, as well as yearly courses in the divisions of the Znaniye Society. Also possible are such forms as Sunday schools for the study of the languages of small peoples, their history, culture and folklore.

I repeat, these are only some points of the program.

[Correspondent] Byashim Charyyrovich, tell us, please, about the priority directions of the work and the most topical subjects of the research of linguists.

[Charyyrov] The implementation of the program "Yazyk", as I have already said, is inconceivable without dictionaries and phrase-books. The publication of a large Russian-Turkmen dictionary, prepared by our scholars and published in Moscow in an edition of 65,000 copies,

has become a significant event. Its two volumes include 77,000 words. A similar publication of a Turkmen-Russian dictionary is in preparation. A 2-volume explanatory dictionary of the Turkmen language is in the process of being edited. The multitude of varieties and the completeness of dictionaries, this, to a certain degree, is an indicator of the degree of study of a language and the language culture of a people. Recently dictionaries of abbreviations and geographical names were published in our republic. But the shortage of such reference literature is still very great. This is why, in the plan of subjects for the work of the institute, the work on a whole series of dictionaries occupies one of the priority places: A phraseological dictionary, a terminological dictionary for various branches of science and production, a dialectological dictionary, a dictionary of difficulties of the Turkmen language, and a dictionary of the Old Turkmen language of the 12th-16th centuries. The collection "Kultura rechi" [The Culture of Speech], which, along with other materials, includes observations on the language of the periodical press, radio and television announcers, addresses itself to a wide range of readers. Another investigation, which is called "Yazyk gazety" [The Language of the Newspaper], I hope, will call forth the professional interests of journalists, who, unfortunately, sometimes circulate clichés, and overload publications with an abundance of foreign terms and "fashionable" words.

The all-union coordinating work "Tipologiya dvuyazychiya i mnogoyazychiya v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiya" [Typology of Bilingualism and Multilingualism in the USSR and the Trends of Their Development]. At present, we are working on the second book of this 6-volume work. The titles of other monographs and investigations speak for themselves. "Kultura yazyka—dostoyaniye sotsialisticheskoy kultury" [The Culture of Language—An Achievement of Socialist Culture]; "Funksionirovaniye i vzaimodeystviye russkogo i turkmenskogo yazykov v sfere narodnogo obrazovaniya" [The Functioning and Interaction of the Russian and Turkmen Languages in the Sphere of Education]; and "Slovoobrazovaniye v turkmenskom yazyke na baze russko-internatsionalnoy leksiki" [Word Formation in the Turkmen Language on the Basis of Russian and International Vocabulary]. This, it can be said, are vitally important subjects.

[Correspondent] To understand language richness is impossible without giving access to the literary heritage of a people. You see, this is the spring of the pure word that makes its way through the centuries.

[Charyyrov] The manuscript archive of our institute is, indeed, a treasure: More than 30,000 folios, books, and manuscripts on all branches of knowledge, original works, and lists of the creations of the classics. Unfortunately, in their study there are many more problems than successes. First of all, this is a cadre problem. In other republics, in such archives, there are 120-130 highly-qualified specialists who work there. Our staff numbers

10 people, including the cleaning woman. The point is that in Turkmenistan one can count on the fingers of one hand the experts on ancient Arabic and Persian writing. We have to reap the fruits of the shortsightedness thanks to which the corresponding department in the philological faculty of Turkmen State University imeni M. Gorki was liquidated. All right, though now they have remembered and a group has again been recruited for the study of the Persian language. The problem must be solved more broadly: To announce a special purpose recruitment for study in the institute for Oriental studies in Moscow. For the time being, the very painstaking work is going slowly. Almost according to Mayakovsky: "By the gram—output, by the year—troubles." Moreover, the alarm over the fate of the manuscripts themselves is increasingly more distinct. The whole archive is located in unpractical premises, where the necessary microclimate does not exist. In the winter, our book treasure becomes damp, in the summer it deteriorates from overheating. From time and the lack of attention, the manuscripts, like people, suffer and die. For the present, we do not have experienced restorers of ancient books.

[Correspondent] What else, in your view, is slowing down the development of linguistics?

[Charyyrov] Similar to the notorious principle of the "residual" financing of culture, the analogous principle of the financing of the social sciences has not yet been overcome. In my view, this is a profoundly mistaken inveterate practice. In spite of the fact that now, in the period of restructuring, the scientific and applied significance of our research has immeasurably increased, the appropriations for them have not increased.

It is impossible not to talk about the small capacity of the publishing house "Ylym" (Nauka), because of which the publication of a work, whose topicality, of course, is lost, is frequently delayed or generally transferred to another year. The scientific publishing house does not even have Latin type. And, perhaps, the question of questions—of the rising generation of scientists. A great deal is focused in it: The inadequate level of the VUZ training of specialists, the uncultivated taste for scientific work, and the low wages of scientists. As a result, there is no healthy competition in the enrollment of graduate students, and we are deprived of the possibility of the selection of the most enthusiastic contender with interesting ideas.

[Correspondent] In what, in your view, are the distinctive marks of the revival of the rich international linguistic traditions of our republic?

[Charyyrov] The traditions, really, are remarkable. During the 1920's-1930's, interest in the study of languages was enormous. A large number of circles of national schools sprang up, and many textbooks were published. The textbook for those studying the Turkmen language by A. P. Potseluyevskiy, published in 1929, deserved an especially good reputation. International folklore and linguistic expeditions were organized.

Today these traditions are being revived. A great deal is being directed by the republic Znaniye Society, where courses have been opened for the study of the Turkmen, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Arabic and other languages. At the methodological center of the Soviet Rayon, an Armenian literary language circle has been operating for half a year, whose members propose to create a cultural center "Dostluk—Druzhiba" in Ashkhabad. Baluchi school children will soon receive a primer for their own language. Our recent competitor, S. Mamednurov, the first of the Baluchi candidates in philology, became one of its authors. Incidentally, Baluchi schools also existed in the 1930's in our republic.

As is well known, rayon newspapers in Uzbek and Kazakh—PAKHGAKOR and ZHUMYSSHI began to be published in the period of restructuring. Not long ago, the reception of Uzbek television broadcasts began. There is still the inertia of the old. I think it would be possible to write the names of streets and the signs of state institutions in two languages, to organize the reception of telegrams in the Turkmen language, and in general to introduce bilingualism in the services sphere more actively. The following fact also leads one to reflect: Of the 71 books planned for publication in the publishing house "Ylym" during this year, only 16 are in the Turkmen language, and in the next year—only 7 of 77.

And nevertheless, even though the first, but serious steps in the democratization of the linguistic sphere have been taken. The integrated program "Yazyk" is still another guarantor of the revival of the spiritual riches of the people and the strengthening of friendship and brotherhood.

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